Names
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1982);
An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Present
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1989);
A Christian Theology of Religion: A Rainbow of Faiths
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995).
2 . For more on this issue, see Alvin Plantinga, “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in
The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity
, ed. Kevin Meeker and Philip Quinn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172-192; also Philip Quinn, “Toward Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity,” in
The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity
, 226-243.
3 . See David Hume,
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
, ed. Tom Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 83-99; also,
The Natural History of Religion
, ed. H.E. Root (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
4 . Among his many works, see
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
(New York: Routledge, 2002).
5 . William James,
The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
(New York: Dover Publications, 1956).
6 . See Alvin Plantinga,
Warranted Christian Belief
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7 . Besides Alvin Plantinga, other thinkers have advocated this position. See, for example, Robert Merrihew Adams,
The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
7
Cartmanland and the Problem of Evil
David Kyle Johnson
Cartman is an ass. More precisely, Cartman is a manipulative, self-centered bastard whose every action is directed either toward increasing his own happiness or decreasing the happiness of others. He deserves to be miserable. When misfortune befalls Cartman, we think it good. When fortune smiles on him, we think something evil has happened—he doesn’t deserve it. This is exactly the conclusion Kyle draws when Cartman gets his own amusement park. In the episode “Cartmanland,” Cartman learns that he’s the heir to his grandmother’s estate—just after he objects to being required to attend her funeral because it is “taking up [his] whole Saturday.” He inherits one million dollars, and uses the money to purchase the local amusement park, renaming it “Cartmanland,” and buying television commercial time to declare that the best thing about Cartmanland is, “You can’t come … especially Stan and Kyle.” For a time, Cartman is completely happy, spending all day, every day, riding any ride he wants without waiting in line.
Understandably, Kyle views Cartman’s happiness as an evil. Cartman doesn’t deserve happiness and his attaining it just isn’t right. But according to Kyle, the problem is much deeper. Kyle observes that the course of events isn’t just unbelievable. Given his worldview—which includes a belief in God—these events are impossible. God, if he exists, is all-good and all-powerful, and so he would surely prevent all evil. If we assume, like Kyle, that such a God exists, it would be impossible for Cartman to attain such happiness. But, since Cartman’s happiness is undeniable, Kyle is forced to revise his worldview and conclude that God doesn’t exist.
Kyle’s argument is a form of the “problem of evil”—more specifically, it is an example of the
logical problem
of moral evil. The problem centers on the fact that the existence of moral evil—that is, evil caused by human action—seems incompatible with God’s existence. If Kyle had a Ph.D. in philosophy, he likely would have expressed the problem like this:
Premise 1
: If God exists (and he’s all-good and all-powerful), he would not allow Cartman to be completely happy (for that’s a great evil).
Premise 2
: But now that Cartman, thanks to his grandmother, has his own amusement park, Cartman is completely happy (again, a great evil).
Conclusion
: Therefore, God does not exist. 1
This argument is valid; that is,
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1982);
An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Present
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1989);
A Christian Theology of Religion: A Rainbow of Faiths
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995).
2 . For more on this issue, see Alvin Plantinga, “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in
The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity
, ed. Kevin Meeker and Philip Quinn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172-192; also Philip Quinn, “Toward Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity,” in
The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity
, 226-243.
3 . See David Hume,
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
, ed. Tom Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 83-99; also,
The Natural History of Religion
, ed. H.E. Root (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
4 . Among his many works, see
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
(New York: Routledge, 2002).
5 . William James,
The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
(New York: Dover Publications, 1956).
6 . See Alvin Plantinga,
Warranted Christian Belief
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7 . Besides Alvin Plantinga, other thinkers have advocated this position. See, for example, Robert Merrihew Adams,
The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
7
Cartmanland and the Problem of Evil
David Kyle Johnson
Cartman is an ass. More precisely, Cartman is a manipulative, self-centered bastard whose every action is directed either toward increasing his own happiness or decreasing the happiness of others. He deserves to be miserable. When misfortune befalls Cartman, we think it good. When fortune smiles on him, we think something evil has happened—he doesn’t deserve it. This is exactly the conclusion Kyle draws when Cartman gets his own amusement park. In the episode “Cartmanland,” Cartman learns that he’s the heir to his grandmother’s estate—just after he objects to being required to attend her funeral because it is “taking up [his] whole Saturday.” He inherits one million dollars, and uses the money to purchase the local amusement park, renaming it “Cartmanland,” and buying television commercial time to declare that the best thing about Cartmanland is, “You can’t come … especially Stan and Kyle.” For a time, Cartman is completely happy, spending all day, every day, riding any ride he wants without waiting in line.
Understandably, Kyle views Cartman’s happiness as an evil. Cartman doesn’t deserve happiness and his attaining it just isn’t right. But according to Kyle, the problem is much deeper. Kyle observes that the course of events isn’t just unbelievable. Given his worldview—which includes a belief in God—these events are impossible. God, if he exists, is all-good and all-powerful, and so he would surely prevent all evil. If we assume, like Kyle, that such a God exists, it would be impossible for Cartman to attain such happiness. But, since Cartman’s happiness is undeniable, Kyle is forced to revise his worldview and conclude that God doesn’t exist.
Kyle’s argument is a form of the “problem of evil”—more specifically, it is an example of the
logical problem
of moral evil. The problem centers on the fact that the existence of moral evil—that is, evil caused by human action—seems incompatible with God’s existence. If Kyle had a Ph.D. in philosophy, he likely would have expressed the problem like this:
Premise 1
: If God exists (and he’s all-good and all-powerful), he would not allow Cartman to be completely happy (for that’s a great evil).
Premise 2
: But now that Cartman, thanks to his grandmother, has his own amusement park, Cartman is completely happy (again, a great evil).
Conclusion
: Therefore, God does not exist. 1
This argument is valid; that is,
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