planning. They knew from latest intelligence reports that there were only two carriers operating out of Pearl Harbor, and should have adjusted their allocations accordingly. Their failure to do so would have tactical implications—as will be seen, it contributed to much of the confusion of the torpedo attack.
Attack Routes and Sequencing
The torpedo units were to attack in single file, a decision that Fuchida claimed to have made. This was a remarkable choice. Line abreast was the usual torpedo attack formation against warships, to make it more difficult for ships to maneuver and avoid several torpedoes dropped simultaneously, and to spread the defensive AA fire. Fuchida claimed that the formation was chosen because it was thought that “the long thin line [was] especially well suited to Pearl Harbor with its narrow channel and many obstacles.” 50
(6) Torpedo Bomber Planned Attack Routes
Gordon Prange’s At Dawn We Slept contains a chart giving Fuchida’s representation of the planned lines of approach for the torpedo bombers. The dotted lines show the attack paths assigned to the Battleship Row attack, while the solid lines were the routes assigned those attacking the carrier anchorage.
There were 18 different attack paths, six against Battleship Row, two against potential battleship moorings along 1010 Dock, and five against potential carrier moorings northwest of Ford Island. Five were directed against potential cruiser locations. This scheme was likely formulated by Murata, a torpedo expert, who had been delegated responsibility for much of the planning for the torpedo bombers.
The Japanese would not know with surety which of the berths would be occupied with priority targets. Their last intelligence would be 24 to 48 hours late. Ships could change their moorings or enter or depart the harbor after the last update. Consequently, the aircraft commanders were to decide their own target selection and routes upon arrival. Aircraft were not pre-assigned to particular routes.
The problem that leaps from the chart is that 11 of the 18 attack routes cross, setting up the potential of mutual interference. Each group had routes that crossed, a problem that might be controlled within the aircraft of a single group through good communications and tight leadership. However, considering that each group was to attack in two lines with aircraft at 500 meter intervals, that each aircraft commander had the authority to choose whichever route he felt best, and that aircraft would be out of communications with their leaders, the possibility that aircraft would select crossing routes remained.
The greater potential for mutual interference came from the fact that routes belonging to different groups also crossed. This potentially sets up mid-air collisions or air-to-air near misses that could disrupt the attack—in modern terminology, the torpedo bombers’ attack routes were not deconflicted.
The most significant crossing route was one assigned to Hiryu’s and Soryu’s bombers going against the carrier moorings. They were given the option to deliver an attack against the fleet flagship’s berth along 1010 dock, which might be occupied by either a carrier or a battleship. Aircraft choosing this route would recover from their run across the approach paths of bombers going against Battleship Row.
Crossing attack routes can be deconflicted by altitude or by time. Altitude was obviously impossible, as the torpedoes had to be released from the same low altitude. The Japanese intended to feed bombers into the attack one at a time from each of the four groups, each sending in an aircraft at about seven-second intervals. But while each aircraft in a group would be separated by time, there was no way to prevent different groups from interfering with each other. Aircraft that were searching for alternate targets or repeating aborted runs would also be a hazard as they tried to re-insert themselves into the attack pattern. The aircraft
Attack Routes and Sequencing
The torpedo units were to attack in single file, a decision that Fuchida claimed to have made. This was a remarkable choice. Line abreast was the usual torpedo attack formation against warships, to make it more difficult for ships to maneuver and avoid several torpedoes dropped simultaneously, and to spread the defensive AA fire. Fuchida claimed that the formation was chosen because it was thought that “the long thin line [was] especially well suited to Pearl Harbor with its narrow channel and many obstacles.” 50
(6) Torpedo Bomber Planned Attack Routes
Gordon Prange’s At Dawn We Slept contains a chart giving Fuchida’s representation of the planned lines of approach for the torpedo bombers. The dotted lines show the attack paths assigned to the Battleship Row attack, while the solid lines were the routes assigned those attacking the carrier anchorage.
There were 18 different attack paths, six against Battleship Row, two against potential battleship moorings along 1010 Dock, and five against potential carrier moorings northwest of Ford Island. Five were directed against potential cruiser locations. This scheme was likely formulated by Murata, a torpedo expert, who had been delegated responsibility for much of the planning for the torpedo bombers.
The Japanese would not know with surety which of the berths would be occupied with priority targets. Their last intelligence would be 24 to 48 hours late. Ships could change their moorings or enter or depart the harbor after the last update. Consequently, the aircraft commanders were to decide their own target selection and routes upon arrival. Aircraft were not pre-assigned to particular routes.
The problem that leaps from the chart is that 11 of the 18 attack routes cross, setting up the potential of mutual interference. Each group had routes that crossed, a problem that might be controlled within the aircraft of a single group through good communications and tight leadership. However, considering that each group was to attack in two lines with aircraft at 500 meter intervals, that each aircraft commander had the authority to choose whichever route he felt best, and that aircraft would be out of communications with their leaders, the possibility that aircraft would select crossing routes remained.
The greater potential for mutual interference came from the fact that routes belonging to different groups also crossed. This potentially sets up mid-air collisions or air-to-air near misses that could disrupt the attack—in modern terminology, the torpedo bombers’ attack routes were not deconflicted.
The most significant crossing route was one assigned to Hiryu’s and Soryu’s bombers going against the carrier moorings. They were given the option to deliver an attack against the fleet flagship’s berth along 1010 dock, which might be occupied by either a carrier or a battleship. Aircraft choosing this route would recover from their run across the approach paths of bombers going against Battleship Row.
Crossing attack routes can be deconflicted by altitude or by time. Altitude was obviously impossible, as the torpedoes had to be released from the same low altitude. The Japanese intended to feed bombers into the attack one at a time from each of the four groups, each sending in an aircraft at about seven-second intervals. But while each aircraft in a group would be separated by time, there was no way to prevent different groups from interfering with each other. Aircraft that were searching for alternate targets or repeating aborted runs would also be a hazard as they tried to re-insert themselves into the attack pattern. The aircraft
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