for example, natural capital and damages to the environment
are not well accounted for. Nevertheless, they represent real progress in comparison
with national accounts from the early postwar years, which were concerned solely with
endless growth in output. 18 These are the official series that I use in this book to analyze aggregate wealth
and the current capital/income ratio in the wealthy countries.
One conclusion stands out in this brief history of national accounting: national accounts
are a social construct in perpetual evolution. They always reflect the preoccupations
of the era when they were conceived. 19 We should be careful not to make a fetish of the published figures. When a country’s
national income per capita is said to be 30,000 euros, it is obvious that this number,
like all economic and social statistics, should be regarded as an estimate, a construct,
and not a mathematical certainty. It is simply the best estimate we have. National
accounts represent the only consistent, systematic attempt to analyze a country’s
economic activity. They should be regarded as a limited and imperfect research tool,
a compilation and arrangement of data from highly disparate sources. In all developed
countries, national accounts are currently compiled by government statistical offices
and central banks from the balance sheets and account books of financial and nonfinancial
corporations together with many other statistical sources and surveys. We have no
reason to think a priori that the officials involved in these efforts do not do their
best to spot inconsistencies in the data in order to achieve the best possible estimates.
Provided we use these data with caution and in a critical spirit and complement them
with other data where there are errors or gaps (say, in dealing with tax havens),
these national accounts are an indispensable tool for estimating aggregate income
and wealth.
In particular, as I will show in Part Two , we can put together a consistent analysis of the historical evolution of the capital/income
ratio by meticulously compiling and comparing national wealth estimates by many authors
from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century and connecting them up with official
capital accounts from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The other
major limitation of official national accounts, apart from their lack of historical
perspective, is that they are deliberately concerned only with aggregates and averages
and not with distributions and inequalities. We must therefore draw on other sources
to measure the distribution of income and wealth and to study inequalities. National
accounts thus constitute a crucial element of our analyses, but only when completed
with additional historical and distributional data.
The Global Distribution of Production
I begin by examining the evolution of the global distribution of production, which
is relatively well known from the early nineteenth century on. For earlier periods,
estimates are more approximate, but we know the broad outlines, thanks most notably
to the historical work of Angus Maddison, especially since the overall pattern is
relatively simple. 20
From 1900 to 1980, 70–80 percent of the global production of goods and services was
concentrated in Europe and America, which incontestably dominated the rest of the
world. By 2010, the European–American share had declined to roughly 50 percent, or
approximately the same level as in 1860. In all probability, it will continue to fall
and may go as low as 20–30 percent at some point in the twenty-first century. This
was the level maintained up to the turn of the nineteenth century and would be consistent
with the European–American share of the world’s population (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 ).
In other words, the lead that Europe and America achieved during the Industrial Revolution
allowed these two regions to claim
are not well accounted for. Nevertheless, they represent real progress in comparison
with national accounts from the early postwar years, which were concerned solely with
endless growth in output. 18 These are the official series that I use in this book to analyze aggregate wealth
and the current capital/income ratio in the wealthy countries.
One conclusion stands out in this brief history of national accounting: national accounts
are a social construct in perpetual evolution. They always reflect the preoccupations
of the era when they were conceived. 19 We should be careful not to make a fetish of the published figures. When a country’s
national income per capita is said to be 30,000 euros, it is obvious that this number,
like all economic and social statistics, should be regarded as an estimate, a construct,
and not a mathematical certainty. It is simply the best estimate we have. National
accounts represent the only consistent, systematic attempt to analyze a country’s
economic activity. They should be regarded as a limited and imperfect research tool,
a compilation and arrangement of data from highly disparate sources. In all developed
countries, national accounts are currently compiled by government statistical offices
and central banks from the balance sheets and account books of financial and nonfinancial
corporations together with many other statistical sources and surveys. We have no
reason to think a priori that the officials involved in these efforts do not do their
best to spot inconsistencies in the data in order to achieve the best possible estimates.
Provided we use these data with caution and in a critical spirit and complement them
with other data where there are errors or gaps (say, in dealing with tax havens),
these national accounts are an indispensable tool for estimating aggregate income
and wealth.
In particular, as I will show in Part Two , we can put together a consistent analysis of the historical evolution of the capital/income
ratio by meticulously compiling and comparing national wealth estimates by many authors
from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century and connecting them up with official
capital accounts from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The other
major limitation of official national accounts, apart from their lack of historical
perspective, is that they are deliberately concerned only with aggregates and averages
and not with distributions and inequalities. We must therefore draw on other sources
to measure the distribution of income and wealth and to study inequalities. National
accounts thus constitute a crucial element of our analyses, but only when completed
with additional historical and distributional data.
The Global Distribution of Production
I begin by examining the evolution of the global distribution of production, which
is relatively well known from the early nineteenth century on. For earlier periods,
estimates are more approximate, but we know the broad outlines, thanks most notably
to the historical work of Angus Maddison, especially since the overall pattern is
relatively simple. 20
From 1900 to 1980, 70–80 percent of the global production of goods and services was
concentrated in Europe and America, which incontestably dominated the rest of the
world. By 2010, the European–American share had declined to roughly 50 percent, or
approximately the same level as in 1860. In all probability, it will continue to fall
and may go as low as 20–30 percent at some point in the twenty-first century. This
was the level maintained up to the turn of the nineteenth century and would be consistent
with the European–American share of the world’s population (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 ).
In other words, the lead that Europe and America achieved during the Industrial Revolution
allowed these two regions to claim
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