The Orphan Brigade: The Kentucky Confederates Who Couldn't Go Home by William C. Davis Page A
Authors: William C. Davis
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The battlefield ahead of Breckinridge and his Orphans was already a mess. Pittsburg Landing lay on the western bank of the Tennessee River, amid a hilly, wooded terrain crisscrossed by small creeks and forest roads. The left of Grant’s thirty-three-thousand-man army rested about four miles below the landing, against the river. The Federals’ right extended perpendicular to the river and almost six miles from it, its right center intersected by the Corinth road. It was upon this road that Johnston’s corps advanced. He hoped to press back Grant’s left, past Pittsburg Landing, almost two miles to Snake Creek, thus denying the possibility of federal reinforcement by way of the river landing. To make the attack, Johnston intended to send Hardee’s corps against Grant’s right, while Bragg’s corps would do the work ofdriving back the Federals along the Tennessee. Breckinridge and Polk, of course, were to assist where needed.
The plan went awry immediately. Johnston achieved a tactical surprise that sent the enemy army into absolute consternation. Yet the Unionists speedily began organizing themselves for a defense, hoping to hold out long enough for twenty-five thousand reinforcements, led by Major General Don C. Buell, to reach them from downriver. As Hardee first struck, and Bragg soon after, it became apparent that Johnston’s plan would not work. The generals and their men were green, and the two corps soon became largely intermingled. Indeed, for the rest of the day officers would lead not so much their own commands as just any group of soldiers who came to hand. It would be a learning battle.
As they neared the field, Breckinridge ordered Trabue to move forward in readiness for easy deployment behind Polk, and soon thereafter he told “Old Trib” to form in line of battle. He put the 3d Kentucky on the right and the 4th Kentucky on the left, the other regiments in the center, and Byrne’s and Cobb’s batteries in the rear. Morgan and his squadron were already out in front, and Helm guarded the right flank. In this fashion they moved forward until sometime after 8 A.M ., when Breckinridge received an order to take the two rear brigades of his corps and move to the right to assist Bragg. It meant that, in its very first battle, he had to leave his Kentucky brigade on its own, but there was no choice. He told Trabue to keep on Polk’s left rear, continue advancing, and tend toward the left. Trabue would be moving almost directly toward Shiloh Church. Then Breckinridge bade him farewell, and both marched toward their fate.
The first sight the Orphans had of the effects of the fighting was a nearly demolished federal battery, “dead men, dead horses, and broken gun carriages, all lying in a mingled condition.” About 9 A.M . Trabue encountered Morgan’s resting men. “Cheer, boys, cheer,” sang a cavalryman, and the foot soldiers responded in kind. They filed down a wooded slope and into a swampy area along the Shiloh Branch. There sat a large open field before them with enemy camps on the opposite side. The Federals stood in line in the woods near their camps, and over to his left Trabue saw two more enemy campsites occupied by bluecoats. At the same time he could see none of his own troops, being separated from Polk’s left by a rise of ground. Trabue appeared to be at the very end of the Confederate line, somewhatisolated, and had discovered a substantial body of the enemy who might hit Polk’s unsuspecting flank with ominous results. Trabue would have to attack.
Just before reaching this position, Trabue lost the 3d Kentucky, Byrne’s battery, the 4th Alabama, and Crews’s battalions, when Beauregard ordered them to the right in support of another brigade. So now his command stood reduced to less than two thousand, and already the enemy was forming to meet him. The federal artillery opened on the Kentuckians first. A shell killed two of Cobb’s gunners and severed both hands of a third, who
The battlefield ahead of Breckinridge and his Orphans was already a mess. Pittsburg Landing lay on the western bank of the Tennessee River, amid a hilly, wooded terrain crisscrossed by small creeks and forest roads. The left of Grant’s thirty-three-thousand-man army rested about four miles below the landing, against the river. The Federals’ right extended perpendicular to the river and almost six miles from it, its right center intersected by the Corinth road. It was upon this road that Johnston’s corps advanced. He hoped to press back Grant’s left, past Pittsburg Landing, almost two miles to Snake Creek, thus denying the possibility of federal reinforcement by way of the river landing. To make the attack, Johnston intended to send Hardee’s corps against Grant’s right, while Bragg’s corps would do the work ofdriving back the Federals along the Tennessee. Breckinridge and Polk, of course, were to assist where needed.
The plan went awry immediately. Johnston achieved a tactical surprise that sent the enemy army into absolute consternation. Yet the Unionists speedily began organizing themselves for a defense, hoping to hold out long enough for twenty-five thousand reinforcements, led by Major General Don C. Buell, to reach them from downriver. As Hardee first struck, and Bragg soon after, it became apparent that Johnston’s plan would not work. The generals and their men were green, and the two corps soon became largely intermingled. Indeed, for the rest of the day officers would lead not so much their own commands as just any group of soldiers who came to hand. It would be a learning battle.
As they neared the field, Breckinridge ordered Trabue to move forward in readiness for easy deployment behind Polk, and soon thereafter he told “Old Trib” to form in line of battle. He put the 3d Kentucky on the right and the 4th Kentucky on the left, the other regiments in the center, and Byrne’s and Cobb’s batteries in the rear. Morgan and his squadron were already out in front, and Helm guarded the right flank. In this fashion they moved forward until sometime after 8 A.M ., when Breckinridge received an order to take the two rear brigades of his corps and move to the right to assist Bragg. It meant that, in its very first battle, he had to leave his Kentucky brigade on its own, but there was no choice. He told Trabue to keep on Polk’s left rear, continue advancing, and tend toward the left. Trabue would be moving almost directly toward Shiloh Church. Then Breckinridge bade him farewell, and both marched toward their fate.
The first sight the Orphans had of the effects of the fighting was a nearly demolished federal battery, “dead men, dead horses, and broken gun carriages, all lying in a mingled condition.” About 9 A.M . Trabue encountered Morgan’s resting men. “Cheer, boys, cheer,” sang a cavalryman, and the foot soldiers responded in kind. They filed down a wooded slope and into a swampy area along the Shiloh Branch. There sat a large open field before them with enemy camps on the opposite side. The Federals stood in line in the woods near their camps, and over to his left Trabue saw two more enemy campsites occupied by bluecoats. At the same time he could see none of his own troops, being separated from Polk’s left by a rise of ground. Trabue appeared to be at the very end of the Confederate line, somewhatisolated, and had discovered a substantial body of the enemy who might hit Polk’s unsuspecting flank with ominous results. Trabue would have to attack.
Just before reaching this position, Trabue lost the 3d Kentucky, Byrne’s battery, the 4th Alabama, and Crews’s battalions, when Beauregard ordered them to the right in support of another brigade. So now his command stood reduced to less than two thousand, and already the enemy was forming to meet him. The federal artillery opened on the Kentuckians first. A shell killed two of Cobb’s gunners and severed both hands of a third, who
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