heâd heard that the war in Europe might be over by early 1945. And he took as a sure sign that the Navyâs drastic reduction of its submarine building program meant victory in the Pacific wasnât too far off either. It also meant that Lawrence would probably not receive a new-construction submarine of his own to command, which every combat skipper hoped to achieve. Yet as he always did, Lawrence delighted in the bounty of his life instead of dwelling on his misfortunes.
Anyhow [the Bonefish ] has to go back to the yard [on the West Coast] eventually. That wonât be [for] as long or as good [as taking command of a new submarine], but I guess I have no just cause for complaint ... if that should be the worst thing to befall me.
CHAPTER FIVE
The âMagicâ Behind the Mission
I t had been a bitter and bloody fight in the Pacific. American forces had suffered terrible casualties in their island-hopping campaign against the Japanese. Starting in March 1942, the Japanese had completed their capture of Java. In May the last Philippine bastion, Corregidor, fell, and with it the remnants of organized U.S. and Filipino resistance. The Japanese army seemed invincible. Yet their defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 marked a turning point in the war. For Japan, the loss of four aircraft carriers (the U.S. lost one carrier), with their planes and pilots, marked the beginning of the end. Yet even as the Japanese fell back across the Pacific in the face of ever more powerful American advances, Japanese soldiers chose to fight to the death rather than surrender. And though America and her allies had taken the initiative, it was clear that the Pacific war was not going to end suddenly, and that it was going to consume more and more lives on both sides. Worse yet, an invasion of the home islands, a dreaded possibility, would likely require five million soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, and incur perhaps a half million casualties. d Even though facing defeat, the Japanese still had the capacity to inflict heavy losses on an invading army. At risk, too, were the thousands of Allied prisoners of war and civilian detainees. Therefore, any military operation that might speed Japanâs collapse and lessen the need for an invasion would receive serious consideration and likely gain approval from Admirals Nimitz and King. They had already approved a naval blockade of the home islands and air strikes on industrial targets across Japan. But no one knew if they would be effective, or, if they were, how long it would take for their effect to end the war.
Â
Â
Looking back after the war Lockwood realized that the operation heâd envisioned for a submarine raid targeted against Japan had had its genesis during the visit he made to the laboratories of UCDWR at San Diego, California, in April 1943, where heâd had his first glimpse of FM sonar. Given his enormous responsibilities and all the issues relating to submarine combat operations vying for his attention, the idea that FM sonar might provide the means to penetrate the minefields guarding the Sea of Japan had taken a while to germinate. When it did it reignited Lockwoodâs determination to once again make that sea a theater of operation for his subs.
Sometime after the Wahoo âs loss in October 1943, an intelligence report arrived at ComSubPac challenging Lockwoodâs belief that the Wahoo had been sunk by a mine in the Sea of Japan. Lockwood had clung to that idea absent an official announcement by the Japanese that their antisubmarine forces had sunk the Wahoo . To Lockwood the lack of an announcement by the Japanese indicated that, unknown to them, the Wahoo had struck one of their mines. Support for this idea came from submarines operating around Japan, whose skippers reported an increase in the number of floating mines that had broken loose of their moorings and gone adrift, sometimes into traffic lanes used by the Japanese
Anyhow [the Bonefish ] has to go back to the yard [on the West Coast] eventually. That wonât be [for] as long or as good [as taking command of a new submarine], but I guess I have no just cause for complaint ... if that should be the worst thing to befall me.
CHAPTER FIVE
The âMagicâ Behind the Mission
I t had been a bitter and bloody fight in the Pacific. American forces had suffered terrible casualties in their island-hopping campaign against the Japanese. Starting in March 1942, the Japanese had completed their capture of Java. In May the last Philippine bastion, Corregidor, fell, and with it the remnants of organized U.S. and Filipino resistance. The Japanese army seemed invincible. Yet their defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 marked a turning point in the war. For Japan, the loss of four aircraft carriers (the U.S. lost one carrier), with their planes and pilots, marked the beginning of the end. Yet even as the Japanese fell back across the Pacific in the face of ever more powerful American advances, Japanese soldiers chose to fight to the death rather than surrender. And though America and her allies had taken the initiative, it was clear that the Pacific war was not going to end suddenly, and that it was going to consume more and more lives on both sides. Worse yet, an invasion of the home islands, a dreaded possibility, would likely require five million soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, and incur perhaps a half million casualties. d Even though facing defeat, the Japanese still had the capacity to inflict heavy losses on an invading army. At risk, too, were the thousands of Allied prisoners of war and civilian detainees. Therefore, any military operation that might speed Japanâs collapse and lessen the need for an invasion would receive serious consideration and likely gain approval from Admirals Nimitz and King. They had already approved a naval blockade of the home islands and air strikes on industrial targets across Japan. But no one knew if they would be effective, or, if they were, how long it would take for their effect to end the war.
Â
Â
Looking back after the war Lockwood realized that the operation heâd envisioned for a submarine raid targeted against Japan had had its genesis during the visit he made to the laboratories of UCDWR at San Diego, California, in April 1943, where heâd had his first glimpse of FM sonar. Given his enormous responsibilities and all the issues relating to submarine combat operations vying for his attention, the idea that FM sonar might provide the means to penetrate the minefields guarding the Sea of Japan had taken a while to germinate. When it did it reignited Lockwoodâs determination to once again make that sea a theater of operation for his subs.
Sometime after the Wahoo âs loss in October 1943, an intelligence report arrived at ComSubPac challenging Lockwoodâs belief that the Wahoo had been sunk by a mine in the Sea of Japan. Lockwood had clung to that idea absent an official announcement by the Japanese that their antisubmarine forces had sunk the Wahoo . To Lockwood the lack of an announcement by the Japanese indicated that, unknown to them, the Wahoo had struck one of their mines. Support for this idea came from submarines operating around Japan, whose skippers reported an increase in the number of floating mines that had broken loose of their moorings and gone adrift, sometimes into traffic lanes used by the Japanese
Similar Books
