American officials believed that the strike had been botched, and that dozens of people died who shouldn’t have.
Other American officials came to the CIA’s defense, saying that the tribal meeting was in fact a meeting of senior militants, and therefore a legitimate target. But the drone strike unleashed a furious response in Pakistan. General Kayani issued a rare public statement, saying the operation was carried out “with complete disregard to human life,” and street protests in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar forced the temporary closure of American consulates in those cities.
Munter wasn’t opposed to the drone program, but he believed that the CIA was being reckless and that his position as ambassador was becoming untenable. His relationship with the CIA station chief in Islamabad, already strained because of their disagreements over the handling of the Raymond Davis case, deteriorated even further when Munter demanded that the CIA notify him before each missile strike and give him the chance to call off the operation. During one screaming match between the two men, Munter tried to make sure the station chief knew who was in charge, only to be reminded of who really held the power in Pakistan.
“You’re not the ambassador!” Munter shouted.
“You’re right, and I don’t want to be the ambassador,” the CIA station chief replied.
This turf battle spread to Washington, and a month after bin Laden was killed President Obama’s top advisers were openly fighting in a National Security Council meeting over who really was in charge in Pakistan. At the June 2011 meeting, Munter, who participated via secure video link, began making his case that he should have veto power over specific drone strikes. Using soccer terminology, he said he should get a “red card” to scuttle proposed strikes.
Leon Panetta cut Munter off midsentence, telling him that the CIA had the authority to do what it wanted in Pakistan. It didn’t need to get the ambassador’s approval for anything.
“I don’t work for you,” Panetta told Munter, according to several people who attended the meeting.
But Secretary of State Hillary Clinton came to Munter’s defense. She turned to Panetta and told him that he was wrong to assume he could steamroll the ambassador and launch strikes against his approval.
“ No, Hillary,” Panetta said , “it’s you who are flat wrong.”
There was a stunned silence, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon tried to regain control of the meeting by quieting the squabbling aides. In the weeks that followed the meeting, Donilon brokered a compromise of sorts: Munter would be allowed to object to specific drone strikes, but the CIA could still press its case to the White House and get approval for strikes even over the ambassador’s objections. The ambassador was given, at best, a “yellow card.” Obama’s CIA had won another battle.
In the months that followed, Munter increasingly found himself isolated. Even Admiral Mullen, once the administration’s most prominent advocate of maintaining at least barely functional relations with Islamabad, began to take a darker view toward Pakistan after the bin Laden raid. Not only did Mullen have his suspicions that someone senior in the Pakistani military or ISI may have been hiding Osama bin Laden; he had also become aware of an astonishing piece of intelligence. American spies had telephone intercepts that seemed to prove that the killing of Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Pakistani journalist who had been investigating links between the ISI and Pakistani militant groups, had been ordered by Pakistani spies. Shahzad had been beaten to death and tossed into an irrigation canal eighty miles south of Islamabad. According to classified assessments by American spy agencies, the killing had been an order from the highest ranks of the ISI, from General Ahmad Shuja Pasha himself.
Not long afterward, a separate intelligence tip warned that two suspicious fertilizer
Other American officials came to the CIA’s defense, saying that the tribal meeting was in fact a meeting of senior militants, and therefore a legitimate target. But the drone strike unleashed a furious response in Pakistan. General Kayani issued a rare public statement, saying the operation was carried out “with complete disregard to human life,” and street protests in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar forced the temporary closure of American consulates in those cities.
Munter wasn’t opposed to the drone program, but he believed that the CIA was being reckless and that his position as ambassador was becoming untenable. His relationship with the CIA station chief in Islamabad, already strained because of their disagreements over the handling of the Raymond Davis case, deteriorated even further when Munter demanded that the CIA notify him before each missile strike and give him the chance to call off the operation. During one screaming match between the two men, Munter tried to make sure the station chief knew who was in charge, only to be reminded of who really held the power in Pakistan.
“You’re not the ambassador!” Munter shouted.
“You’re right, and I don’t want to be the ambassador,” the CIA station chief replied.
This turf battle spread to Washington, and a month after bin Laden was killed President Obama’s top advisers were openly fighting in a National Security Council meeting over who really was in charge in Pakistan. At the June 2011 meeting, Munter, who participated via secure video link, began making his case that he should have veto power over specific drone strikes. Using soccer terminology, he said he should get a “red card” to scuttle proposed strikes.
Leon Panetta cut Munter off midsentence, telling him that the CIA had the authority to do what it wanted in Pakistan. It didn’t need to get the ambassador’s approval for anything.
“I don’t work for you,” Panetta told Munter, according to several people who attended the meeting.
But Secretary of State Hillary Clinton came to Munter’s defense. She turned to Panetta and told him that he was wrong to assume he could steamroll the ambassador and launch strikes against his approval.
“ No, Hillary,” Panetta said , “it’s you who are flat wrong.”
There was a stunned silence, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon tried to regain control of the meeting by quieting the squabbling aides. In the weeks that followed the meeting, Donilon brokered a compromise of sorts: Munter would be allowed to object to specific drone strikes, but the CIA could still press its case to the White House and get approval for strikes even over the ambassador’s objections. The ambassador was given, at best, a “yellow card.” Obama’s CIA had won another battle.
In the months that followed, Munter increasingly found himself isolated. Even Admiral Mullen, once the administration’s most prominent advocate of maintaining at least barely functional relations with Islamabad, began to take a darker view toward Pakistan after the bin Laden raid. Not only did Mullen have his suspicions that someone senior in the Pakistani military or ISI may have been hiding Osama bin Laden; he had also become aware of an astonishing piece of intelligence. American spies had telephone intercepts that seemed to prove that the killing of Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Pakistani journalist who had been investigating links between the ISI and Pakistani militant groups, had been ordered by Pakistani spies. Shahzad had been beaten to death and tossed into an irrigation canal eighty miles south of Islamabad. According to classified assessments by American spy agencies, the killing had been an order from the highest ranks of the ISI, from General Ahmad Shuja Pasha himself.
Not long afterward, a separate intelligence tip warned that two suspicious fertilizer
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