interest,” one step below being suspects. In August 2002, they regarded their prime person of interest as Steven J. Hatfill, a scientist who had worked at USAMRIID from 1997 to 1999. While he was there, he had easy access to the Ames strain of anthrax, and he had told coworkers that he knew how to “weaponize” anthrax.
When the FBI searched Hatfill’s apartment in Frederick, Maryland, in June 2002, agents discovered what the FBI characterized as detailed “anthrax production protocols,” some of which matched techniques used by the U.S. Army. Investigators also discovered that Hatfill was quite familiar with how to conduct an anthrax letter attack on the United States. He had, in fact, commissioned a “risk assessment study.”
Suspicious Use of Cipro
The circumstantial evidence continued to pile up against Hatfill, including his use of the drug ciprofloxacin, or Cipro, the only antibiotic approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of inhalational anthrax. The doses he received had been prescribed by a doctor friend in January, July, September, October, and November 2001 and included refills that he filled two days before each of the letter assaults.
The Feds seemed to have not one but two smoking guns to use against Hatfill, but that turned out not to be the case. As the investigation continued, the task force reluctantly concluded that Hatfill’s use of Cipro was not to fight inhalational anthrax but for chronic sinus and bronchial infections.
The most important facts that helped completely clear Hatfill, were later scientific breakthroughs. Originally, the task force had assumed that any scientist who worked in the USAMRIID Building and had access to the biocontainment side of Building 1412 also had access to the anthrax powder used in the attacks. But that was not correct. Investigators discovered that a powder called RMR-1029 had actually been used in the attacks. Hatfill had left USAMRIID two years before RMR-1029 was available. In other words, he wasn’t around when the anthrax was weaponized.
After that, investigators simply had to figure out who had access to RMR-1029. They quickly eliminated everyone who was a suspect except one person, Bruce Ivins, PhD.
Ivins was a microbiologist, a renowned expert in all aspects of anthrax who had worked at USAMRIID for twenty-seven years. The task force also learned that Ivins had been able to transfer small quantities of the main ingredient of the anthrax (RMR-1029) used in the letters to two other domestic labs before the attacks in 2001.
Bruce Ivins
Investigators closely examined Ivins’ emails and online searches, and the deeper they dug, the more concerned they became. They received authorization to wiretap his phones, “tossed his trash,” (as cops say, so they could examine what was in it), and put a GPS on his car so they could follow him. Of course, investigators also wanted to know what made Ivins tick and took a close look at his personal and professional life.
Bizarre Behavior
Ivins exhibited truly bizarre behavior in his personal life. For example, he had a history of disguising his identity and mailing things under fictitious names, even when there was no logical reason to do so. Investigators discovered a dozen pseudonyms that he had used. They also learned that he exhibited a variety of obsessive behaviors. For example, he had a penchant for going on long drives to mail letters. And he didn’t hesitate to name friends and colleagues as being behind the anthrax attacks.
At first, investigators kept their focus on Ivins secret, but when they felt they had exhausted all investigative avenues, they confronted him and his lawyers. Ivins was given every reasonable opportunity to answer questions related to the anthrax attack, but he was not able to answer anything adequately.
Ivins’ main reaction was rage, and his behavior in the following days and weeks clearly indicated that he had a homicidal side and was capable
When the FBI searched Hatfill’s apartment in Frederick, Maryland, in June 2002, agents discovered what the FBI characterized as detailed “anthrax production protocols,” some of which matched techniques used by the U.S. Army. Investigators also discovered that Hatfill was quite familiar with how to conduct an anthrax letter attack on the United States. He had, in fact, commissioned a “risk assessment study.”
Suspicious Use of Cipro
The circumstantial evidence continued to pile up against Hatfill, including his use of the drug ciprofloxacin, or Cipro, the only antibiotic approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of inhalational anthrax. The doses he received had been prescribed by a doctor friend in January, July, September, October, and November 2001 and included refills that he filled two days before each of the letter assaults.
The Feds seemed to have not one but two smoking guns to use against Hatfill, but that turned out not to be the case. As the investigation continued, the task force reluctantly concluded that Hatfill’s use of Cipro was not to fight inhalational anthrax but for chronic sinus and bronchial infections.
The most important facts that helped completely clear Hatfill, were later scientific breakthroughs. Originally, the task force had assumed that any scientist who worked in the USAMRIID Building and had access to the biocontainment side of Building 1412 also had access to the anthrax powder used in the attacks. But that was not correct. Investigators discovered that a powder called RMR-1029 had actually been used in the attacks. Hatfill had left USAMRIID two years before RMR-1029 was available. In other words, he wasn’t around when the anthrax was weaponized.
After that, investigators simply had to figure out who had access to RMR-1029. They quickly eliminated everyone who was a suspect except one person, Bruce Ivins, PhD.
Ivins was a microbiologist, a renowned expert in all aspects of anthrax who had worked at USAMRIID for twenty-seven years. The task force also learned that Ivins had been able to transfer small quantities of the main ingredient of the anthrax (RMR-1029) used in the letters to two other domestic labs before the attacks in 2001.
Bruce Ivins
Investigators closely examined Ivins’ emails and online searches, and the deeper they dug, the more concerned they became. They received authorization to wiretap his phones, “tossed his trash,” (as cops say, so they could examine what was in it), and put a GPS on his car so they could follow him. Of course, investigators also wanted to know what made Ivins tick and took a close look at his personal and professional life.
Bizarre Behavior
Ivins exhibited truly bizarre behavior in his personal life. For example, he had a history of disguising his identity and mailing things under fictitious names, even when there was no logical reason to do so. Investigators discovered a dozen pseudonyms that he had used. They also learned that he exhibited a variety of obsessive behaviors. For example, he had a penchant for going on long drives to mail letters. And he didn’t hesitate to name friends and colleagues as being behind the anthrax attacks.
At first, investigators kept their focus on Ivins secret, but when they felt they had exhausted all investigative avenues, they confronted him and his lawyers. Ivins was given every reasonable opportunity to answer questions related to the anthrax attack, but he was not able to answer anything adequately.
Ivins’ main reaction was rage, and his behavior in the following days and weeks clearly indicated that he had a homicidal side and was capable
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