In 1953, Deng and Chen Yun (see Key People in the Deng Era, p. 717) went to Mao to inform him of the biggest personnel problem facing China in its early years of Communist rule: the threat that Gao Gang might split the party. Mao heeded their warning, and Deng and Chen Yun played a central role in managing the case. 27
While playing the central role in leading the daily work of the party, Deng could see firsthand how Mao weighed the issues facing China and how he made decisions affecting the country. In his later years Mao was to commit devastating errors, yet he remained a brilliant political leader with deep insight and bold strategies. In addition, as Kissinger was later to consider Premier Zhou Enlai one of the greatest leaders he ever encountered, Deng could see how this great master, whom he had known well in Paris and Shanghai,dealt with foreign relations and with managing overall government activity. By taking part in top-level meetings with both Mao and Zhou, Deng had an opportunity to learn how China's two greatest leaders of their generation assessed the major issues facing the country. Further, as a participant in the building of new organizations, Deng had the chance to see the logic of major decisions and to consider the broader framework of fundamental changes, experiences that would serve him well as he endeavored to rebuild China's economic and political framework in the 1980s.
Mao in 1960 split with the Soviet Union and kept China a closed country, but he spent a great deal of time considering how to deal with the great powers. Deng, as vice premier in the government from 1952 to 1955, was included in discussions on foreign relations. As general secretary of the party from 1956 to 1966, he dealt with relations with other Communist parties (not with non-Communist countries), at a time when most of China's important foreign relationships were with these Communist countries. In February 1956, for instance, he was the political leader of the Chinese delegation to Moscow for the 20th Soviet Party Congress, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. Like other foreign comrades attending the congress, Deng was not allowed to attend the session in which Khrushchev made his speech, but he was allowed to read the text of that speech the next day. Deng, who was shrewd enough to recognize immediately that the speech had not just domestic but also international implications, assigned two interpreters to work all night to translate the speech, even as he also carefully avoided addressing the content of the speech until Mao decided how to respond. He therefore returned to Beijing and reported on the speech to Mao (who was vulnerable to many of the same criticisms made of Stalin), and Mao made the decisions about how to proceed. 28 Deng was immediately aware that the massive criticism of Stalin would affect those who worked with Stalin and weaken the authority of the Soviet Communist Party.
From September 15–27, 1956, after China's agriculture and handicrafts had been collectivized and its industry had been nationalized, the Chinese Communist Party held its 8th Party Congress, the first party congress to be held since the 7th Party Congress in 1945 that had set out the tasks on the eve of the civil war. The congress was comprehensive and carefully prepared; it offered a vision of a party with responsibility for governing a great nation. The early stage of socialism had arrived, five-year plans had been introduced, the bourgeois and landlord classes no longer existed, and class warfare had ended. Zhou Enlai, Deng, and others hoped that the party could thereafterconcentrate on strengthening regular procedures and advancing orderly economic growth. 29
Deng played a central role at the 8th Party Congress; he was promoted to general secretary of the party, making him, as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, one of the top six leaders of the party (after Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Chen Yun). His
While playing the central role in leading the daily work of the party, Deng could see firsthand how Mao weighed the issues facing China and how he made decisions affecting the country. In his later years Mao was to commit devastating errors, yet he remained a brilliant political leader with deep insight and bold strategies. In addition, as Kissinger was later to consider Premier Zhou Enlai one of the greatest leaders he ever encountered, Deng could see how this great master, whom he had known well in Paris and Shanghai,dealt with foreign relations and with managing overall government activity. By taking part in top-level meetings with both Mao and Zhou, Deng had an opportunity to learn how China's two greatest leaders of their generation assessed the major issues facing the country. Further, as a participant in the building of new organizations, Deng had the chance to see the logic of major decisions and to consider the broader framework of fundamental changes, experiences that would serve him well as he endeavored to rebuild China's economic and political framework in the 1980s.
Mao in 1960 split with the Soviet Union and kept China a closed country, but he spent a great deal of time considering how to deal with the great powers. Deng, as vice premier in the government from 1952 to 1955, was included in discussions on foreign relations. As general secretary of the party from 1956 to 1966, he dealt with relations with other Communist parties (not with non-Communist countries), at a time when most of China's important foreign relationships were with these Communist countries. In February 1956, for instance, he was the political leader of the Chinese delegation to Moscow for the 20th Soviet Party Congress, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. Like other foreign comrades attending the congress, Deng was not allowed to attend the session in which Khrushchev made his speech, but he was allowed to read the text of that speech the next day. Deng, who was shrewd enough to recognize immediately that the speech had not just domestic but also international implications, assigned two interpreters to work all night to translate the speech, even as he also carefully avoided addressing the content of the speech until Mao decided how to respond. He therefore returned to Beijing and reported on the speech to Mao (who was vulnerable to many of the same criticisms made of Stalin), and Mao made the decisions about how to proceed. 28 Deng was immediately aware that the massive criticism of Stalin would affect those who worked with Stalin and weaken the authority of the Soviet Communist Party.
From September 15–27, 1956, after China's agriculture and handicrafts had been collectivized and its industry had been nationalized, the Chinese Communist Party held its 8th Party Congress, the first party congress to be held since the 7th Party Congress in 1945 that had set out the tasks on the eve of the civil war. The congress was comprehensive and carefully prepared; it offered a vision of a party with responsibility for governing a great nation. The early stage of socialism had arrived, five-year plans had been introduced, the bourgeois and landlord classes no longer existed, and class warfare had ended. Zhou Enlai, Deng, and others hoped that the party could thereafterconcentrate on strengthening regular procedures and advancing orderly economic growth. 29
Deng played a central role at the 8th Party Congress; he was promoted to general secretary of the party, making him, as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, one of the top six leaders of the party (after Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Chen Yun). His
Similar Books
