the nineteenth century, however, that estimates of national wealth
proliferated. From 1870 to 1900, Robert Giffen regularly updated his estimates of
Britain’s stock of national capital, which he compared to estimates by other authors
(especially Patrick Colquhoun) from the early 1800s. Giffen marveled at the size of
Britain’s stock of industrial capital as well as the stock of foreign assets acquired
since the Napoleonic wars, which was many times larger than the entire public debt
due to those wars. 17 In France at about the same time, Alfred de Foville and Clément Colson published
estimates of “national wealth” and “private wealth,” and, like Giffen, both writers
also marveled at the considerable accumulation of private capital over the course
of the nineteenth century. It was glaringly obvious to everyone that private fortunes
were prospering in the period 1870–1914. For the economists of the day, the problem
was to measure that wealth and compare different countries (the Franco-British rivalry
was never far from their minds). Until World War I, estimates of wealth received much
more attention than estimates of income and output, and there were in any case more
of them, not only in Britain and France but also in Germany, the United States, and
other industrial powers. In those days, being an economist meant first and foremost
being able to estimate the national capital of one’s country: this was almost a rite
of initiation.
It was not until the period between the two world wars that national accounts began
to be established on an annual basis. Previous estimates had always focused on isolated
years, with successive estimates separated by ten or more years, as in the case of
Giffen’s calculations of British national capital in the nineteenth century. In the
1930s, improvements in the primary statistical sources made the first annual series
of national income data possible. These generally went back as far as the beginning
of the twentieth century or the last decades of the nineteenth. They were established
for the United States by Kuznets and Kendrick, for Britain by Bowley and Clark, and
for France by Dugé de Bernonville. After World War II, government statistical offices
supplanted economists and began to compile and publish official annual data on GDP
and national income. These official series continue to this day.
Compared with the pre–World War I period, however, the focal point of the data had
changed entirely. From the 1940s on, the primary motivation was to respond to the
trauma of the Great Depression, during which governments had no reliable annual estimates
of economic output. There was therefore a need for statistical and political tools
in order to steer the economy properly and avoid a repeat of the catastrophe. Governments
thus insisted on annual or even quarterly data on output and income. Estimates of
national wealth, which had been so prized before 1914, now took a backseat, especially
after the economic and political chaos of 1914–1945 made it difficult to interpret
their meaning. Specifically, the prices of real estate and financial assets fell to
extremely low levels, so low that private capital seemed to have evaporated. In the
1950s and 1960s, a period of reconstruction, the main goal was to measure the remarkable
growth of output in various branches of industry.
In the 1990s–2000s, wealth accounting again came to the fore. Economists and political
leaders were well aware that the financial capitalism of the twenty-first century
could not be properly analyzed with the tools of the 1950s and 1960s. In collaboration
with central banks, government statistical agencies in various developed countries
compiled and published annual series of data on the assets and liabilities of different
groups, in addition to the usual income and output data. These wealth accounts are
still far from perfect:
proliferated. From 1870 to 1900, Robert Giffen regularly updated his estimates of
Britain’s stock of national capital, which he compared to estimates by other authors
(especially Patrick Colquhoun) from the early 1800s. Giffen marveled at the size of
Britain’s stock of industrial capital as well as the stock of foreign assets acquired
since the Napoleonic wars, which was many times larger than the entire public debt
due to those wars. 17 In France at about the same time, Alfred de Foville and Clément Colson published
estimates of “national wealth” and “private wealth,” and, like Giffen, both writers
also marveled at the considerable accumulation of private capital over the course
of the nineteenth century. It was glaringly obvious to everyone that private fortunes
were prospering in the period 1870–1914. For the economists of the day, the problem
was to measure that wealth and compare different countries (the Franco-British rivalry
was never far from their minds). Until World War I, estimates of wealth received much
more attention than estimates of income and output, and there were in any case more
of them, not only in Britain and France but also in Germany, the United States, and
other industrial powers. In those days, being an economist meant first and foremost
being able to estimate the national capital of one’s country: this was almost a rite
of initiation.
It was not until the period between the two world wars that national accounts began
to be established on an annual basis. Previous estimates had always focused on isolated
years, with successive estimates separated by ten or more years, as in the case of
Giffen’s calculations of British national capital in the nineteenth century. In the
1930s, improvements in the primary statistical sources made the first annual series
of national income data possible. These generally went back as far as the beginning
of the twentieth century or the last decades of the nineteenth. They were established
for the United States by Kuznets and Kendrick, for Britain by Bowley and Clark, and
for France by Dugé de Bernonville. After World War II, government statistical offices
supplanted economists and began to compile and publish official annual data on GDP
and national income. These official series continue to this day.
Compared with the pre–World War I period, however, the focal point of the data had
changed entirely. From the 1940s on, the primary motivation was to respond to the
trauma of the Great Depression, during which governments had no reliable annual estimates
of economic output. There was therefore a need for statistical and political tools
in order to steer the economy properly and avoid a repeat of the catastrophe. Governments
thus insisted on annual or even quarterly data on output and income. Estimates of
national wealth, which had been so prized before 1914, now took a backseat, especially
after the economic and political chaos of 1914–1945 made it difficult to interpret
their meaning. Specifically, the prices of real estate and financial assets fell to
extremely low levels, so low that private capital seemed to have evaporated. In the
1950s and 1960s, a period of reconstruction, the main goal was to measure the remarkable
growth of output in various branches of industry.
In the 1990s–2000s, wealth accounting again came to the fore. Economists and political
leaders were well aware that the financial capitalism of the twenty-first century
could not be properly analyzed with the tools of the 1950s and 1960s. In collaboration
with central banks, government statistical agencies in various developed countries
compiled and published annual series of data on the assets and liabilities of different
groups, in addition to the usual income and output data. These wealth accounts are
still far from perfect:
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