talents.
Presently it was learned that the Thebans had admitted some anti-Macedonians whose lives Philip had spared after Chaeronea on condition of their exile, murdered two Macedonian commanders who in peacetime laxity had gone outside the citadel, and proceeded to invest the garrison within it. Elated by this news, and well supplied with funds, Demosthenes sent Thebes a large consignment of arms. Continuing to assure the Athenians that Alexander was a strutting boy, he urged them to join the war. They voted to do so, and started to prepare. Still no word came from the hinterland. Then rumour announced that Alexander was dead.
No sickness or wound had caused a genuine error. Demosthenes produced a man who swore to having seen him fall. On the strength of this, the Thebans openly proclaimed alliance with Persia against Macedon. When, within a week, they heard that an army led by Alexander was coming down through Thessaly, they refused at first to credit it. At all events, it could not conceivably be that Alexander. It would be Alexandros of Lyncestis. (They must have supposed him the new king.)
They were swiftly disillusioned. Alexander had brought his forces down from Pelium, through a series of mountain passes, a distance even by air of a hundred miles, in a six-day march. Scarcely pausing to pick up his allied troops from central Greece, in another six he was already in Boeotia. He appeared before Thebes next day.
Had he in fact been dead, it would have cancelled theThebans’ treaty. His early forbearance may have come from knowledge of the rumour. For reasons which may have been emotional or religious, he encamped by the precinct of the hero Iolaus, Heracles’ charioteer and beloved companion, at whose shrine the couples of the Sacred Band used to take their vows. He sent an envoy to the city, offering to accept their surrender on terms if they would give up the anti-Macedonians who were there illegally. The Thebans refused, with a mocking counter-demand for Philotas and Antipater. They made a sortie against Alexander’s pickets, some of whom they killed. He now moved to a strategic position, near the gate that faced towards Attica and gave him the nearest approach to the beleaguered Macedonian garrison.
It was also the approach route from Athens, of whose intentions he would by now have heard. But in that respect his vigilance was needless. No troops from the south appeared. The alarming speed of his march had brought painful second thoughts. Without protest from Demosthenes the Athenians closed their gates, leaving the Thebans to weather the storm alone.
It did not yet break. Alexander still awaited a parley. He had collected on his southward march contingents of troops from Macedonian satellites, chiefly Phocians and Plataeans. The latter, it will be remembered, were the descendants of the Marathon heroes, inheritors of their perpetual Athenian citizenship, whom Demosthenes had traded to the Thebans on the eve of Chaeronea.
Alexander kept close to the Theban siege lines, at their nearest point of approach to the Macedonian garrison, trapped inside the Cadmea. This, as can still be seen, was no acropolis perched on natural rock; it relied for defence on its massive walls. For the next sequence of events, which Arrian gives in vivid detail, he expressly says thathis source is Ptolemy, who must have taken part. He claimed that Perdiccas, still at that time holding only a small command, was posted next the siege works. For some reason, without awaiting orders, he rushed his men to the palisade and started to tear it down.
For justice towards Perdiccas we shall look in vain to Ptolemy, who had been his mortal enemy many years before he wrote his History, and has probably suppressed a good reason for this apparent breach of discipline, such as a signal from the garrison of some weakness in the enemy dispositions which needed quick action. Perdiccas was the man for it, as he had shown at Philip’s death. He broke
Presently it was learned that the Thebans had admitted some anti-Macedonians whose lives Philip had spared after Chaeronea on condition of their exile, murdered two Macedonian commanders who in peacetime laxity had gone outside the citadel, and proceeded to invest the garrison within it. Elated by this news, and well supplied with funds, Demosthenes sent Thebes a large consignment of arms. Continuing to assure the Athenians that Alexander was a strutting boy, he urged them to join the war. They voted to do so, and started to prepare. Still no word came from the hinterland. Then rumour announced that Alexander was dead.
No sickness or wound had caused a genuine error. Demosthenes produced a man who swore to having seen him fall. On the strength of this, the Thebans openly proclaimed alliance with Persia against Macedon. When, within a week, they heard that an army led by Alexander was coming down through Thessaly, they refused at first to credit it. At all events, it could not conceivably be that Alexander. It would be Alexandros of Lyncestis. (They must have supposed him the new king.)
They were swiftly disillusioned. Alexander had brought his forces down from Pelium, through a series of mountain passes, a distance even by air of a hundred miles, in a six-day march. Scarcely pausing to pick up his allied troops from central Greece, in another six he was already in Boeotia. He appeared before Thebes next day.
Had he in fact been dead, it would have cancelled theThebans’ treaty. His early forbearance may have come from knowledge of the rumour. For reasons which may have been emotional or religious, he encamped by the precinct of the hero Iolaus, Heracles’ charioteer and beloved companion, at whose shrine the couples of the Sacred Band used to take their vows. He sent an envoy to the city, offering to accept their surrender on terms if they would give up the anti-Macedonians who were there illegally. The Thebans refused, with a mocking counter-demand for Philotas and Antipater. They made a sortie against Alexander’s pickets, some of whom they killed. He now moved to a strategic position, near the gate that faced towards Attica and gave him the nearest approach to the beleaguered Macedonian garrison.
It was also the approach route from Athens, of whose intentions he would by now have heard. But in that respect his vigilance was needless. No troops from the south appeared. The alarming speed of his march had brought painful second thoughts. Without protest from Demosthenes the Athenians closed their gates, leaving the Thebans to weather the storm alone.
It did not yet break. Alexander still awaited a parley. He had collected on his southward march contingents of troops from Macedonian satellites, chiefly Phocians and Plataeans. The latter, it will be remembered, were the descendants of the Marathon heroes, inheritors of their perpetual Athenian citizenship, whom Demosthenes had traded to the Thebans on the eve of Chaeronea.
Alexander kept close to the Theban siege lines, at their nearest point of approach to the Macedonian garrison, trapped inside the Cadmea. This, as can still be seen, was no acropolis perched on natural rock; it relied for defence on its massive walls. For the next sequence of events, which Arrian gives in vivid detail, he expressly says thathis source is Ptolemy, who must have taken part. He claimed that Perdiccas, still at that time holding only a small command, was posted next the siege works. For some reason, without awaiting orders, he rushed his men to the palisade and started to tear it down.
For justice towards Perdiccas we shall look in vain to Ptolemy, who had been his mortal enemy many years before he wrote his History, and has probably suppressed a good reason for this apparent breach of discipline, such as a signal from the garrison of some weakness in the enemy dispositions which needed quick action. Perdiccas was the man for it, as he had shown at Philip’s death. He broke
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