themselves. The dangers they posed to submarines as well as surface ships were all too real, as evidenced by the sinking of the Flier .
The intelligence report Lockwood received indicated that Japanese antisubmarine forces had attacked and sunk a submarine in La Pérouse Strait on October 11, 1943. e Why the Japanese hadnât made an official announcement to that effect was a real mystery, given their penchant for exaggerating reports of attacks on U.S. subs. There was no denying that the submarine in question was the Wahoo . Lockwood mulled over what he knew for sure. The Wahoo had gone in there twice. Other subs had too and had gotten out. Only the Wahoo had been sunk, and apparently not by a mine. If a mine hadnât sunk her, did that mean the Sea of Japan wasnât impregnable after all? Did it mean that the minefields guarding the sea werenât as formidable as Lockwood and Voge had thought? Could they be penetratedâsomehowâwithout incurring the loss of men and ships?
Lockwood realized that UCDWR had unintentionally created the tool that would make it possible to attempt a mission that he believed would keep his submarines in the fight. The war was evolving into a naval air campaign just as the submarine war of attrition against Japanese shipping was slackening for lack of targets. His force was on the brink of going out of business. Lockwoodâs mission would sink the Japanese empire once and for all, and in the bargain avenge Morton and the Wahoo .
A big-picture man, Lockwood envisioned a mission that had three main objectives: One, penetrate the minefields guarding the Sea of Japan to prove that submarines could do it. Two, show the Japanese that they were virtually isolated and defenseless against submarine incursions. Three, cut off the imports of rice, coal, and iron ore from East Asia that Japan needed for survival. Lockwoodâs submarines would accomplish these objectives by sinking every last ship still afloat in the Sea of Japan. Another important goal coming into focus as a result of Americaâs sometimes difficult collaboration with the Russians, though not articulated by Lockwood, was to demonstrate to the leaders of the Soviet Union that the United States Navyâs powerful submarine force would have a role to play in the implementation of Americaâs strategic objectives in the postwar world.
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In early 1944, after several follow-up visits to UCDWRâs labs to see what progress had been made on FM sonar, Lockwood came away convinced that the new device had the potential to become the secret weapon the sub force needed to wipe out the remains of Japanâs merchant marine. He was more determined than ever to get the sonar units into full-scale production and to get one installed in a submarine for trials as soon as possible.
Lockwood outlined for Admiral Nimitz what heâd learned about FM sonar. Impressed by what he heard, Nimitz approved Lockwoodâs request to have the first available sonar unit installed aboard a submarine. His approval also allowed Lockwood to set in motion an almost continuous rotation of civilian scientists and instructors between UCDWR in California and the sub base at Pearl Harbor and, later, at Guam. At both California and Pearl Harbor, the scientists would supervise the installation and repair of FM sonar units in subs, and the training of the submarine personnel who would operate them. This cooperative effort would give the scientists an opportunity to experience the hot, humid, and rugged environment of a submarine, where the sonar equipment would have to operate without malfunctioning. It would also provide an opportunity for the submariners undergoing training to become acquainted with the difficulties inherent in the development and manufacture of extraordinarily complex and temperamental equipment, as well as its operation and maintenance. From the beginning, and despite all the problems imposed by rush
The intelligence report Lockwood received indicated that Japanese antisubmarine forces had attacked and sunk a submarine in La Pérouse Strait on October 11, 1943. e Why the Japanese hadnât made an official announcement to that effect was a real mystery, given their penchant for exaggerating reports of attacks on U.S. subs. There was no denying that the submarine in question was the Wahoo . Lockwood mulled over what he knew for sure. The Wahoo had gone in there twice. Other subs had too and had gotten out. Only the Wahoo had been sunk, and apparently not by a mine. If a mine hadnât sunk her, did that mean the Sea of Japan wasnât impregnable after all? Did it mean that the minefields guarding the sea werenât as formidable as Lockwood and Voge had thought? Could they be penetratedâsomehowâwithout incurring the loss of men and ships?
Lockwood realized that UCDWR had unintentionally created the tool that would make it possible to attempt a mission that he believed would keep his submarines in the fight. The war was evolving into a naval air campaign just as the submarine war of attrition against Japanese shipping was slackening for lack of targets. His force was on the brink of going out of business. Lockwoodâs mission would sink the Japanese empire once and for all, and in the bargain avenge Morton and the Wahoo .
A big-picture man, Lockwood envisioned a mission that had three main objectives: One, penetrate the minefields guarding the Sea of Japan to prove that submarines could do it. Two, show the Japanese that they were virtually isolated and defenseless against submarine incursions. Three, cut off the imports of rice, coal, and iron ore from East Asia that Japan needed for survival. Lockwoodâs submarines would accomplish these objectives by sinking every last ship still afloat in the Sea of Japan. Another important goal coming into focus as a result of Americaâs sometimes difficult collaboration with the Russians, though not articulated by Lockwood, was to demonstrate to the leaders of the Soviet Union that the United States Navyâs powerful submarine force would have a role to play in the implementation of Americaâs strategic objectives in the postwar world.
Â
Â
In early 1944, after several follow-up visits to UCDWRâs labs to see what progress had been made on FM sonar, Lockwood came away convinced that the new device had the potential to become the secret weapon the sub force needed to wipe out the remains of Japanâs merchant marine. He was more determined than ever to get the sonar units into full-scale production and to get one installed in a submarine for trials as soon as possible.
Lockwood outlined for Admiral Nimitz what heâd learned about FM sonar. Impressed by what he heard, Nimitz approved Lockwoodâs request to have the first available sonar unit installed aboard a submarine. His approval also allowed Lockwood to set in motion an almost continuous rotation of civilian scientists and instructors between UCDWR in California and the sub base at Pearl Harbor and, later, at Guam. At both California and Pearl Harbor, the scientists would supervise the installation and repair of FM sonar units in subs, and the training of the submarine personnel who would operate them. This cooperative effort would give the scientists an opportunity to experience the hot, humid, and rugged environment of a submarine, where the sonar equipment would have to operate without malfunctioning. It would also provide an opportunity for the submariners undergoing training to become acquainted with the difficulties inherent in the development and manufacture of extraordinarily complex and temperamental equipment, as well as its operation and maintenance. From the beginning, and despite all the problems imposed by rush
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