ready to renew the fight.
On the afternoon of 10 February, Wavell, making his final visit to Singapore, met Bennett at Western Area headquarters and was informed that the Jurong Line had been taken; though to a great extent it had really been abandoned. Wavell ordered Bennett to mount a counter-attack to recover the Jurong positions at theearliest opportunity. If successful, it would provide a focus for the defence of the rest of the island and a barrier behind which the infantry units could be regrouped, replenished and rotated, and where artillery batteries could be sited. Without the Jurong Line there was no realistic prospect of halting the Japanese and a plan of sorts was formulated in which 22nd Brigade to the south, 15th Brigade in the centre and 12th Brigade to the north, with the support of two regiments of field artillery and with 44th Brigade in reserve, would regain the Jurong Line. The first step of the attack would take place before 1800hrs that day. The problem with the scheme was that none of the formations involved were fit for an advance at all. By chance – and nothing more – they happened to be in relatively convenient locations for the tasks allotted, butlosses in men, transport and communications, exhaustion and local shortages of ammunition and water meant that there was no realistic prospect of mounting a successful attack without bringing large numbers of fresh troops into the battle. Additionally, the plan gave precious little thought to the practical difficulties of moving a large proportion of the attacking force through the night and seemingly no consideration at all to what actions the Japanese might have in mind.
38. Forest and mountain terrain in eastern Malaya. (Author’s collection)
39. A jungle creek. Although few Japanese soldiers had received any jungle-warfare training, they proved adept at infiltrating Allied positions by following small streams like this one in western Singapore. (Author’s collection)
40. Gen. Wavell in Singapore inspecting coastal guns, November 1941.
Relentless
11 February
0000hrs
Japanese troops secure Bukit Timah junction.
0300hrs
18th Division advance toward Bukit Timah.
0530hrs
15th Brigade ordered to counter-attack and break contact with the enemy by going cross country toward 22nd Brigade.
1300hrs
Bennett’s counter-attack to retake Bukit Timah abandoned.
Around 0300hrs on 11 February elements of 18th Division, with a modest amount of armoured support, advanced from the Tengah area toward Bukit Timah along the Jurong Road.
Around 0530hrs Brigadier Coates, aware that 15th Brigade was in danger of being completely surrounded and overwhelmed, gave orders to cancel the counter-attack and to break contact with the enemy. This was easier said than done. Japanese advances meant that much of the Jurong Road was now impassable and Coates ordered his remaining units to strike out cross-country toward the positions of 22nd Brigade.
To the north, troops from 5th Division, with a strong armoured element, had advanced from their concentration area and despite a strong stand by 2/29th, were able to reach Bukit Panjang village and then turn south toward Bukit Timah. At about 2230hrs they encountered the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who put up a fierce fight but could not hope to stop a column of fifty or so tanks.By midnight Japanese troops had secured the Bukit Timah junction, cutting communications to 15th Brigade, but did not press on into Singapore city, though there was really precious little to stop them.
Operations of 11 February 1942.
By this time several units had simply been destroyed and others so badly damaged that they were increasingly being formed into ad hoc units. Breakdown of discipline was also becoming a problem, with considerable numbers of personnel – chiefly British and Australian – roaming around in search of loot or any means of escape.
Now that Bukit Timah was in Japanese hands, they were well positioned to advance
On the afternoon of 10 February, Wavell, making his final visit to Singapore, met Bennett at Western Area headquarters and was informed that the Jurong Line had been taken; though to a great extent it had really been abandoned. Wavell ordered Bennett to mount a counter-attack to recover the Jurong positions at theearliest opportunity. If successful, it would provide a focus for the defence of the rest of the island and a barrier behind which the infantry units could be regrouped, replenished and rotated, and where artillery batteries could be sited. Without the Jurong Line there was no realistic prospect of halting the Japanese and a plan of sorts was formulated in which 22nd Brigade to the south, 15th Brigade in the centre and 12th Brigade to the north, with the support of two regiments of field artillery and with 44th Brigade in reserve, would regain the Jurong Line. The first step of the attack would take place before 1800hrs that day. The problem with the scheme was that none of the formations involved were fit for an advance at all. By chance – and nothing more – they happened to be in relatively convenient locations for the tasks allotted, butlosses in men, transport and communications, exhaustion and local shortages of ammunition and water meant that there was no realistic prospect of mounting a successful attack without bringing large numbers of fresh troops into the battle. Additionally, the plan gave precious little thought to the practical difficulties of moving a large proportion of the attacking force through the night and seemingly no consideration at all to what actions the Japanese might have in mind.
38. Forest and mountain terrain in eastern Malaya. (Author’s collection)
39. A jungle creek. Although few Japanese soldiers had received any jungle-warfare training, they proved adept at infiltrating Allied positions by following small streams like this one in western Singapore. (Author’s collection)
40. Gen. Wavell in Singapore inspecting coastal guns, November 1941.
Relentless
11 February
0000hrs
Japanese troops secure Bukit Timah junction.
0300hrs
18th Division advance toward Bukit Timah.
0530hrs
15th Brigade ordered to counter-attack and break contact with the enemy by going cross country toward 22nd Brigade.
1300hrs
Bennett’s counter-attack to retake Bukit Timah abandoned.
Around 0300hrs on 11 February elements of 18th Division, with a modest amount of armoured support, advanced from the Tengah area toward Bukit Timah along the Jurong Road.
Around 0530hrs Brigadier Coates, aware that 15th Brigade was in danger of being completely surrounded and overwhelmed, gave orders to cancel the counter-attack and to break contact with the enemy. This was easier said than done. Japanese advances meant that much of the Jurong Road was now impassable and Coates ordered his remaining units to strike out cross-country toward the positions of 22nd Brigade.
To the north, troops from 5th Division, with a strong armoured element, had advanced from their concentration area and despite a strong stand by 2/29th, were able to reach Bukit Panjang village and then turn south toward Bukit Timah. At about 2230hrs they encountered the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who put up a fierce fight but could not hope to stop a column of fifty or so tanks.By midnight Japanese troops had secured the Bukit Timah junction, cutting communications to 15th Brigade, but did not press on into Singapore city, though there was really precious little to stop them.
Operations of 11 February 1942.
By this time several units had simply been destroyed and others so badly damaged that they were increasingly being formed into ad hoc units. Breakdown of discipline was also becoming a problem, with considerable numbers of personnel – chiefly British and Australian – roaming around in search of loot or any means of escape.
Now that Bukit Timah was in Japanese hands, they were well positioned to advance
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