4th
Army commander, Major General A. A. Korobkov, without support on
either flank. Had the Russians but known it, the threat to Leningrad
was as nothing beside the menace bearing down on the 4th Army. With
his centre under pressure from Kluge, Korobkov was isolated to the
north by Hoth's 3rd Panzergruppe and his left flank driven in
by Guderian's 2nd Panzergruppe . In three days Guderian had
driven a hundred miles northeast to Slonim, drawing, with Hoth, a
noose around the bulk of the Soviet infantry and the remaining
armour, which Pavlov had left in position. On 25th June, the 26th
Panzer Corps took Lesna and advanced fifty miles toward Slutsk; on
the 26th, the 66th Panzer Corps captured Baranovichi in the morning
and drove nearly sixty miles during the day to enter Stolpce at
nightfall. On the 27th this corps covered the remaining fifty miles
to Minsk, where it joined up with the southern arm of Hoth's pincer,
putting a "long-stop" behind the Slonim pocket and
achieving one of the most spectacular marches in the history of
armoured warfare.
In the south the Red Army held its ground better, thoueh at a
fearful price in men and equipment. The front commander was Colonel
General M. P. Kirponos (commander of the Kiev Military District), and
the forces of which he disposed were substantially stronger both than
those of his colleague to the north, the unfortunate Pavlov, and of
the Germans opposite him.
The main German thrust was directed down the relatively narrow gap
between the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes and the foothills of
the Carpathian range. Here Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group
South, had concentrated the whole of the 1st Panzer Army (Colonel
General von Kleist) and the 6th Army (Field Marshal von Reichenau)
and the 17th Army (Colonel General von Stülpnagel).
The longer front along the Prut and down to the shore of the Black
Sea had only one German army, the 11th (General von Schobert), to
stiffen a large mixed group of Hungarians and Rumanians. These last
were slow in getting off the mark, and being fitted out with French
equipment, were not formidable.
Kirponos therefore was free to concentrate against Kleist and
Reichenau. He had four infantry armies, [These were the 5th (Major
General of Tank Troops M. I. Potapov), the 6th (Lieutenant General I.
N. Muzychenko), the 26th (Lieutenant General F. Kostenko), and the
12th (Major General P. G. Ponedelin).] three mechanised corps in
close support (the 22nd, 4th, and 15th), one (the 8th) in reserve,
about 250 miles inland, and two in "strategic reserve" at
Zhitomir (the 19th and 9th). But this powerful force was dissipated
in a sequence of piecemeal counterattacks, and due largely to command
difficulties and the inexperience of the senior officers of the Red
Army in handling masses of armour, the strongest concentration of
Russian tank strength in the east lost its cutting edge before the
really critical phase of the southern battles developed.
On 22nd June, Kirponos had ordered up all three mechanised corps
from the reserve with the intention of concentrating them northeast
of Rovno and staging an attack, together with the 22nd (which was
already in position there), against Kleist's left flank. In fact, the
22nd Mechanised Corps was drawn into battle on the first day and cut
to pieces. The 15th Mechanised Corps, attacking from the south, was
likewise fought to a standstill in front of the German antitank
screen. With his tank strength seriously diminished, Kirponos held on
grimly, but by the time the 8th Mechanised Corps had completed its
forced march the situation had become so bad that it was sent
straight into action alone. Once again the Russian tanks took a
severe mauling, though better combat discipline and more up-to-date
equipment (some regiments had just been refitted with the T 34)
helped the corps preserve its cohesion.
[On 24th June, Halder, besides noting, "Interesting
historical coincidence that Napoleon also took Vilna on 24th June,"
also
Army commander, Major General A. A. Korobkov, without support on
either flank. Had the Russians but known it, the threat to Leningrad
was as nothing beside the menace bearing down on the 4th Army. With
his centre under pressure from Kluge, Korobkov was isolated to the
north by Hoth's 3rd Panzergruppe and his left flank driven in
by Guderian's 2nd Panzergruppe . In three days Guderian had
driven a hundred miles northeast to Slonim, drawing, with Hoth, a
noose around the bulk of the Soviet infantry and the remaining
armour, which Pavlov had left in position. On 25th June, the 26th
Panzer Corps took Lesna and advanced fifty miles toward Slutsk; on
the 26th, the 66th Panzer Corps captured Baranovichi in the morning
and drove nearly sixty miles during the day to enter Stolpce at
nightfall. On the 27th this corps covered the remaining fifty miles
to Minsk, where it joined up with the southern arm of Hoth's pincer,
putting a "long-stop" behind the Slonim pocket and
achieving one of the most spectacular marches in the history of
armoured warfare.
In the south the Red Army held its ground better, thoueh at a
fearful price in men and equipment. The front commander was Colonel
General M. P. Kirponos (commander of the Kiev Military District), and
the forces of which he disposed were substantially stronger both than
those of his colleague to the north, the unfortunate Pavlov, and of
the Germans opposite him.
The main German thrust was directed down the relatively narrow gap
between the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes and the foothills of
the Carpathian range. Here Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group
South, had concentrated the whole of the 1st Panzer Army (Colonel
General von Kleist) and the 6th Army (Field Marshal von Reichenau)
and the 17th Army (Colonel General von Stülpnagel).
The longer front along the Prut and down to the shore of the Black
Sea had only one German army, the 11th (General von Schobert), to
stiffen a large mixed group of Hungarians and Rumanians. These last
were slow in getting off the mark, and being fitted out with French
equipment, were not formidable.
Kirponos therefore was free to concentrate against Kleist and
Reichenau. He had four infantry armies, [These were the 5th (Major
General of Tank Troops M. I. Potapov), the 6th (Lieutenant General I.
N. Muzychenko), the 26th (Lieutenant General F. Kostenko), and the
12th (Major General P. G. Ponedelin).] three mechanised corps in
close support (the 22nd, 4th, and 15th), one (the 8th) in reserve,
about 250 miles inland, and two in "strategic reserve" at
Zhitomir (the 19th and 9th). But this powerful force was dissipated
in a sequence of piecemeal counterattacks, and due largely to command
difficulties and the inexperience of the senior officers of the Red
Army in handling masses of armour, the strongest concentration of
Russian tank strength in the east lost its cutting edge before the
really critical phase of the southern battles developed.
On 22nd June, Kirponos had ordered up all three mechanised corps
from the reserve with the intention of concentrating them northeast
of Rovno and staging an attack, together with the 22nd (which was
already in position there), against Kleist's left flank. In fact, the
22nd Mechanised Corps was drawn into battle on the first day and cut
to pieces. The 15th Mechanised Corps, attacking from the south, was
likewise fought to a standstill in front of the German antitank
screen. With his tank strength seriously diminished, Kirponos held on
grimly, but by the time the 8th Mechanised Corps had completed its
forced march the situation had become so bad that it was sent
straight into action alone. Once again the Russian tanks took a
severe mauling, though better combat discipline and more up-to-date
equipment (some regiments had just been refitted with the T 34)
helped the corps preserve its cohesion.
[On 24th June, Halder, besides noting, "Interesting
historical coincidence that Napoleon also took Vilna on 24th June,"
also
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