Camp Mecklenburg, by the SS before being taken by the Allies (26).
Establishment historians have all told us that the German atomic program was inept and disorganized. There may be some evidence for the charge that they did not share information between themselves due to strong rivalry (27) but the real facts are quite different than heretofore publicly disclosed (28). The overwhelming fact is that until now establishment historians have not had enough information to reach final conclusions about the German atomic program. Many facts have been concealed and these facts are only now being brought into the open. One fact is that there were even more German atomic programs than previously known, and the fact is that one of these programs was run by the SS (28).
One establishment historian, Thomas Powers (29), perhaps unwittingly gives us some insight into the discussion at hand. Powers concentrates on the historical sequence of the German atomic program and with the people involved and their relationships with one another. He also follows the progress of the many organizations researching atomic physics for the purposes of energy production and bomb making. Powers documents six such groups.
One group concerns this discussion. It was run by the Heereswaffenamt or Army Weapons Department. Its Director of Research was Dr. Erich Schumann who was also the scientific advisor to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Schumann was a professor of military physics at the University of Berlin. He also held a commission in the army so with these credentials he was able to move comfortably in both academic and military circles. Schumann should be thought of as an administrator rather than a research scientist (30).
The field of research was left to Dr. Kurt Diebner (31). Diebner was a physicist for the Heereswaffenamt since 1934 and headed his own atomic research project. German physics during the war years was geared towards practical results. During the early phases of the war it was thought that nuclear weapons were unnecessary. The thinking at the time was that the war could be won without an atomic bomb using conventional weaponry. Therefore, work on atomic weapons was de-emphasized in the early years of the war. Work on atomic means of energy production was always a high priority, a priority which only got higher as the war drug to a conclusion.
Germany always felt more threatened by dependence upon foreign sources for energy. Therefore, harnessing the energy potential of the atom for an ongoing source of energy was always a concern for German atomic scientists, much more so than for the Americans. This aim is clearly mentioned in discussion among the scientists involved in the work.
In early 1942 the success of Diebner’s reactor experiments lead him to propose a full-scale effort to develop both power-producing machines and atomic bombs. He continued to pressure Schumann who was more pessimistic about the possibilities of bringing this research to a practical result. Schumann finally became convinced and agreed to give a presentation to top Nazi officials of their findings. The text of Schumann’s speech was to stress the more conservative energy production aspect of atomic research rather than the building of a bomb. This was considered more feasible and so gives us an insight into the German atomic program and its thinking (32).
One example of their optimism was the participation of Diebner in plans for building an atomic power plant for Germany’s submarine fleet. The year 1945 was mentioned as a target date for this to happen (33)(34).
Diebner’s relationship to Schumann is made clear by Powers. Powers also introduces us to two additional players who were not officially involved with this project but who somehow interject themselves into things making their view heard.
The first is industrial physicist, Carl Ramsauer. Ramsauer was the head of the German Physical Society and a leading researcher for the electrical firm
Establishment historians have all told us that the German atomic program was inept and disorganized. There may be some evidence for the charge that they did not share information between themselves due to strong rivalry (27) but the real facts are quite different than heretofore publicly disclosed (28). The overwhelming fact is that until now establishment historians have not had enough information to reach final conclusions about the German atomic program. Many facts have been concealed and these facts are only now being brought into the open. One fact is that there were even more German atomic programs than previously known, and the fact is that one of these programs was run by the SS (28).
One establishment historian, Thomas Powers (29), perhaps unwittingly gives us some insight into the discussion at hand. Powers concentrates on the historical sequence of the German atomic program and with the people involved and their relationships with one another. He also follows the progress of the many organizations researching atomic physics for the purposes of energy production and bomb making. Powers documents six such groups.
One group concerns this discussion. It was run by the Heereswaffenamt or Army Weapons Department. Its Director of Research was Dr. Erich Schumann who was also the scientific advisor to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Schumann was a professor of military physics at the University of Berlin. He also held a commission in the army so with these credentials he was able to move comfortably in both academic and military circles. Schumann should be thought of as an administrator rather than a research scientist (30).
The field of research was left to Dr. Kurt Diebner (31). Diebner was a physicist for the Heereswaffenamt since 1934 and headed his own atomic research project. German physics during the war years was geared towards practical results. During the early phases of the war it was thought that nuclear weapons were unnecessary. The thinking at the time was that the war could be won without an atomic bomb using conventional weaponry. Therefore, work on atomic weapons was de-emphasized in the early years of the war. Work on atomic means of energy production was always a high priority, a priority which only got higher as the war drug to a conclusion.
Germany always felt more threatened by dependence upon foreign sources for energy. Therefore, harnessing the energy potential of the atom for an ongoing source of energy was always a concern for German atomic scientists, much more so than for the Americans. This aim is clearly mentioned in discussion among the scientists involved in the work.
In early 1942 the success of Diebner’s reactor experiments lead him to propose a full-scale effort to develop both power-producing machines and atomic bombs. He continued to pressure Schumann who was more pessimistic about the possibilities of bringing this research to a practical result. Schumann finally became convinced and agreed to give a presentation to top Nazi officials of their findings. The text of Schumann’s speech was to stress the more conservative energy production aspect of atomic research rather than the building of a bomb. This was considered more feasible and so gives us an insight into the German atomic program and its thinking (32).
One example of their optimism was the participation of Diebner in plans for building an atomic power plant for Germany’s submarine fleet. The year 1945 was mentioned as a target date for this to happen (33)(34).
Diebner’s relationship to Schumann is made clear by Powers. Powers also introduces us to two additional players who were not officially involved with this project but who somehow interject themselves into things making their view heard.
The first is industrial physicist, Carl Ramsauer. Ramsauer was the head of the German Physical Society and a leading researcher for the electrical firm
Similar Books
