Greece, Rome, and the Bill of Rights by Susan Ford Wiltshire
Authors: Susan Ford Wiltshire
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apart from the human beings who comprised them. 33
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all shared a notion of the
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"pre-social" human being, which assumes that individuals exist prior to the social institutions they invent. Thus the task of political philosophy is to describe the nature of that individuality and then to proceed to an analysis of what the rights and obligations of those individuals would be in their state as citizens. Andrzej Rapaczynski summarizes the place of these three thinkers in the tradition of political thought:
A theory of natural law and natural right ... had a very long standing in political philosophy. But what distinguished the appeal to natural law in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau from the older political theories was their view that nature does not operate with the help of moral or quasi-moral norms: it does not prescribe, allow, or condemn, but forces, inclines, or incapacitates. The question that they, therefore, thought had to be answered before any natural law was used to legitimize a political system was whether the operation of the mechanical laws of nature provided a sufficient ground for inferring a system of normative principles.
34
Hobbes was not a liberal but rather an important critic of liberalism who would later exercise enormous influence on Kant and Marx. A positivist and absolutist, he denied any element of teleology or ultimate direction in politics and transformed normative politics into a purely descriptive political science. In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes denied that human beings are by nature social beings but are instead moved only by selfishness and a desire for power. In the natural state, human society was in a condition of "a war of all against all." The solution was for individuals to give up or "alienate" their autonomy and their judgment to absolute rulers.
Locke would agree with Hobbes that primitive human liberties have to be alienated for political society to be created, but he would add that individuals need not give up their freedom of conscience in the process. For Locke, freedom of conscience is possible even while we obey the
page_75
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magistrates in all our actions, whereas Hobbes eliminates freedom of conscience as well as of action.
35
Rousseau was a severe critic of natural law and the order of civil society proposed by liberals such as Locke. His polemic against the natural rights tradition stems from the radical break he posited between nature and society. For Rousseau, history replaces the natural order as the foundation of human rights. In his Social Contract (1762), Rousseau holds that men by nature are free and equal. The only way to reconcile with civil society their freedom and equality in the natural state is for human beings unanimously to surrender to the general will under collective, impartial laws. These laws, however, are particular to each nation and do not apply to humankind in general.
Rousseau sees productivity, a central Lockean thesis, as degrading to human lives, thus leaving very little room for Locke's ennobling and enriching interaction between nature and society. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rousseau considers individual autonomy in a rigidly formalistic way, as contrasted with Locke's more fluid and nonformalistic version. It was this insistence on freedom of the will from any determination that led to potentially totalitarian implications for Rousseau's fol-lowers such as Marx and Hegel. 36
Montesquieu believed that laws underlay everything human, divine, and natural, and that through empirical investigation these laws could be discerned. The influence of his Spirit of the Laws (1748) was especially felt in the framers' determination to establish a mixed constitution and separation of powers as safeguards of human freedom. He was an Aristotelian in his commitment to moderation in politics, which contributed to his elaboration of a system of checks and balances far more intricate than the one
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all shared a notion of the
page_74
Page 74
"pre-social" human being, which assumes that individuals exist prior to the social institutions they invent. Thus the task of political philosophy is to describe the nature of that individuality and then to proceed to an analysis of what the rights and obligations of those individuals would be in their state as citizens. Andrzej Rapaczynski summarizes the place of these three thinkers in the tradition of political thought:
A theory of natural law and natural right ... had a very long standing in political philosophy. But what distinguished the appeal to natural law in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau from the older political theories was their view that nature does not operate with the help of moral or quasi-moral norms: it does not prescribe, allow, or condemn, but forces, inclines, or incapacitates. The question that they, therefore, thought had to be answered before any natural law was used to legitimize a political system was whether the operation of the mechanical laws of nature provided a sufficient ground for inferring a system of normative principles.
34
Hobbes was not a liberal but rather an important critic of liberalism who would later exercise enormous influence on Kant and Marx. A positivist and absolutist, he denied any element of teleology or ultimate direction in politics and transformed normative politics into a purely descriptive political science. In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes denied that human beings are by nature social beings but are instead moved only by selfishness and a desire for power. In the natural state, human society was in a condition of "a war of all against all." The solution was for individuals to give up or "alienate" their autonomy and their judgment to absolute rulers.
Locke would agree with Hobbes that primitive human liberties have to be alienated for political society to be created, but he would add that individuals need not give up their freedom of conscience in the process. For Locke, freedom of conscience is possible even while we obey the
page_75
Page 75
magistrates in all our actions, whereas Hobbes eliminates freedom of conscience as well as of action.
35
Rousseau was a severe critic of natural law and the order of civil society proposed by liberals such as Locke. His polemic against the natural rights tradition stems from the radical break he posited between nature and society. For Rousseau, history replaces the natural order as the foundation of human rights. In his Social Contract (1762), Rousseau holds that men by nature are free and equal. The only way to reconcile with civil society their freedom and equality in the natural state is for human beings unanimously to surrender to the general will under collective, impartial laws. These laws, however, are particular to each nation and do not apply to humankind in general.
Rousseau sees productivity, a central Lockean thesis, as degrading to human lives, thus leaving very little room for Locke's ennobling and enriching interaction between nature and society. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rousseau considers individual autonomy in a rigidly formalistic way, as contrasted with Locke's more fluid and nonformalistic version. It was this insistence on freedom of the will from any determination that led to potentially totalitarian implications for Rousseau's fol-lowers such as Marx and Hegel. 36
Montesquieu believed that laws underlay everything human, divine, and natural, and that through empirical investigation these laws could be discerned. The influence of his Spirit of the Laws (1748) was especially felt in the framers' determination to establish a mixed constitution and separation of powers as safeguards of human freedom. He was an Aristotelian in his commitment to moderation in politics, which contributed to his elaboration of a system of checks and balances far more intricate than the one
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