never leave his beliefs and principles. But the moment he became a head of state he became president of all Egyptians, which include the Muslim Brotherhood. He looks at the Muslim Brotherhood just like he looks at all Egyptians, but his principles remain to apply the parts of Islam which are not applied in the society in a gradual way.
And was President Morsi getting instructions from the Ikhwan leadership?
No, no, no! He now has his own group of advisers. But the Muslim Brotherhood are still Egyptians, and if they have an idea or suggestion they should be able to share it with the president just like Al-Wafd Party and other parties. The [Brotherhood’s] Supreme Guide looks up to Morsi as his president. Morsi has left the Ikhwan and he has no relation with our notion of listen and obey. This is for us only.
The Brotherhood was in power not because it landed a knockout blow, but because the military conceded defeat. The army realised it no longer wanted, or had the capacity, to rule. The army watched from the sidelines as the Brotherhood wrestled with the problems of governance. These are issues the military men are glad they have now left behind. The Brotherhood was in charge, but it did not have the full obedience of the institutions of the state. It has started to stuff government bodies with its own people, but it will take many years to take charge of Egypt’s vast bureaucracy, most of it appointed through ‘ wasta ’ with the old regime. But key to running the new Egypt is the consent of the people. Both the old foes now know that. This was illustrated by the mayhem that resulted from the death sentences imposed on twenty-one football fans for their role in the Port Said football riots.
Tensions were already high after protests on the second anniversary of the revolution, 25 January 2013, against the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi. Fighting took place between demonstrators and the security services in Tahrir Square, in Suez, Alexandria, and Isma’iliyah, where the Ikhwan headquarters was set ablaze. Hundreds of people were injured and five died.
But it was on the following day, when the football riots verdicts were read out, that the country descended into a political crisis, provoking Tantawi’s replacement General al-Sisi to warn: ‘The continuing conflict between political forces and their differences concerning the management of the country could lead to a collapse of the state and threaten future generations.’ 35 That is the sort of thing that generals like to say just before they embark on a coup. That did not happen. The protesters claimed that the football fans who had been sentenced to death were made scapegoats to protect the police and security officials, who they say should have been held accountable for failing to take action to stop the riots taking place. Their fury was only quelled after the army was deployed along the Suez Canal Zone where the violence was at its worst. More than fifty people died, hundreds were injured and the Muslim Brotherhood learned its most important lesson since it took power. It might be hard to live with the army, but it is impossible to govern without them.
The challenges facing the new Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt were huge. Most of the big ones – unemployment, corruption, bad infrastructure, poor education – they inherited from the old regime. Three-quarters of Egyptians under thirty years old are jobless and increasingly frustrated with the lack of change in their lives after the revolution. 36 The regular violent protests have damaged its crucial tourism industry, leaving Egypt in 2013 at the bottom of the rankings for safe and secure places to go on holiday, below even Pakistan. 37 The new government shied away from making politically painful economic reforms in an election year. Instead, by the spring of that year, public sector salaries had gone up 80 per cent since the revolution. 38 That all led to protracted
And was President Morsi getting instructions from the Ikhwan leadership?
No, no, no! He now has his own group of advisers. But the Muslim Brotherhood are still Egyptians, and if they have an idea or suggestion they should be able to share it with the president just like Al-Wafd Party and other parties. The [Brotherhood’s] Supreme Guide looks up to Morsi as his president. Morsi has left the Ikhwan and he has no relation with our notion of listen and obey. This is for us only.
The Brotherhood was in power not because it landed a knockout blow, but because the military conceded defeat. The army realised it no longer wanted, or had the capacity, to rule. The army watched from the sidelines as the Brotherhood wrestled with the problems of governance. These are issues the military men are glad they have now left behind. The Brotherhood was in charge, but it did not have the full obedience of the institutions of the state. It has started to stuff government bodies with its own people, but it will take many years to take charge of Egypt’s vast bureaucracy, most of it appointed through ‘ wasta ’ with the old regime. But key to running the new Egypt is the consent of the people. Both the old foes now know that. This was illustrated by the mayhem that resulted from the death sentences imposed on twenty-one football fans for their role in the Port Said football riots.
Tensions were already high after protests on the second anniversary of the revolution, 25 January 2013, against the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi. Fighting took place between demonstrators and the security services in Tahrir Square, in Suez, Alexandria, and Isma’iliyah, where the Ikhwan headquarters was set ablaze. Hundreds of people were injured and five died.
But it was on the following day, when the football riots verdicts were read out, that the country descended into a political crisis, provoking Tantawi’s replacement General al-Sisi to warn: ‘The continuing conflict between political forces and their differences concerning the management of the country could lead to a collapse of the state and threaten future generations.’ 35 That is the sort of thing that generals like to say just before they embark on a coup. That did not happen. The protesters claimed that the football fans who had been sentenced to death were made scapegoats to protect the police and security officials, who they say should have been held accountable for failing to take action to stop the riots taking place. Their fury was only quelled after the army was deployed along the Suez Canal Zone where the violence was at its worst. More than fifty people died, hundreds were injured and the Muslim Brotherhood learned its most important lesson since it took power. It might be hard to live with the army, but it is impossible to govern without them.
The challenges facing the new Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt were huge. Most of the big ones – unemployment, corruption, bad infrastructure, poor education – they inherited from the old regime. Three-quarters of Egyptians under thirty years old are jobless and increasingly frustrated with the lack of change in their lives after the revolution. 36 The regular violent protests have damaged its crucial tourism industry, leaving Egypt in 2013 at the bottom of the rankings for safe and secure places to go on holiday, below even Pakistan. 37 The new government shied away from making politically painful economic reforms in an election year. Instead, by the spring of that year, public sector salaries had gone up 80 per cent since the revolution. 38 That all led to protracted
Similar Books
