Montenegro declared war on Turkey on October 8, 1912, followed by its allies Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece on October 17. Turkey immediately brought the war with Italy to an end.
The Ottoman forces were, to everyone's surprise, quickly and utterly defeated. They were driven from almost all of Turkey-in-Europe. In a month of lightning warfare, the Balkan states had practically brought the Eastern Question to a close. This was a role that the Great Powers had always imagined that they themselves would play. Now they scrambled to make sure that whatever settlement was reached—by others—would not threaten their vital interests. Their task was complicated by a change of personnel: the foreign secretaries of Germany and Austria died, the foreign secretary of Russia resigned, and their replacements did not carry the same weight.
In December 1912 a conference of ambassadors convened in London. Sixty-three sittings ensued. Macedonia was partitioned. Bulgaria felt cheated of its share by Serbia and Greece. A peace treaty was signed May 30, 1913, but did not last. A month later, on the night of June 29–30, Bulgaria turned against its former allies, Serbia and Greece, in a surprise attack ordered byKing Ferdinand I without consulting even his own government. It led to the so-called Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was defeated by Serbia, Greece, Turkey, and Romania.
The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 10, and negotiated by the local states rather than by the Great Powers, brought the First and SecondBalkan Wars to an end. Austria-Hungary was taken by surprise. It had wanted to see Serbia crushed—hoping and believing that Turkey would win the first war and Bulgaria the second—and might well have intervened to dictate different results had there been time. As it was, the Hapsburg Empire feared for its future. The fears centered on victorious Serbia and its sponsor, Russia.
Austrian fears were not unjustified. During the Balkan wars, Russia's new foreign minister,Serge Sazonov, told the Serbian ambassador in St. Petersburg that "we shall shake Austria to the foundations," and that in winning as much as possible in the peace negotiations "we must be content with what we shall receive, regarding it as an installment, for the future belongs to us."
It was Austria-Hungary itself, having annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, that had provoked Russia and Serbia to seek revenge. It was possible that Serbia, which had doubled in size, and its allies Russia and the forces of pan-Slavism would continue their advance. Aehrenthal had upset the Balkan balance of power in 1908 in Austria's favor. Now Hartwig had upset the balance in Russia's favor. In turn, would the Dual Monarchy riposte? Or would Germandom continue to retreat before Slavdom?
CHAPTER 14: THE SLAVIC TIDE
Times had changed. In the nineteenth century, when foreign policy alignments and readjustments tended to focus on ideology, Russia and the Germanic states of Austria and Prussia had been the closest of allies. In 1912 they still shared the same outlook, the same reactionary politics, and the same values. But their solidarity, based on common beliefs, gave way to a life-or-death conflict based on a clash of interests and a power rivalry.
The clash of interests was in the Balkans, where it was believed that Austria, in order to survive, would have to put down all challenges by Slavic peoples. In turn, Austria's survival as a Great Power was a vital German interest. Moreover, the sheer size of Russia, and its startlingly rapid growth in power as it industrialized with French financial backing, turned the czarist empire into Germany's potential rival for supremacy on the Continent. The Teuton versus Slav aspect of that potential contest reflected race hatred. Moreover in seeing Germany's future in terms of penetration and exploitation of the Middle East and Far East, the Kaiser imagined yet another goal that could be achieved only by overcoming the Slavic world.
Inconsistent as he
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