Churchill and Fisher were responsible, and the army’s Royal Flying Corps (RFC). (The two air arms would not combine into the Royal Air Force until April 1918.) The RNAS had more than 90 planes, 53 of them seaplanes, and 7 small airships. The RFC possessed 190 planes. However, many of the planes of both services were unairworthy.
With all the RFC’s serviceable airplanes dispatched to France, on September 3, 1914, Churchill and the Admiralty accepted responsibility for the air defense of Britain from the army. Two days later Churchill announced his strategy. The RNAS would establish a forward line of defense in France and a second line somewhere between Dover and London. Other measures included ordering and siting antiaircraft guns and searchlights and laying out floodlit landing strips in London’s parks for British fighters. By the end of 1914, Churchill’s plans had crystallized into a two-tier system; aircraft stationed inland should receive sufficient warning of zeppelins approaching London to get airborne to intercept them while planes nearer the coast would be waiting to attack returning zeppelins. In practice, however, he knew that all planes then available would struggle to reach the height at which zeppelins flew.
From October 1 the government imposed a blackout—limited at first but soon extended. The tops and sides of streetlamps were painted black to mask their radiance from above and people were asked to draw their curtains tight. In these early weeks anxious Londoners scanned the night skies but no zeppelins came. During the first days of the war the German army lost three zeppelins on the western front. French shell fire brought down the first two while the third was fired on initially by German soldiers in error, then by Allied troops who shot off its rudder leaving it to drift helplessly before plummeting into a forest. However, any hopes that airships might not be as menacing or effective as feared were extinguished when zeppelin attacks in August and early September on Liège and Antwerp in support of the German advance killed a number of civilians.
Believing the best place to attack a zeppelin was on the ground, Churchill ordered an RNAS raid on zeppelin sheds in Cologne and Düsseldorf. On October 8, 1914, two British pilots took off from Antwerp just as British troops were about to pull out of the city in the face of a German advance. One headed for Cologne where he was unable to find the sheds. However, Flight Lieutenant Reggie Marix in a Sopwith Tabloid reached Düsseldorf and finally located a shed further outside the city than his map indicated. Swooping low, he released his two bombs: “As I pulled out of my dive, I looked over my shoulder and was rewarded with the sight of enormous sheets of flame pouring out of the shed.” After landing his bullet-riddled plane north of Antwerp because his fuel was running out and finally catching up with the retreating British forces by means of train and bicycle, he learned that he had destroyed a brand-new airship.
Encouraged by what was Britain’s first successful bombing raid on Germany and learning from intelligence reports that two zeppelins had almost been completed at the zeppelin plant in Friedrichshafen, Churchill ordered a further RNAS raid. On November 21 four new Avro 504 biplanes, each armed with four twenty-pound bombs, took off from Belfort in eastern France. Three reached Friedrichshafen and dropped nine bombs but failed to destroy the zeppelins. Two of the pilots returned to base but the third was forced to land near the burning zeppelin sheds where local people attacked him. German soldiers intervened and took him to a hospital. The German government at once accused the British of barbarously dropping bombs on the “innocent civilians” of Friedrichshafen despite knowing the only casualties had been mechanics and crewmen.
In December the RNAS targeted zeppelin sheds at Nordholz on the German North Sea coast. Since Nordholz was
With all the RFC’s serviceable airplanes dispatched to France, on September 3, 1914, Churchill and the Admiralty accepted responsibility for the air defense of Britain from the army. Two days later Churchill announced his strategy. The RNAS would establish a forward line of defense in France and a second line somewhere between Dover and London. Other measures included ordering and siting antiaircraft guns and searchlights and laying out floodlit landing strips in London’s parks for British fighters. By the end of 1914, Churchill’s plans had crystallized into a two-tier system; aircraft stationed inland should receive sufficient warning of zeppelins approaching London to get airborne to intercept them while planes nearer the coast would be waiting to attack returning zeppelins. In practice, however, he knew that all planes then available would struggle to reach the height at which zeppelins flew.
From October 1 the government imposed a blackout—limited at first but soon extended. The tops and sides of streetlamps were painted black to mask their radiance from above and people were asked to draw their curtains tight. In these early weeks anxious Londoners scanned the night skies but no zeppelins came. During the first days of the war the German army lost three zeppelins on the western front. French shell fire brought down the first two while the third was fired on initially by German soldiers in error, then by Allied troops who shot off its rudder leaving it to drift helplessly before plummeting into a forest. However, any hopes that airships might not be as menacing or effective as feared were extinguished when zeppelin attacks in August and early September on Liège and Antwerp in support of the German advance killed a number of civilians.
Believing the best place to attack a zeppelin was on the ground, Churchill ordered an RNAS raid on zeppelin sheds in Cologne and Düsseldorf. On October 8, 1914, two British pilots took off from Antwerp just as British troops were about to pull out of the city in the face of a German advance. One headed for Cologne where he was unable to find the sheds. However, Flight Lieutenant Reggie Marix in a Sopwith Tabloid reached Düsseldorf and finally located a shed further outside the city than his map indicated. Swooping low, he released his two bombs: “As I pulled out of my dive, I looked over my shoulder and was rewarded with the sight of enormous sheets of flame pouring out of the shed.” After landing his bullet-riddled plane north of Antwerp because his fuel was running out and finally catching up with the retreating British forces by means of train and bicycle, he learned that he had destroyed a brand-new airship.
Encouraged by what was Britain’s first successful bombing raid on Germany and learning from intelligence reports that two zeppelins had almost been completed at the zeppelin plant in Friedrichshafen, Churchill ordered a further RNAS raid. On November 21 four new Avro 504 biplanes, each armed with four twenty-pound bombs, took off from Belfort in eastern France. Three reached Friedrichshafen and dropped nine bombs but failed to destroy the zeppelins. Two of the pilots returned to base but the third was forced to land near the burning zeppelin sheds where local people attacked him. German soldiers intervened and took him to a hospital. The German government at once accused the British of barbarously dropping bombs on the “innocent civilians” of Friedrichshafen despite knowing the only casualties had been mechanics and crewmen.
In December the RNAS targeted zeppelin sheds at Nordholz on the German North Sea coast. Since Nordholz was
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