All In by Paula Broadwell Page A

terms, the document governed the use of what Petraeus had called, during his confirmation hearing, “large, casualty-producing devices”—bombs, close air support, attack helicopters. The biggest single change in his update was stated unequivocally in its first paragraph: “Subordinate commanders are not authorized to further restrict this guidance without my approval.” His conclusion was that the problem lay not so much with McChrystal’s directive but with subordinate commanders who had added conditions that made it more difficult for U.S. and NATO forces to fight—in essence, restricting units beyond McChrystal’s intent.
    But Petraeus also sought greater clarity. Where the prior directive had instructed “leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance with this guidance,” Petraeus’s said: “Prior to the use of fires, the commander approving the strike must determine that no civilians are present. If unable to assess the risk of civilian presence, fires are prohibited.” The only exception: protecting the lives of ISAF or Afghan forces.
    Petraeus’s directive called to mind the observation by F. Scott Fitzgerald: “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” The directive required commanders to do everything humanly possible both to protect Afghan civilians, which typically meant not firing, while also protecting those in uniform, which often meant firing full bore.
    To help alleviate that tension, Petraeus stated unequivocally in the new Tactical Directive that he wanted ISAF troops to partner with Afghan forces on “every operation.” “Partnering is how we operate,” the directive states. “Some civilian casualties result from a misunderstanding or ignorance of local customs and behaviors. No individuals are more attuned to the Afghan culture than our Afghan partners.”
    The key difference between the old and new directives, in Petraeus’s mind, was the provision that prohibited subordinate commanders from issuing more restrictive conditions, such as limiting the use of attack helicopters and close air support. “It was the
application
of the last Tactical Directive that created some of the mythology that we had restricted the dropping of bombs,” Petraeus said. As a matter of fact, Petraeus had no qualms about dropping bombs—albeit when and where appropriate.The number of bombs dropped in Iraq under Petraeus’s command increased dramatically during the surge in 2007, just as the tempo of Special Operations raids there had—and that tempo was increasing on his watch in Afghanistan as well. The
Counterinsurgency Field Manual
he produced in 2006 at Fort Leavenworth, between tours in Iraq, “doesn’t say that the best weapons don’t shoot,” he said.“It says
sometimes
the best weapons don’t shoot. Sometimes the best weapons do shoot.” Still, the new Tactical Directive was quite clear: “
Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause.
If we use excessive force or operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.”
    In any event, the bitter complaining by troops who felt their hands had been tied ceased after Petraeus issued his update.
    AT ISAF HEADQUARTERS on the morning of August 15, Petraeus and his staff geared up to begin doing press engagements again, after Petraeus, following the precedent he’d set in Iraq, had eschewed such activities in his first month in Afghanistan. NBC’s David Gregory, the first to arrive, called him “easily America’s most famous warrior” at the start of the broadcast and asked him during a lengthy interview