British had not actually agreed to his conditions.
Madison was right to be cautious, for when Foreign Secretary Castlereagh saw the president’s proposals, he rejected them out of hand. He wrote to Russell on August 29 that His Majesty’s government could not, under any circumstances, “consent to suspend the exercise of a right [impressment] upon which the naval strength of the Empire mainly depends.” Castlereagh believed, with good cause, that if he accepted Madison’s terms, he would be thrown out of office, as would the entire ministry. And those who replaced them would not accept American terms either.
Anticipating this response, Russell offered “to give assurance that a law shall be passed (to be reciprocal) to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States.” Monroe had authorized Russell to offer the British, by an act of Congress, a prohibition on the employment of British seamen in the public or private marine of the United States. And Madison wrote an editorial in the National Intelligencer offering to “prevent the employment of British seamen in American vessels if Britain would stop making impressments from them.”
But Castlereagh would not be moved. British seamen could easily obtain American papers (bogus or real) by purchase or theft, making it impossible to determine who were British subjects. Castlereagh considered impressment so vital to British interests that only a guarantee that the Royal Navy could retrieve British seamen from American ships would suffice. This could only be accomplished, in his view, by the Royal Navy searching the vessels. He emphasized that no British government could rely on the United States, no matter what legislation was passed, to retrieve her deserters. Few in Britain disagreed with him. The Times wrote that giving up the impressment of British subjects on American ships is to “demand of us the sacrifice of our very existence.” Castlereagh was willing to admit that in practice overly zealous British officers had committed abuses, and he was willing to talk about putting a rein on them but not about the necessity of stopping and searching American ships for deserters.
Castlereagh’s rejection of Madison’s terms made it clear that impressment was at the heart of the dispute between the two governments. It would remain so throughout the war. Madison pointed out later that Castlereagh’s attitude left him no alternative but to fight. “Still more precise advances were repeated,” the president wrote, “and have been received in a spirit forbidding every reliance not placed on the military resources of the nation.”
At the same time that he was trying to negotiate a quick settlement with the British, Madison was taking a tougher line with Napoleon, threatening that if the United States reached a settlement with Britain, she would turn on France for the depredations Bonaparte had committed over many years and was continuing. The French dictator was unimpressed. Ambassador Joel Barlow did his best to convey the president’s messages to the emperor and, in fact, later died trying to do so, but Barlow failed to make an impression.
No matter how badly Napoleon treated the United States, however, Madison was determined to uphold the country’s honor by fighting Britain. He knew he could not fight both the British and the French at the same time; he chose the one he considered the more serious threat.
CHAPTER SIX
Blue-Water Victories
W HEN COMMODORE JOHN Rodgers spotted H.M.S. Belvidera on June 23 and began the first naval action of the war, he was operating far beyond the orders given to him by Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, who had instructed Rodgers to remain close to New York with his squadron and await further orders. Even though war had been declared five days earlier, the president still had not decided how to employ his miniscule fleet.
During the first three weeks of June, Rodgers,
Madison was right to be cautious, for when Foreign Secretary Castlereagh saw the president’s proposals, he rejected them out of hand. He wrote to Russell on August 29 that His Majesty’s government could not, under any circumstances, “consent to suspend the exercise of a right [impressment] upon which the naval strength of the Empire mainly depends.” Castlereagh believed, with good cause, that if he accepted Madison’s terms, he would be thrown out of office, as would the entire ministry. And those who replaced them would not accept American terms either.
Anticipating this response, Russell offered “to give assurance that a law shall be passed (to be reciprocal) to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States.” Monroe had authorized Russell to offer the British, by an act of Congress, a prohibition on the employment of British seamen in the public or private marine of the United States. And Madison wrote an editorial in the National Intelligencer offering to “prevent the employment of British seamen in American vessels if Britain would stop making impressments from them.”
But Castlereagh would not be moved. British seamen could easily obtain American papers (bogus or real) by purchase or theft, making it impossible to determine who were British subjects. Castlereagh considered impressment so vital to British interests that only a guarantee that the Royal Navy could retrieve British seamen from American ships would suffice. This could only be accomplished, in his view, by the Royal Navy searching the vessels. He emphasized that no British government could rely on the United States, no matter what legislation was passed, to retrieve her deserters. Few in Britain disagreed with him. The Times wrote that giving up the impressment of British subjects on American ships is to “demand of us the sacrifice of our very existence.” Castlereagh was willing to admit that in practice overly zealous British officers had committed abuses, and he was willing to talk about putting a rein on them but not about the necessity of stopping and searching American ships for deserters.
Castlereagh’s rejection of Madison’s terms made it clear that impressment was at the heart of the dispute between the two governments. It would remain so throughout the war. Madison pointed out later that Castlereagh’s attitude left him no alternative but to fight. “Still more precise advances were repeated,” the president wrote, “and have been received in a spirit forbidding every reliance not placed on the military resources of the nation.”
At the same time that he was trying to negotiate a quick settlement with the British, Madison was taking a tougher line with Napoleon, threatening that if the United States reached a settlement with Britain, she would turn on France for the depredations Bonaparte had committed over many years and was continuing. The French dictator was unimpressed. Ambassador Joel Barlow did his best to convey the president’s messages to the emperor and, in fact, later died trying to do so, but Barlow failed to make an impression.
No matter how badly Napoleon treated the United States, however, Madison was determined to uphold the country’s honor by fighting Britain. He knew he could not fight both the British and the French at the same time; he chose the one he considered the more serious threat.
CHAPTER SIX
Blue-Water Victories
W HEN COMMODORE JOHN Rodgers spotted H.M.S. Belvidera on June 23 and began the first naval action of the war, he was operating far beyond the orders given to him by Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, who had instructed Rodgers to remain close to New York with his squadron and await further orders. Even though war had been declared five days earlier, the president still had not decided how to employ his miniscule fleet.
During the first three weeks of June, Rodgers,
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