general secretary, to write a letter to Patrick Neill, the commissioner for standards in public life, based on a lie. The letter referred to a new code of conduct for party funding. Sawyer mentioned that the Labour Party had accepted a donation fromEcclestone while in opposition, and that ‘Mr Ecclestone has since the election offered a further donation’. So far, wrote Sawyer inaccurately, the second offer had been refused out of fear of a potential conflict of interest because of the tobacco exemption. He asked Neill whether the party’s concern was justified. The letter was sent on 7 November. On the same day, David Hill, as he would later admit, continued using evasions and menaces to deflect journalists’ questions.
Wracked by fear, Blair was not sleeping. His fate depended upon the ability of his clique – especially Alastair Campbell – to manage the media. After the election, the PR man had introduced himself to government information officers as ‘a believer in strategic communications’. Few officials immediately understood that in the daily battle for favourable headlines they were to serve Blair’s interests and not the media’s. ‘We must not let the press think they can push us around,’ Campbell said. While working for Robert Maxwell, he and other Mirror journalists were routinely ordered to distort the news, a practice that Campbell imported into Downing Street. Frightening people was his strategy. His misfortune was that Hill’s denials about Ecclestone were denying him his accustomed influence over the media. Blair, he realised, ‘was taking a real hit. We had made a big mistake in not going upfront. We were looking shifty and shabby.’
Patrick Neill only contributed to Blair’s plight. Regardless of the truth, he replied to Sawyer the same day, the appearance of taking Ecclestone’s money had raised questions of honesty and offended the rules. Therefore, he recommended, not only should the second donation be refused, but Ecclestone’s first should be returned. In Downing Street, the panic intensified. No one had anticipated that interpretation. Campbell suggested limiting the damage by admitting some truth. Accordingly, Hill told journalists that Ecclestone had given the party ‘over £5,000’. At the same time, another Downing Street spokesman said that, during their meeting in No. 10, Ecclestone made ‘no request regarding policy’. That lie was quickly contradicted by Campbell. Ecclestone’s donation, he admitted, was made to change Labour’s policy.
‘Tony Blair has started talking,’ Ecclestone cursed. ‘It’s third-rate behaviour.’ Besieged by journalists, he was told that Blair had finally admitted receiving the donation. ‘Well, if Mr Blair said that, he wouldn’t lie, would he?’ Ecclestone replied.
‘How much did you give?’ he was asked.
‘£1 million,’ said Ecclestone.
His admission was explosive. Off message, Jack Straw publicly admitted that Blair had ‘been aware of the second offer from Mr Ecclestone when they met at Downing Street’. After implying that the additional £3 million had persuaded Blair to accommodate Ecclestone’s wishes, Straw then promptly headed for the bunker.
The ammunition against Blair was so strong that no one even referred to the manifesto’s pledge to ‘clean up public life’. To close down the horror, Campbell arranged Blair’s first post-election television interview. The prime minister’s words were carefully rehearsed. He resisted Irvine’s advice of total disclosure, refused to apologise and instead blamed Ecclestone. Even ‘before any journalist had been in touch’ with Downing Street, Blair told his audience, the Labour Party had notified Ecclestone that, despite his ‘firm commitment’ of paying another £1 million, ‘we couldn’t accept further donations’. Only then, said Blair, had the government asked Neill about the probity of the first donation, and as a result it would of course be repaid. To
Wracked by fear, Blair was not sleeping. His fate depended upon the ability of his clique – especially Alastair Campbell – to manage the media. After the election, the PR man had introduced himself to government information officers as ‘a believer in strategic communications’. Few officials immediately understood that in the daily battle for favourable headlines they were to serve Blair’s interests and not the media’s. ‘We must not let the press think they can push us around,’ Campbell said. While working for Robert Maxwell, he and other Mirror journalists were routinely ordered to distort the news, a practice that Campbell imported into Downing Street. Frightening people was his strategy. His misfortune was that Hill’s denials about Ecclestone were denying him his accustomed influence over the media. Blair, he realised, ‘was taking a real hit. We had made a big mistake in not going upfront. We were looking shifty and shabby.’
Patrick Neill only contributed to Blair’s plight. Regardless of the truth, he replied to Sawyer the same day, the appearance of taking Ecclestone’s money had raised questions of honesty and offended the rules. Therefore, he recommended, not only should the second donation be refused, but Ecclestone’s first should be returned. In Downing Street, the panic intensified. No one had anticipated that interpretation. Campbell suggested limiting the damage by admitting some truth. Accordingly, Hill told journalists that Ecclestone had given the party ‘over £5,000’. At the same time, another Downing Street spokesman said that, during their meeting in No. 10, Ecclestone made ‘no request regarding policy’. That lie was quickly contradicted by Campbell. Ecclestone’s donation, he admitted, was made to change Labour’s policy.
‘Tony Blair has started talking,’ Ecclestone cursed. ‘It’s third-rate behaviour.’ Besieged by journalists, he was told that Blair had finally admitted receiving the donation. ‘Well, if Mr Blair said that, he wouldn’t lie, would he?’ Ecclestone replied.
‘How much did you give?’ he was asked.
‘£1 million,’ said Ecclestone.
His admission was explosive. Off message, Jack Straw publicly admitted that Blair had ‘been aware of the second offer from Mr Ecclestone when they met at Downing Street’. After implying that the additional £3 million had persuaded Blair to accommodate Ecclestone’s wishes, Straw then promptly headed for the bunker.
The ammunition against Blair was so strong that no one even referred to the manifesto’s pledge to ‘clean up public life’. To close down the horror, Campbell arranged Blair’s first post-election television interview. The prime minister’s words were carefully rehearsed. He resisted Irvine’s advice of total disclosure, refused to apologise and instead blamed Ecclestone. Even ‘before any journalist had been in touch’ with Downing Street, Blair told his audience, the Labour Party had notified Ecclestone that, despite his ‘firm commitment’ of paying another £1 million, ‘we couldn’t accept further donations’. Only then, said Blair, had the government asked Neill about the probity of the first donation, and as a result it would of course be repaid. To
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