the early 1870s. It claimed to rank as a Great Power and felt the need to win colonies, such as older, more established countries possessed. Italians harbored even more ambitious goals: they dreamed of their ancestors in ancient Rome and hoped to win similar glory. Austria-Hungary's move in the Balkans followed by France's in North Africa jolted the Italians into pursuing such aims.
CHAPTER 13: ITALY GRASPS;
THEN THE BALKANS DO TOO
The territory of Tripolitania, now part ofLibya, was Italy's first target. Under the indolent sway of the Ottoman government, Tripolitania, along with adjoining Cyrenaica, was ruled minimally and defended inadequately. For years,Italian diplomats had been clearing the way for a future takeover. In 1900, France had waived any objections it might have had in return for Italy's similar waiver in regard to France's hoped-for annexation of Morocco.
Later the Italians made similar arrangements with the Austrians in regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina and with the Russians in respect to the Straits of the Dardanelles. To keep Italy as an ally, Germany agreed to the Tripoli venture; Britain concurred in hopes of detaching Italy from that alliance.
So once Austria had moved on Bosnia, and France on Morocco, the Italian press and public urged their leaders to go ahead before it became too late. In a leisurely fashion more Mediterranean than modern, the Italian government then gave the other powers notice of its intention to go to war—some two months in advance.
As a youngItalian diplomat later remembered it, "I . . . expected that the communication itself would create a stir. Nothing of the kind! Nobody took the slightest notice. . . . People thought that we were bluffing."
On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war, accusing Turkey of injuring Italian interests. Italy occupied the Libyan coastline quickly, but then was bogged down in the interior. Fighting continued for about a year. A cease-fire took effect October 15, 1912, followed by a peace that left Italy in possession not only of Libya but also of Rhodes and other Dodecanese islands off the shore of Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Italian war was a signal to Hartwig's Russian-inspired Balkan alliance that their time had come to strike—and to preempt Austria. The pace of conflict was accelerating; the clashes began to overlap. The Italo-Turkish war started before the Second Moroccan Crisis was resolved, and now out of the embers of countless local blood feuds, the First Balkan War caught fire in 1912 before the Italian colonial war was concluded. Indeed, the main reason that the Turkish government accepted Italy's terms for concluding hostilities was its need to focus on southeastern Europe. There was a revolt inAlbania, a border conflict with Montenegro, continuing guerrilla warfare in Macedonia, and, above all, turmoil in Constantinople, where opponents of the Young Turks briefly had come to power.
As seen earlier, on March 13, 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia had been brought together by the pan-Slav Russian Nicolai Hartwig, who inspired them to take advantage of the Italian war to press their own claims against a distracted Turkey. Greece joined later. So, by verbal agreement, did Montenegro. Russia did not, at first, apprise France of what was afoot; even later Russia did not keep France informed fully. But even St. Petersburg may not have been kept advised: Hartwig was running something close to a rogue operation. Izvolsky and other leaders of the Russian government "denounced the dangers of Hartwig's 'incurable Austrophobia' " and what the historianDominic Lieven has recently called "his disloyalty to overall Russian foreign policy."
The Balkan peoples harbored murderous hatreds against one another, and asserted rival claims to territories and frontiers, but they acted together in order to strike at Turkey before it could make peace with Italy. Mounting a crusade to free all that remained of the Ottoman Empire in Christian southeastern Europe,
CHAPTER 13: ITALY GRASPS;
THEN THE BALKANS DO TOO
The territory of Tripolitania, now part ofLibya, was Italy's first target. Under the indolent sway of the Ottoman government, Tripolitania, along with adjoining Cyrenaica, was ruled minimally and defended inadequately. For years,Italian diplomats had been clearing the way for a future takeover. In 1900, France had waived any objections it might have had in return for Italy's similar waiver in regard to France's hoped-for annexation of Morocco.
Later the Italians made similar arrangements with the Austrians in regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina and with the Russians in respect to the Straits of the Dardanelles. To keep Italy as an ally, Germany agreed to the Tripoli venture; Britain concurred in hopes of detaching Italy from that alliance.
So once Austria had moved on Bosnia, and France on Morocco, the Italian press and public urged their leaders to go ahead before it became too late. In a leisurely fashion more Mediterranean than modern, the Italian government then gave the other powers notice of its intention to go to war—some two months in advance.
As a youngItalian diplomat later remembered it, "I . . . expected that the communication itself would create a stir. Nothing of the kind! Nobody took the slightest notice. . . . People thought that we were bluffing."
On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war, accusing Turkey of injuring Italian interests. Italy occupied the Libyan coastline quickly, but then was bogged down in the interior. Fighting continued for about a year. A cease-fire took effect October 15, 1912, followed by a peace that left Italy in possession not only of Libya but also of Rhodes and other Dodecanese islands off the shore of Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Italian war was a signal to Hartwig's Russian-inspired Balkan alliance that their time had come to strike—and to preempt Austria. The pace of conflict was accelerating; the clashes began to overlap. The Italo-Turkish war started before the Second Moroccan Crisis was resolved, and now out of the embers of countless local blood feuds, the First Balkan War caught fire in 1912 before the Italian colonial war was concluded. Indeed, the main reason that the Turkish government accepted Italy's terms for concluding hostilities was its need to focus on southeastern Europe. There was a revolt inAlbania, a border conflict with Montenegro, continuing guerrilla warfare in Macedonia, and, above all, turmoil in Constantinople, where opponents of the Young Turks briefly had come to power.
As seen earlier, on March 13, 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia had been brought together by the pan-Slav Russian Nicolai Hartwig, who inspired them to take advantage of the Italian war to press their own claims against a distracted Turkey. Greece joined later. So, by verbal agreement, did Montenegro. Russia did not, at first, apprise France of what was afoot; even later Russia did not keep France informed fully. But even St. Petersburg may not have been kept advised: Hartwig was running something close to a rogue operation. Izvolsky and other leaders of the Russian government "denounced the dangers of Hartwig's 'incurable Austrophobia' " and what the historianDominic Lieven has recently called "his disloyalty to overall Russian foreign policy."
The Balkan peoples harbored murderous hatreds against one another, and asserted rival claims to territories and frontiers, but they acted together in order to strike at Turkey before it could make peace with Italy. Mounting a crusade to free all that remained of the Ottoman Empire in Christian southeastern Europe,
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