the beginning of a long-range American policy to try to settle world problems by "negotiation."
As the preparations for the Spring meetings go forward, I am struck by a singular fact: no one on our side claims—let alone believes—that the West will be stronger after these new negotiations than it is today. The same was true last Summer. We agreed to "negotiate" about Berlin—not because we hoped to gain anything by such talks—but because the Communists had created a "crisis," and we could think of nothing better to do about it than go to the conference table. After all, we assured ourselves, there is no harm in talking.
I maintain there is harm in talking under present conditions. There are several reasons why this is so. First of all, Communists do not look upon negotiations, as we do, as an effort to reach an agreement. For them, negotiations are simply an instrument of political warfare. For them, a summit meeting is another battle in the struggle for the world. A diplomatic conference, in Communist language, is a "propaganda forum from which to speak to the masses over the heads of their leaders."
Of course, if the Communists can obtain a formal agreement beneficial to them, so much the better. But if not, the negotiations themselves will provide victory enough. For example, when the Soviets challenged our rights in West Berlin, we handed them a victory by the mere act of sitting down at the conference table. By agreeing to negotiate on that subject, we agreed that our rights in Berlin were "negotiable"—something they never were before. Thus we acknowledged, in effect, the inadequacy of our position, and the world now expects us to adjust it as proof of our good faith. Our answer to Khrushchev's ultimatum should have been that the status of West Berlin concerns only West Berliners and the occupying powers, and is therefore not a matter that we are prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union. That would have been the end of the Berlin "crisis."
The Berlin situation illustrates another reason why the West is at an inherent disadvantage in negotiating with the Communists. The central strategic fact of the Cold War, as it is presently fought, is that the Communists are on the offensive and we are on the defensive. The Soviet Union is always moving ahead, always trying to get something from the free world; the West endeavors, at best, to hold what it has. Therefore, the focal point of negotiations is invariably somewhere in the non-Communist world. Every conference between East and West deals with some territory or right belonging to the free world which the Communists covet. Conversely, since the free world does not seek the liberation of Communist territory, the possibility of Communist concessions never arises. Once the West did attempt to use the conference table for positive gain. At Geneva, in 1955, President Eisenhower told the Soviets he wanted to discuss the status of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. He was promptly advised that the Soviet Union did not consider the matter a legitimate subject for negotiation, and that was that. Now since we are not permitted to talk about what we can get, the only interesting question at an East-West conference is what the Communists can get. Under such conditions, we can never win. At best we can hope for a stalemate that will place us exactly where we started.
There is still another reason for questioning the value of negotiations. Assume that somehow we achieve an agreement we think advances our interests. Is there any reason for supposing the Communists will keep it one moment longer than suits their purpose? We, and they, are different in this respect. We keep our word. The long and perfidious Communist record of breaking agreements and treaties proves that the Soviet Union will not keep any agreement that is not to its advantage to keep. It follows that the only agreement worth making with the Soviets is one that will be self-enforceable—which means one that
As the preparations for the Spring meetings go forward, I am struck by a singular fact: no one on our side claims—let alone believes—that the West will be stronger after these new negotiations than it is today. The same was true last Summer. We agreed to "negotiate" about Berlin—not because we hoped to gain anything by such talks—but because the Communists had created a "crisis," and we could think of nothing better to do about it than go to the conference table. After all, we assured ourselves, there is no harm in talking.
I maintain there is harm in talking under present conditions. There are several reasons why this is so. First of all, Communists do not look upon negotiations, as we do, as an effort to reach an agreement. For them, negotiations are simply an instrument of political warfare. For them, a summit meeting is another battle in the struggle for the world. A diplomatic conference, in Communist language, is a "propaganda forum from which to speak to the masses over the heads of their leaders."
Of course, if the Communists can obtain a formal agreement beneficial to them, so much the better. But if not, the negotiations themselves will provide victory enough. For example, when the Soviets challenged our rights in West Berlin, we handed them a victory by the mere act of sitting down at the conference table. By agreeing to negotiate on that subject, we agreed that our rights in Berlin were "negotiable"—something they never were before. Thus we acknowledged, in effect, the inadequacy of our position, and the world now expects us to adjust it as proof of our good faith. Our answer to Khrushchev's ultimatum should have been that the status of West Berlin concerns only West Berliners and the occupying powers, and is therefore not a matter that we are prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union. That would have been the end of the Berlin "crisis."
The Berlin situation illustrates another reason why the West is at an inherent disadvantage in negotiating with the Communists. The central strategic fact of the Cold War, as it is presently fought, is that the Communists are on the offensive and we are on the defensive. The Soviet Union is always moving ahead, always trying to get something from the free world; the West endeavors, at best, to hold what it has. Therefore, the focal point of negotiations is invariably somewhere in the non-Communist world. Every conference between East and West deals with some territory or right belonging to the free world which the Communists covet. Conversely, since the free world does not seek the liberation of Communist territory, the possibility of Communist concessions never arises. Once the West did attempt to use the conference table for positive gain. At Geneva, in 1955, President Eisenhower told the Soviets he wanted to discuss the status of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. He was promptly advised that the Soviet Union did not consider the matter a legitimate subject for negotiation, and that was that. Now since we are not permitted to talk about what we can get, the only interesting question at an East-West conference is what the Communists can get. Under such conditions, we can never win. At best we can hope for a stalemate that will place us exactly where we started.
There is still another reason for questioning the value of negotiations. Assume that somehow we achieve an agreement we think advances our interests. Is there any reason for supposing the Communists will keep it one moment longer than suits their purpose? We, and they, are different in this respect. We keep our word. The long and perfidious Communist record of breaking agreements and treaties proves that the Soviet Union will not keep any agreement that is not to its advantage to keep. It follows that the only agreement worth making with the Soviets is one that will be self-enforceable—which means one that
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