under the British Governor. After falling from power in 1939, thanks to a British-rigged election, he made contact with some Pan-Asianist military lobbyists. In January 1941, Japanâs Prime Minister Tojo announced in the Diet that âif the Burmese offer to co-operate with Japan in establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan would gladly grant independence to the Burmeseâ. The British were driven out of Burma a yearlater by the Japanese Army, accompanied by a Burma Independence Army mainly recruited from Burmans living in Siam. In July 1943, a treaty of alliance between Japan and Burma was signed in the emperorâs palace, and Dr Ba Maw became the head of state.
Something not too different happened in the Philippines at the same time. The US allowed Manuel Quezon to become the first elected president in 1935, and promised independence in 1946. But when the Japanese Occupation took place and Quezon fled to the US, along with most Americans, Senator José Laurel became president, with the same kind of status as Dr Ba Maw in Burma, and the promise of a speedy independence. Nothing like this happened in Indonesia. In late 1943 Prime Minister Koiso promised independence only âsome timeâ, and there was never an Indonesian head of state. With the downfall of Hitler in April 1945, Tokyo realized that Japan was facing total defeat, and officers in Indonesia assumed that they should fight to the death for the sake of the emperor. But there were others, including Maeda Tadeshi, who believed they should fulfil the promise of independence as fast as they could, whatever the cost.
The end came when American atomic bombs obliterated Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki three days later. On August 15 the emperor announced on the radio his immediate surrender. On September 2, he ordered all armed personnel to lay down their weapons.
Maeda was among those who argued successfully that most of the Japanese armaments should be quietly passed to the Indonesian leaders of the PETA, trained from 1943to fight with the Japanese if and when the Allies attacked (which did not happen). Without an army, the country would relapse into a Dutch colony. He also believed that the country had to have an effective head of state, in the person of Soekarno. But on August 16, a small group of young radicals kidnapped Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, his respected no. 2. The youngsters believed that the pair had no courage, and would not announce a Republic of Indonesia. It was Maeda who connected with the radicals and persuaded them to release the victims, and further managed to arrange a compromise meeting between all parties in his house. But he retired to bed without interfering. Late on the morning of August 17, Soekarno and Hatta announced the birth of a free Indonesia. Maeda made sure that the army would not make any trouble.
Maeda was quite frank that the war had been a stupid disaster (this was in line with the Japanese Navy view of the folly of the Japanese Army), and that he had seen his role as head of the Kaigun Bukanfu (naval liaison office) in Jakarta as helping Indonesia to become independent, in line with the early idea that Japan should promote the liberation of Asia, not its conquest and insertion into the Japanese Empire.
The best thing about the interviews Maeda gave me was that he spoke in detail about what he had tried to do, failed to do and managed to do, under very difficult circumstances. He was modest about his role in the complicated process whereby Indonesia was able to declare its independence on 17 August 1945. What he did feel proud of was simply that he had intervened to convince the armyleaders to let the Indonesians make their own decisions. He had deliberately absented himself from the final discussions about the independence declaration among the Indonesians. Later, when I interviewed Indonesians who had worked with Maeda and the Kaigun Bukanfu, including the soft-hearted communist and
Something not too different happened in the Philippines at the same time. The US allowed Manuel Quezon to become the first elected president in 1935, and promised independence in 1946. But when the Japanese Occupation took place and Quezon fled to the US, along with most Americans, Senator José Laurel became president, with the same kind of status as Dr Ba Maw in Burma, and the promise of a speedy independence. Nothing like this happened in Indonesia. In late 1943 Prime Minister Koiso promised independence only âsome timeâ, and there was never an Indonesian head of state. With the downfall of Hitler in April 1945, Tokyo realized that Japan was facing total defeat, and officers in Indonesia assumed that they should fight to the death for the sake of the emperor. But there were others, including Maeda Tadeshi, who believed they should fulfil the promise of independence as fast as they could, whatever the cost.
The end came when American atomic bombs obliterated Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki three days later. On August 15 the emperor announced on the radio his immediate surrender. On September 2, he ordered all armed personnel to lay down their weapons.
Maeda was among those who argued successfully that most of the Japanese armaments should be quietly passed to the Indonesian leaders of the PETA, trained from 1943to fight with the Japanese if and when the Allies attacked (which did not happen). Without an army, the country would relapse into a Dutch colony. He also believed that the country had to have an effective head of state, in the person of Soekarno. But on August 16, a small group of young radicals kidnapped Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, his respected no. 2. The youngsters believed that the pair had no courage, and would not announce a Republic of Indonesia. It was Maeda who connected with the radicals and persuaded them to release the victims, and further managed to arrange a compromise meeting between all parties in his house. But he retired to bed without interfering. Late on the morning of August 17, Soekarno and Hatta announced the birth of a free Indonesia. Maeda made sure that the army would not make any trouble.
Maeda was quite frank that the war had been a stupid disaster (this was in line with the Japanese Navy view of the folly of the Japanese Army), and that he had seen his role as head of the Kaigun Bukanfu (naval liaison office) in Jakarta as helping Indonesia to become independent, in line with the early idea that Japan should promote the liberation of Asia, not its conquest and insertion into the Japanese Empire.
The best thing about the interviews Maeda gave me was that he spoke in detail about what he had tried to do, failed to do and managed to do, under very difficult circumstances. He was modest about his role in the complicated process whereby Indonesia was able to declare its independence on 17 August 1945. What he did feel proud of was simply that he had intervened to convince the armyleaders to let the Indonesians make their own decisions. He had deliberately absented himself from the final discussions about the independence declaration among the Indonesians. Later, when I interviewed Indonesians who had worked with Maeda and the Kaigun Bukanfu, including the soft-hearted communist and
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