beyond the range of any British plane flying from Britain, France, or unoccupied Belgium, the navy converted three Channel passenger steamers into carriers from which seaplanes could be lowered into the water for takeoff. On Christmas Day 1914, seven RNAS seaplanes launched the raid which in foggy conditions failed to locate and destroy any zeppelins but provoked the word’s first air-sea battle as zeppelins and German seaplanes attacked the British seaplane carriers and their naval escort.
The German army and navy both hoped for the glory of being the first to bomb the British mainland. Von Tirpitz wrote in mid-November 1914 of his conviction that “the English are now in terror of Zeppelins, perhaps not without reason.” Though “not in favour of ‘frightfulness’ ” and considering indiscriminate bombing “repulsive” when it “killed an old woman,” he saw the potential that “if one could set fire to London in thirty places then the repulsiveness would be lost sight of,” later adding that “all that flies . . . should be concentrated on that city.” Admiral Gustav Bachmann, shortly to become chief of the naval staff, agreed, arguing that Germany “should leave no means untried to crush England, and that successful raids on London, in view of the already existing nervousness of the people, would prove a valuable means to this end.” However, the army and navy high commands had to contend with the kaiser, who hesitated over what the zeppelin targets should be and in particular whether zeppelins should be allowed to bomb London, where his royal relations lived and of which he had sentimental memories. Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, a habitual opponent of von Tirpitz’s aggressive policies, whom the admiral would accuse of “lukewarm flabbiness,” was also reluctant.
While the kaiser pondered, German planes conducted three small air raids on England. On December 21, 1914, an Albatross seaplane dropped two twenty-pound bombs that fell into the sea near Dover pier. In the days that followed, a second plane dropped the first bomb to fall on British soil. It landed near Dover Castle, shattering several windows. A third dropped two bombs on the village of Cliffe on the Thames estuary.
Churchill believed from intelligence sources that raids on London itself could not be far away. On New Year’s Day 1915 he told the British cabinet that Germany had approximately twenty airships capable of reaching London “carrying each a ton of high explosives. They could traverse the English part of the journey, coming and going, in the dark hours . . . There is no known means of preventing the airships coming, and not much chance of punishing them on their return. The un-avenged destruction of non-combatant life may therefore be very considerable.” So perturbed was Admiral Jacky Fisher that he suggested Britain inform Germany that any captured zeppelin men would be shot as pirates. When Churchill disagreed with him he threatened to resign but Churchill deftly dissuaded him.
Early in January 1915, the kaiser agreed that zeppelins could attack England but insisted their targets be limited to naval shipyards, arsenals, docks, and other military establishments in the Thames estuary and on the east coast, and that “London itself was not to be bombed.” On January 19 three naval zeppelins took off, aiming to inflict the damage so ardently demanded in a popular German song:
Zeppelin, flieg,
Fly Zeppelin
Hilf uns in Krieg,
Help us in war,
Fliege nach England,
Fly to England,
England wird abgebrannt,
England will burn,
Zeppelin, flieg!
Fly Zeppelin!
L6 was only halfway across the North Sea when engine trouble forced it back but L3 and L4 continued and despite rain, fog, and sleet reached the Norfolk coast. A young man on the ground spotted “two bright stars moving, apparently thirty yards apart”—the navigation lights of the L3 and L4 . Once over land, the two zeppelins
The German army and navy both hoped for the glory of being the first to bomb the British mainland. Von Tirpitz wrote in mid-November 1914 of his conviction that “the English are now in terror of Zeppelins, perhaps not without reason.” Though “not in favour of ‘frightfulness’ ” and considering indiscriminate bombing “repulsive” when it “killed an old woman,” he saw the potential that “if one could set fire to London in thirty places then the repulsiveness would be lost sight of,” later adding that “all that flies . . . should be concentrated on that city.” Admiral Gustav Bachmann, shortly to become chief of the naval staff, agreed, arguing that Germany “should leave no means untried to crush England, and that successful raids on London, in view of the already existing nervousness of the people, would prove a valuable means to this end.” However, the army and navy high commands had to contend with the kaiser, who hesitated over what the zeppelin targets should be and in particular whether zeppelins should be allowed to bomb London, where his royal relations lived and of which he had sentimental memories. Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, a habitual opponent of von Tirpitz’s aggressive policies, whom the admiral would accuse of “lukewarm flabbiness,” was also reluctant.
While the kaiser pondered, German planes conducted three small air raids on England. On December 21, 1914, an Albatross seaplane dropped two twenty-pound bombs that fell into the sea near Dover pier. In the days that followed, a second plane dropped the first bomb to fall on British soil. It landed near Dover Castle, shattering several windows. A third dropped two bombs on the village of Cliffe on the Thames estuary.
Churchill believed from intelligence sources that raids on London itself could not be far away. On New Year’s Day 1915 he told the British cabinet that Germany had approximately twenty airships capable of reaching London “carrying each a ton of high explosives. They could traverse the English part of the journey, coming and going, in the dark hours . . . There is no known means of preventing the airships coming, and not much chance of punishing them on their return. The un-avenged destruction of non-combatant life may therefore be very considerable.” So perturbed was Admiral Jacky Fisher that he suggested Britain inform Germany that any captured zeppelin men would be shot as pirates. When Churchill disagreed with him he threatened to resign but Churchill deftly dissuaded him.
Early in January 1915, the kaiser agreed that zeppelins could attack England but insisted their targets be limited to naval shipyards, arsenals, docks, and other military establishments in the Thames estuary and on the east coast, and that “London itself was not to be bombed.” On January 19 three naval zeppelins took off, aiming to inflict the damage so ardently demanded in a popular German song:
Zeppelin, flieg,
Fly Zeppelin
Hilf uns in Krieg,
Help us in war,
Fliege nach England,
Fly to England,
England wird abgebrannt,
England will burn,
Zeppelin, flieg!
Fly Zeppelin!
L6 was only halfway across the North Sea when engine trouble forced it back but L3 and L4 continued and despite rain, fog, and sleet reached the Norfolk coast. A young man on the ground spotted “two bright stars moving, apparently thirty yards apart”—the navigation lights of the L3 and L4 . Once over land, the two zeppelins
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