whether he would ever run for president. âI am not a politician and I will never be, and I say that with absolute conviction,â Petraeus said, paraphrasing Shermanâs famous response to a similar question.
âNo way, nohow?â Gregory asked.
âNo way, nohow,â said Petraeus.
Since arriving in Afghanistan, he had spoken again and again during his stand-ups about the need for skillful media interplay, mindful of what one of his heroes, T. E. Lawrence, said in 1920: âThe printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander.â
As he sat down with Gregory, Petraeus repeated a point he had made during a stand-up back in early July: âWeâre making progress, and progress is winning.â His performance was measured. âI think itâs incumbent upon us to show greater progress . . . really just began this spring.â
Petraeus said that he and General McChrystal had spent the past year and a half getting âthe inputsâ right. By the end of the month, when the final brigade from the 101st Airborne had arrived, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan would be three times what it had been at the beginning of 2009. Now the real fight could begin.
CHAPTER 3
TRUE BELIEVERS
A mericaâs involvement in Afghanistan since the fall of 2001 had been a colossal missed opportunity. The brilliant combination of U.S. Special Operations Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, Afghan Northern Alliance fighters, and American airpower that toppled the Taliban in three months was squandered when the United States marched headlong into Iraq in early 2003. The war there diverted troops, airpower, technology, and focus from Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces were far too few in number to stop an insurgency that had returned with a vengeance by 2006. The reemergence of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other insurgent fighters was by no means inevitable, if America and its NATO allies had capitalized on the Talibanâs swift demise and brought enough soldiers to Afghanistan to protect the people and rebuild the nation, beginning at the village and provincial level. But that was never to be. By the time McChrystalâs predecessor, General David McKiernan, took command of the war in Afghanistan in the spring of 2008, the United States had only 33,000 military personnel in the countryâand only about a third of them were fulfilling combat missions. Despite the success of counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq, where U.S. forces moved off large bases to live with the people, in Afghanistan most U.S. forces remained on heavily fortified bases and a limited number of outposts. Protecting the Afghan people, rooting out corruption and fostering competent government were not priorities they could execute.
The âlight footprintâ mandated by thenâDefense secretary Donald Rumsfeld for the first five years of the war reflected Rumsfeldâs preferenceâcritics would call it a prejudiceâfor speed, agility and precision instead of a heavy, massed force. The Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force was an outdated Cold War imperative that, in Rumsfeldâs mind, was no longer necessary in an age of proxy forces, smart bombs and armed drones that could find and kill the enemy without any troops at all. The stunning speed with which small numbers of Special Forces and CIA operatives, working in tandem with Afghan warlords, had dispatched the Taliban the first time around only served to confirm and validate Rumsfeldâs notions.Indeed, Rumsfeld imposed a âforce capâ in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.
His preference for a lighter force also contributed to the downward spiral in Iraq, where U.S. forces invaded with fewer troops than most generals, including Petraeus, thought advisable. While the invasion force easily toppled Saddam Husseinâs regime, the Bush administration did not have enough personnel to either secure the nation or
âNo way, nohow?â Gregory asked.
âNo way, nohow,â said Petraeus.
Since arriving in Afghanistan, he had spoken again and again during his stand-ups about the need for skillful media interplay, mindful of what one of his heroes, T. E. Lawrence, said in 1920: âThe printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander.â
As he sat down with Gregory, Petraeus repeated a point he had made during a stand-up back in early July: âWeâre making progress, and progress is winning.â His performance was measured. âI think itâs incumbent upon us to show greater progress . . . really just began this spring.â
Petraeus said that he and General McChrystal had spent the past year and a half getting âthe inputsâ right. By the end of the month, when the final brigade from the 101st Airborne had arrived, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan would be three times what it had been at the beginning of 2009. Now the real fight could begin.
CHAPTER 3
TRUE BELIEVERS
A mericaâs involvement in Afghanistan since the fall of 2001 had been a colossal missed opportunity. The brilliant combination of U.S. Special Operations Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, Afghan Northern Alliance fighters, and American airpower that toppled the Taliban in three months was squandered when the United States marched headlong into Iraq in early 2003. The war there diverted troops, airpower, technology, and focus from Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces were far too few in number to stop an insurgency that had returned with a vengeance by 2006. The reemergence of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other insurgent fighters was by no means inevitable, if America and its NATO allies had capitalized on the Talibanâs swift demise and brought enough soldiers to Afghanistan to protect the people and rebuild the nation, beginning at the village and provincial level. But that was never to be. By the time McChrystalâs predecessor, General David McKiernan, took command of the war in Afghanistan in the spring of 2008, the United States had only 33,000 military personnel in the countryâand only about a third of them were fulfilling combat missions. Despite the success of counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq, where U.S. forces moved off large bases to live with the people, in Afghanistan most U.S. forces remained on heavily fortified bases and a limited number of outposts. Protecting the Afghan people, rooting out corruption and fostering competent government were not priorities they could execute.
The âlight footprintâ mandated by thenâDefense secretary Donald Rumsfeld for the first five years of the war reflected Rumsfeldâs preferenceâcritics would call it a prejudiceâfor speed, agility and precision instead of a heavy, massed force. The Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force was an outdated Cold War imperative that, in Rumsfeldâs mind, was no longer necessary in an age of proxy forces, smart bombs and armed drones that could find and kill the enemy without any troops at all. The stunning speed with which small numbers of Special Forces and CIA operatives, working in tandem with Afghan warlords, had dispatched the Taliban the first time around only served to confirm and validate Rumsfeldâs notions.Indeed, Rumsfeld imposed a âforce capâ in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.
His preference for a lighter force also contributed to the downward spiral in Iraq, where U.S. forces invaded with fewer troops than most generals, including Petraeus, thought advisable. While the invasion force easily toppled Saddam Husseinâs regime, the Bush administration did not have enough personnel to either secure the nation or
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