enough to sink a carrier compared to four to five for a battleship. The Japanese plan sent sixteen torpedo bombers to achieve the eight hits needed to guarantee the sinking of two carriers (two bombers per needed hit), but only 24 bombers to get the 30 hits needed to guarantee the sinking of six battleships (0.8 of a bomber per needed hit).
The D3A Val dive-bombers added more firepower against the carriers. Eighty-one Vals were to be sent against fleet targets in the second wave, and their first priority was aircraft carriers. If the carriers had been sunk or capsized by the torpedo attack, the dive-bombers were instructed to bomb the hulks. The planners added suspenders to their belt to ensure that the carriers would never sail again.
This was likely the aviation commander Genda’s work. Genda had previously made clear his views that battleships were obsolete and that carriers were the most important objectives of the attack. In initial estimates for Yamamoto in February of 1941, Genda made carriers the attack’s first priority, but was overruled.
Genda gave voice to his opinions the day before the attack. Aboard Akagi , he learned there were no carriers in Pearl Harbor. However, another staff officer pointed out that the carriers might return. Genda cheered up, saying, “If that happened, I don’t care if all eight battleships are away.” 48
Another thing that suggests that the weighting was intentional was the numbers involved. The carrier attack moorings were attacked by two groups of eight carrier attack planes. Eight is an unusual number in Japanese air doctrine—it is not a multiple of the usual 3-plane shotai . This indicates that the number of planes sent against the carrier moorings was not a product of doctrine but a conscious decision.
Additional evidence comes from Abe Zenji, a dive-bomber pilot in the second wave, who stated, “If we could not find the carriers, our secondary targets would be cruisers.” Speaking of the attack as a whole, he went on to say, “We missed our main objective, the aircraft carriers , since they were at sea.” 49
Genda and his aviators had their own priorities, and killing carriers was at the top of the list. They would go for battleships, but they were doubly interested in pulverizing their own US counterparts.
Did Genda slip this allocation into the plan, or was it made with Yamamoto’s knowledge and consent? It is hard to say, because Japanese staffs had a much different culture from Western staffs. The Japanese military vested an unusual amount of independence to middle grade officers, to the extent that some started wars or initiated invasions or even assassinated political leaders on their own initiative. The planning environment allowed little interplay between seniors and juniors. Criticism would imply that the work was inadequate, a failure by the junior officer. Failure was anathema, a shame that in some cases might only be expunged by ritual suicide.
So, whether the firepower distribution was as Yamamoto wanted, or as Genda slipped in, is hard to discern. It likely was Genda’s. After all, with an opportunity to assign additional firepower to targets when he granted the midget submarines a place in the attack, Yamamoto assigned them to strike battleships. Yamamoto wanted more hits on battleships; Genda wanted more on carriers.
It is never good when the objectives of the boss and his chief planner are not aligned.
There is another consideration. The torpedo bomber allocations were made early in the planning process. Some Japanese documents refer to the possibility that there might be four American carriers in port. If that was their expectation, then the Japanese were sending four torpedo bombers per carrier, the same as what they allocated against the battleships. This is still an overweight against the carriers, since carriers were more vulnerable than battleships. But if this was the case, it demonstrated again the incredible inflexibility in Japanese
The D3A Val dive-bombers added more firepower against the carriers. Eighty-one Vals were to be sent against fleet targets in the second wave, and their first priority was aircraft carriers. If the carriers had been sunk or capsized by the torpedo attack, the dive-bombers were instructed to bomb the hulks. The planners added suspenders to their belt to ensure that the carriers would never sail again.
This was likely the aviation commander Genda’s work. Genda had previously made clear his views that battleships were obsolete and that carriers were the most important objectives of the attack. In initial estimates for Yamamoto in February of 1941, Genda made carriers the attack’s first priority, but was overruled.
Genda gave voice to his opinions the day before the attack. Aboard Akagi , he learned there were no carriers in Pearl Harbor. However, another staff officer pointed out that the carriers might return. Genda cheered up, saying, “If that happened, I don’t care if all eight battleships are away.” 48
Another thing that suggests that the weighting was intentional was the numbers involved. The carrier attack moorings were attacked by two groups of eight carrier attack planes. Eight is an unusual number in Japanese air doctrine—it is not a multiple of the usual 3-plane shotai . This indicates that the number of planes sent against the carrier moorings was not a product of doctrine but a conscious decision.
Additional evidence comes from Abe Zenji, a dive-bomber pilot in the second wave, who stated, “If we could not find the carriers, our secondary targets would be cruisers.” Speaking of the attack as a whole, he went on to say, “We missed our main objective, the aircraft carriers , since they were at sea.” 49
Genda and his aviators had their own priorities, and killing carriers was at the top of the list. They would go for battleships, but they were doubly interested in pulverizing their own US counterparts.
Did Genda slip this allocation into the plan, or was it made with Yamamoto’s knowledge and consent? It is hard to say, because Japanese staffs had a much different culture from Western staffs. The Japanese military vested an unusual amount of independence to middle grade officers, to the extent that some started wars or initiated invasions or even assassinated political leaders on their own initiative. The planning environment allowed little interplay between seniors and juniors. Criticism would imply that the work was inadequate, a failure by the junior officer. Failure was anathema, a shame that in some cases might only be expunged by ritual suicide.
So, whether the firepower distribution was as Yamamoto wanted, or as Genda slipped in, is hard to discern. It likely was Genda’s. After all, with an opportunity to assign additional firepower to targets when he granted the midget submarines a place in the attack, Yamamoto assigned them to strike battleships. Yamamoto wanted more hits on battleships; Genda wanted more on carriers.
It is never good when the objectives of the boss and his chief planner are not aligned.
There is another consideration. The torpedo bomber allocations were made early in the planning process. Some Japanese documents refer to the possibility that there might be four American carriers in port. If that was their expectation, then the Japanese were sending four torpedo bombers per carrier, the same as what they allocated against the battleships. This is still an overweight against the carriers, since carriers were more vulnerable than battleships. But if this was the case, it demonstrated again the incredible inflexibility in Japanese
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