the fact that Germany had penetrated the RN codes, and had a reasonable idea of where the hunting groups were.
On 14th September an attack was made on HMS Vengeance west of the Hebrides by U.39. One torpedo missed, the other hit the carrier but did not explode (it was suggested later that this was due to a faulty magnetic exploder) The carrier was accompanied by three destroyers, and as a result the U.39 was attacked and sunk with all hands.
On the 16th September the carrier Argus was spotted in the Western Approaches by U.29, who had been alerted some days earlier that the carrier was worki ng in the area. The U.29 fired four torpedoes, two of which hit the old ship which sank in 20 minutes, taking over 300 of her crew with her (the underwater protection of the old WW1 ship was nowhere near as good as that of a modern warship). Attacks by the destroyers were unsuccessful.
It was pointed out that in a few days we had lost one carrier and almost lost a second. As a result, the policy of hunting submarines in this way was terminated, and plans were made to have the light carriers pr ovide close escort for convoys where they would have the protection of a greater number of escorts, and, somewhat brutally, be in the middle of the convoy protected by the bulk of the merchant ships. In the harsh logic of war, a merchant ship was far more expendable than a carrier.
While he understood the logic of the decision, Churchill was not happy with what he saw as a Royal Navy too busy with defensive actions to take the fight to the enemy. While the main fleet simply couldn't see any way to tempt the German ships out into range of their guns, the FAA did have a plan they had been working on for some years. Operation Chastise was presented to Churchill.
The day after, a memo arrived on the First Sea Lords desk. "Chastise. Expedite immediately"
North Sea
On the 25th September news was received at the Admiralty that the submarine Spearfish had been badly damaged off the Horn reef and as a result was unable to dive. Admiral Forbes ordered the 2nd Cruiser squadron and 6 destroyers to proceed and extricate her. The battle cruisers and the 18th Cruiser squadron, with the carrier HMS Illustrious in company, sailed as a covering force.
On the 26th the damaged submarine was met by the cruisers and destroyers and safely escorted to Rosyth. Meanwhile German flying boats had started to attempt to shadow the covering force. The force had been operating under radio and radar silence until the first shadower was spotted, thereafter the Illustrious's radar was in use. It was found difficult with this early model to get an accurate reading on a single aircraft, but it proved good enough to guide one of the carriers CAP of Goshawk fighters into visual range. A number of the flying boats seemed to have been assigned to find and track the force, two of which were shot down. Although radar could show the presence of a single plane, it was difficult for the fighters to close with them as they continually took cover in cloud.
During the afternoon, a single bomber, believed to be an He111, attempted a glide bomb attack on the Illustrious. The primitive operations room had been concentrating on the shadowing floatplanes, and as a result had missed this single plane. It was spotted visually as it moved into attack, and received the undivided attention of 72 40mm c annon from Illustrious and her two escort destroyers. The plane was shot down, but not before dropping its bomb, which missed the carrier by some fifty yards. The Illustrious's captain reported later the dedication with which the plane carried out its attack in the face of such heavy AA fire. Later analysis of this action led to the interesting comment that the fire from the twin mounts on the destroyers (which were using tracer as these mounts did not have a director) seemed to cause move evasion by the bomber than the much heavier fire from the carrier which only used minimal tracer.
What was
On 14th September an attack was made on HMS Vengeance west of the Hebrides by U.39. One torpedo missed, the other hit the carrier but did not explode (it was suggested later that this was due to a faulty magnetic exploder) The carrier was accompanied by three destroyers, and as a result the U.39 was attacked and sunk with all hands.
On the 16th September the carrier Argus was spotted in the Western Approaches by U.29, who had been alerted some days earlier that the carrier was worki ng in the area. The U.29 fired four torpedoes, two of which hit the old ship which sank in 20 minutes, taking over 300 of her crew with her (the underwater protection of the old WW1 ship was nowhere near as good as that of a modern warship). Attacks by the destroyers were unsuccessful.
It was pointed out that in a few days we had lost one carrier and almost lost a second. As a result, the policy of hunting submarines in this way was terminated, and plans were made to have the light carriers pr ovide close escort for convoys where they would have the protection of a greater number of escorts, and, somewhat brutally, be in the middle of the convoy protected by the bulk of the merchant ships. In the harsh logic of war, a merchant ship was far more expendable than a carrier.
While he understood the logic of the decision, Churchill was not happy with what he saw as a Royal Navy too busy with defensive actions to take the fight to the enemy. While the main fleet simply couldn't see any way to tempt the German ships out into range of their guns, the FAA did have a plan they had been working on for some years. Operation Chastise was presented to Churchill.
The day after, a memo arrived on the First Sea Lords desk. "Chastise. Expedite immediately"
North Sea
On the 25th September news was received at the Admiralty that the submarine Spearfish had been badly damaged off the Horn reef and as a result was unable to dive. Admiral Forbes ordered the 2nd Cruiser squadron and 6 destroyers to proceed and extricate her. The battle cruisers and the 18th Cruiser squadron, with the carrier HMS Illustrious in company, sailed as a covering force.
On the 26th the damaged submarine was met by the cruisers and destroyers and safely escorted to Rosyth. Meanwhile German flying boats had started to attempt to shadow the covering force. The force had been operating under radio and radar silence until the first shadower was spotted, thereafter the Illustrious's radar was in use. It was found difficult with this early model to get an accurate reading on a single aircraft, but it proved good enough to guide one of the carriers CAP of Goshawk fighters into visual range. A number of the flying boats seemed to have been assigned to find and track the force, two of which were shot down. Although radar could show the presence of a single plane, it was difficult for the fighters to close with them as they continually took cover in cloud.
During the afternoon, a single bomber, believed to be an He111, attempted a glide bomb attack on the Illustrious. The primitive operations room had been concentrating on the shadowing floatplanes, and as a result had missed this single plane. It was spotted visually as it moved into attack, and received the undivided attention of 72 40mm c annon from Illustrious and her two escort destroyers. The plane was shot down, but not before dropping its bomb, which missed the carrier by some fifty yards. The Illustrious's captain reported later the dedication with which the plane carried out its attack in the face of such heavy AA fire. Later analysis of this action led to the interesting comment that the fire from the twin mounts on the destroyers (which were using tracer as these mounts did not have a director) seemed to cause move evasion by the bomber than the much heavier fire from the carrier which only used minimal tracer.
What was
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