Closing the Ring by Winston S. Churchill Page A

would give us the power to have a number of floating Air Force refuelling stations, movable at will for particular operations. In the “Habakkuk” discussions it is stated that a timber structure can be made, and obviously steel pontoons could be fastened together. But all these when subject to the movement of the waves are liable to break up, and anyhow they are subject to intense strain and do not give that smooth run which aircraft require.
    2. If however the Bubble story works, there is no reason why a pipe should not be lowered from two or three suitable ships and dangled from them at the right depth, and thus immunity from waves would be secured within an area in which the raft or pontoon runway could be stationed. The runway could always be kept head to wind, and no moorings would be necessary in deep water, as the whole of the vessels and the raft would drift together a few miles this way or that in the course of the day. This matter therefore deserves very keen examination.
    3. One can imagine the use of two or three such refuelling bases for an attack on “Jupiter” [Norway]. But what about two or threestepping-stones of this kind across the Bay of Bengal for “Culverin” [Sumatra]? This would leave the carriers free to protect the vessels and the landing, and also the nearest of the stepping-stones concerned. The fighter aircraft could therefore do two or three hops across the bay and come into action in much larger numbers than would be possible if they were used from ships. This apparatus seems at first sight to be far less costly and quicker to make than aircraft-carriers. Naturally, you choose good weather conditions for the operation. I am most anxious that this subject should be pursued theoretically at once, and thereafter, if all is well, on a large scale. Pray let me have your opinion.
    Three dominating assumptions were made both by the framers of the plan and the British Chiefs of Staff. With these I was in entire agreement, and, as will be seen later, they were approved by the Americans and accepted by the Russians.
    That there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter aircraft in Northwest Europe before the assault took place.
    2. That there should be not more than twelve mobile German divisions in Northern France at the time the operation was launched, and that it must not be possible for the Germans to build up more than fifteen divisions in the succeeding two months.
    3. That the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. To ensure this it was essential that we should be able to construct at least two effective synthetic harbours.
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    I also had many discussions with the Chiefs of Staff on our affairs in the Indian and Far Eastern theatres. We had none too good a tale to tell. A division had advanced at the end of 1942 down the Arakan coast of Burma to recapture the port of Akyab. Though strengthened until a complete corps was engaged, under the command of General Irwin, the operation had failed, and our troops were forced back over the Indian frontier.
    Although there was much to be said in explanation, I felt that the whole question of the British High Command against Japan must come under review. New methods and new menwere needed. I had long felt that it was a bad arrangement for the Commander-in-Chief India to command the operations in Burma in addition to his other far-reaching responsibilities. It seemed to me that the vigorous prosecution of large-scale operations against the Japanese in Southeast Asia necessitated the creation of a separate Supreme Allied Command. The Chiefs of Staff were in complete agreement, and prepared a memorandum on these lines for discussion with their American colleagues in Quebec. There remained the question of the commander of this new theatre, and we were in no doubt that he should be British. Of the various names that were