Closing the Ring by Winston S. Churchill Page B
Authors: Winston S. Churchill
Tags: History, Western, World War II, Military, British, War, Non-Fiction, Europe, Political Science, Great Britain
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put forward, I was sure in my own mind that Admiral Mountbatten had superior qualifications for this great command, and I determined to make this proposal to President Roosevelt at the first opportunity. The appointment of an officer of the substantive rank of Captain R.N. to the Supreme Command of one of the main theatres of the war was an unusual step. But, having carefully prepared the ground beforehand, I was not surprised when the President cordially agreed.
* * * * *
I produced for the Chiefs of Staff Committee a note on plans and policies, from which the following is an extract:
7 Aug. 43
Before we meet the Americans we must settle upon: ( a ) The general plan for the Southeast Asia Command and the Supreme Commander, and ( b ) positive proposals for attacking the enemy, and proving our zeal in this theatre of war, which by its failures and sluggishness is in a measure under reasonable reproach.
I feel that we ought to let Brigadier Wingate tell his story and furnish the United States Chiefs of Staff with copies of his report, and thus convince them that we mean business in this sector of the Southeast Asia Front. Obviously the Arakan force should lie up against the enemy and engage him. But the advance upon Akyab ought to be stopped now, not only in the interests of the Mediterranean campaign, which should be paramount, but also because it is in itself a faulty and unsound operation. It seeks to strike the enemy where he is best prepared. It lays itself open to serious counter-measures by him. It achieves no major strategic purpose.
* * * * *
It is astonishing how quickly a voyage can pass if one has enough to do to occupy every waking minute. I had looked forward to an interval of rest and a change from the perpetual clatter of the war. But as we approached our destination, the holiday seemed to be over before it had begun.
----
1 Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander.
2 See facsimile, page 73.
3 See Volume II, Their Finest Hour , Chapter 12 , pages 252–54.
5
The Quebec Conference
“Quadrant”
The Citadel___My Telegram to The King, August 11___ Visit to Hyde Park___My Memorandum of August 17 About Italy___The “Quadrant” Conference Opens, August 19___ The Chiefs of Staff Report upon “Overlord”___I Propose an American Commander___Strategy in Italy___Mountbatten for Supreme Commander in Southeast Asia___Major Strategy Against Japan___Proposed British Contribution Against Sumatra___My Telegram to Mr. Attlee, August 22___ British Claims to Share in the Main Attack on Japan___A Comical Incident___“Habakkuk” Dismissed___Mountbatten Appointed___My Telegram to Mr. Attlee of August 25___ My Liaison Officers with General MacArthur and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek___Eisenhower Presses for the Invasion of Italy___Need to Take Naples___Disquieting Estimates of British Reinforcements___I Give Instructions for a Large Increase.
H ALIFAX was reached on August 9. The great ship drew in to the landing jetty and we went straight to our train. In spite of all precautions about secrecy, large crowds were assembled. As my wife and I sat in our saloon at the end of the train, the people gathered round and gave us welcome. Before we started, I made them sing “The Maple Leaf” and “O Canada!” I feared they did not know “Rule, Britannia,” though I am sure they would have enjoyed it if we had had a band. After about twenty minutes of handshakings, photographs, and autographs, we left for Quebec.
Two days later I telegraphed to the King:
11 Aug. 43
Prime Minister to His Majesty the King, with humble duty
The Citadel is in every way delightful and ideally suited to the purpose. Arrangements for the President are perfect. He has the upper floor and ramps are fitted everywhere for his convenience. I am most grateful to Your Majesty for arranging this. I have telegraphed to the Governor-General thanking him for the trouble he has taken and for his kindly welcome.
2.
* * * * *
I produced for the Chiefs of Staff Committee a note on plans and policies, from which the following is an extract:
7 Aug. 43
Before we meet the Americans we must settle upon: ( a ) The general plan for the Southeast Asia Command and the Supreme Commander, and ( b ) positive proposals for attacking the enemy, and proving our zeal in this theatre of war, which by its failures and sluggishness is in a measure under reasonable reproach.
I feel that we ought to let Brigadier Wingate tell his story and furnish the United States Chiefs of Staff with copies of his report, and thus convince them that we mean business in this sector of the Southeast Asia Front. Obviously the Arakan force should lie up against the enemy and engage him. But the advance upon Akyab ought to be stopped now, not only in the interests of the Mediterranean campaign, which should be paramount, but also because it is in itself a faulty and unsound operation. It seeks to strike the enemy where he is best prepared. It lays itself open to serious counter-measures by him. It achieves no major strategic purpose.
* * * * *
It is astonishing how quickly a voyage can pass if one has enough to do to occupy every waking minute. I had looked forward to an interval of rest and a change from the perpetual clatter of the war. But as we approached our destination, the holiday seemed to be over before it had begun.
----
1 Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander.
2 See facsimile, page 73.
3 See Volume II, Their Finest Hour , Chapter 12 , pages 252–54.
5
The Quebec Conference
“Quadrant”
The Citadel___My Telegram to The King, August 11___ Visit to Hyde Park___My Memorandum of August 17 About Italy___The “Quadrant” Conference Opens, August 19___ The Chiefs of Staff Report upon “Overlord”___I Propose an American Commander___Strategy in Italy___Mountbatten for Supreme Commander in Southeast Asia___Major Strategy Against Japan___Proposed British Contribution Against Sumatra___My Telegram to Mr. Attlee, August 22___ British Claims to Share in the Main Attack on Japan___A Comical Incident___“Habakkuk” Dismissed___Mountbatten Appointed___My Telegram to Mr. Attlee of August 25___ My Liaison Officers with General MacArthur and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek___Eisenhower Presses for the Invasion of Italy___Need to Take Naples___Disquieting Estimates of British Reinforcements___I Give Instructions for a Large Increase.
H ALIFAX was reached on August 9. The great ship drew in to the landing jetty and we went straight to our train. In spite of all precautions about secrecy, large crowds were assembled. As my wife and I sat in our saloon at the end of the train, the people gathered round and gave us welcome. Before we started, I made them sing “The Maple Leaf” and “O Canada!” I feared they did not know “Rule, Britannia,” though I am sure they would have enjoyed it if we had had a band. After about twenty minutes of handshakings, photographs, and autographs, we left for Quebec.
Two days later I telegraphed to the King:
11 Aug. 43
Prime Minister to His Majesty the King, with humble duty
The Citadel is in every way delightful and ideally suited to the purpose. Arrangements for the President are perfect. He has the upper floor and ramps are fitted everywhere for his convenience. I am most grateful to Your Majesty for arranging this. I have telegraphed to the Governor-General thanking him for the trouble he has taken and for his kindly welcome.
2.
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