the Scots fighting qualities, he had them moved from the island defences and placed them (seriously under strength) in the most strategic and vital position on The Gin Drinkersâ Line, a position they were unfamiliar with and which required substantial improvements.
General Maltby received another intelligence report that a Japanese regiment was only a few miles from the mainland border. This he believed and he placed Hong Kong on a war footing.
After the war it was Brigadier Wallisâ opinion that the Royal Scots should not receive the Battle Honour âHong Kongâ. This seemed unfair and unjust to many. They were the sole target for the initial Japanese attack, while also being heavily shelled by their own guns. Brigadier Wallis himself did not witness the fighting on the Gin Drinkersâ Line.
Dad, Tam and Willie often joked about their new nickname âThe First to Foot Itâ after the war and the many fights it caused in the bars of Singapore. General Wavell, the worst offender in underestimating the Japanese Army, was finally replaced by General Slim, a well-respected commander from a working class background. Slim also changed the British tactics. The subsequent battles of Kohima and Imphal were great victories for the British Army. A Japanese soldier who survived described the British soldiers at Kohima as formidable.
The Japanese Army did have weaknesses; the Russians proved this in 1939. The Japanese lost two major border battles fought in the vicinity of Khal-khin-Gol (Halha River) and were totally beaten by the Russian Eastern Divisions led by General Zhukov. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties. The Russians exposed the fact that the Japanese were an outdated Army, employed repetitive and primitive tactics, had weak logistics and lacked large scale mobility. The arid plains of Burma were suitable for tank warfare and our tanks were far superior to that of the Japanese and yet we were constantly out-manoeuvred by soldiers on foot.
The Three British Blunders
Perhaps these blunders were mistakes, deliberate or just down to plain laziness. I have heard that two of these blunders were committed by members of the Royal Scots, one an officer and the other a private soldier.
Firstly, Captain Jones sent out a patrol to the north to check Needle Hill and Shing Mun Valley. Colonel White felt that both areas were prone to enemy infiltration. Captain Jones asked a newly arrived officer,Lieutenant Thompson, (known as âBuntyâ to his fellow officers) to carry out this vital patrol. The Lieutenant was accompanied by twelve armed men. For reasons of his own Lieutenant Thompson neglected to carry out the full patrol as ordered and instead, decided to do some socializing. Had he continued to Shing Mun Valley as ordered, he would have seen below him hundreds of crouching enemy soldiers hiding in the ravine, alerting all the British commanders that an attack was imminent.
The second blunder was to take place an hour later. Sitting in his bunker, Captain Jones wished to communicate with a fellow officer above ground. Surprisingly he did not have a direct telephone line connection so he ordered his runner, a Private Gillie, a somewhat insubordinate native of Glasgow, to take a message.
Although the ground was rocky and uneven, Captain Jones knew the nimble, rock-hopping soldier would make easy and quick work of the task. However Gillie did not seem keen to leave the warmth and the company of Captain Jonesâ headquarters. Perhaps he was also hungry. He, like all the others, had not eaten that day and was afraid he would miss his rations.
On leaving the underground bunker, Gillie did a rather strange and unexplained thing. Taking the big key hanging near the solid iron doors, the only entrance to the bunker, he locked the iron door from the outside and took the only key with him as he skipped away into the evening mists and oblivion. This action in effect trapped all the men below, some twenty
General Maltby received another intelligence report that a Japanese regiment was only a few miles from the mainland border. This he believed and he placed Hong Kong on a war footing.
After the war it was Brigadier Wallisâ opinion that the Royal Scots should not receive the Battle Honour âHong Kongâ. This seemed unfair and unjust to many. They were the sole target for the initial Japanese attack, while also being heavily shelled by their own guns. Brigadier Wallis himself did not witness the fighting on the Gin Drinkersâ Line.
Dad, Tam and Willie often joked about their new nickname âThe First to Foot Itâ after the war and the many fights it caused in the bars of Singapore. General Wavell, the worst offender in underestimating the Japanese Army, was finally replaced by General Slim, a well-respected commander from a working class background. Slim also changed the British tactics. The subsequent battles of Kohima and Imphal were great victories for the British Army. A Japanese soldier who survived described the British soldiers at Kohima as formidable.
The Japanese Army did have weaknesses; the Russians proved this in 1939. The Japanese lost two major border battles fought in the vicinity of Khal-khin-Gol (Halha River) and were totally beaten by the Russian Eastern Divisions led by General Zhukov. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties. The Russians exposed the fact that the Japanese were an outdated Army, employed repetitive and primitive tactics, had weak logistics and lacked large scale mobility. The arid plains of Burma were suitable for tank warfare and our tanks were far superior to that of the Japanese and yet we were constantly out-manoeuvred by soldiers on foot.
The Three British Blunders
Perhaps these blunders were mistakes, deliberate or just down to plain laziness. I have heard that two of these blunders were committed by members of the Royal Scots, one an officer and the other a private soldier.
Firstly, Captain Jones sent out a patrol to the north to check Needle Hill and Shing Mun Valley. Colonel White felt that both areas were prone to enemy infiltration. Captain Jones asked a newly arrived officer,Lieutenant Thompson, (known as âBuntyâ to his fellow officers) to carry out this vital patrol. The Lieutenant was accompanied by twelve armed men. For reasons of his own Lieutenant Thompson neglected to carry out the full patrol as ordered and instead, decided to do some socializing. Had he continued to Shing Mun Valley as ordered, he would have seen below him hundreds of crouching enemy soldiers hiding in the ravine, alerting all the British commanders that an attack was imminent.
The second blunder was to take place an hour later. Sitting in his bunker, Captain Jones wished to communicate with a fellow officer above ground. Surprisingly he did not have a direct telephone line connection so he ordered his runner, a Private Gillie, a somewhat insubordinate native of Glasgow, to take a message.
Although the ground was rocky and uneven, Captain Jones knew the nimble, rock-hopping soldier would make easy and quick work of the task. However Gillie did not seem keen to leave the warmth and the company of Captain Jonesâ headquarters. Perhaps he was also hungry. He, like all the others, had not eaten that day and was afraid he would miss his rations.
On leaving the underground bunker, Gillie did a rather strange and unexplained thing. Taking the big key hanging near the solid iron doors, the only entrance to the bunker, he locked the iron door from the outside and took the only key with him as he skipped away into the evening mists and oblivion. This action in effect trapped all the men below, some twenty
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