and the dashing Murat, who were believed to be in advance of the main body of troops around the town of Rudnia. During the offensive, scouts reported that the French had been spotted to the north. Barclay turned his troops toward the French forces, but the new orders never got through to his cavalry. They continued advancing along the original lines and at Inkovo ran into the enemy cavalry, still in their tents. The Russians attacked at dawn, sweeping through the camp, spreading chaos, and capturing 200 prisoners.
The attack had acted as a trip wire. Now Napoleon knew where the Russians were, and he concluded that the main body of troops had gathered at Smolensk. He moved quickly to pin them down for a large-scale battle, moving his corps to the Dnieper River. Believing that the First and Second armies were southeast of him, he was engaging in a classic Napoleonic technique: he would circle around and get behind the Russians at Smolensk, cut off their line of retreat, and then crush them.
The hoped-for alliance between Bagration and Barclay had never materialized on the ground. Bagration, a Russian hawk to his highly excitable nerve endings, lobbied for a battle, while the careful Barclay was still terrified of being crushed by one of Napoleon’s surprise flank or rearguard attacks. Finally, Barclay agreed that a confrontation with Napoleon was necessary, and he marched northwest from Smolensk to find the French. But a confusing and contradictory series of orders was sent to Bagration, miles to the south, the last of which ordered him to a rendezvous. The Second Army’s leader had grown exasperated by the blizzard of directives and now refused the command to turn around for another pointless march. Instead of joining forces with Barclay, his troops continued toward Smolensk. Barclay was forced to abandon his offensive and turned back toward the city. The rift in the Russian high command was now deep and wide.
Confusion—and Napoleon’s own reputation—worked against Barclay, denying him the decisive battle he needed. Barclay didn’t believe that his opponent’s tactical skills had deteriorated. The Russians repeatedly suspected a Napoleonic strike would come wheeling in from some unexpected direction, and so they chose again and again to retreat away from the invisible presence they sensed over the next hill.
On August 14, Napoleon sent Davout rushing to Smolensk from the southwest, followed by Ney and Murat. “At last! I have them!” he cried when Marshal Ney reported back that he had the entire Russian army in sight. The emperor decided on a classic frontal assault against a fortified position, just the kind of warfare he had seemed to make obsolete in victories such as Austerlitz. The time for finesse was gone.
But now that Napoleon needed the kind of massive army he had assembled in Germany, his numbers were falling fast. He was down to 175,000 effective fighting troops, with 100,000 others on the sick or missing lists. Ney’s corps had been reduced from 39,342 men at the start of the campaign to 16,053 troops fit enough for battle. The medical situation was grim.
The German foot soldier Jakob Walter saw his company dwindle to 25 men as they marched toward Smolensk. “One man after another stretched himself half-dead upon the ground,” he wrote in his diary. “Most of them died a few hours later; several, however, suddenly fell to the ground dead.” He attributes many of the casualties to thirst but reports no symptoms. It’s likely that typhus and dysentery were killing as many as, if not more than, dehydration was.
As he approached Smolensk, Napoleon decided against sending an encircling force to block any Russian retreat, allowing the road to Moscow at the Russian forces’ rear to remain clear. Some historians have theorized that he expected a decisive battle in which no retreat would be possible, but it’s also likely that the emperor felt he needed every available man for the assault and
The attack had acted as a trip wire. Now Napoleon knew where the Russians were, and he concluded that the main body of troops had gathered at Smolensk. He moved quickly to pin them down for a large-scale battle, moving his corps to the Dnieper River. Believing that the First and Second armies were southeast of him, he was engaging in a classic Napoleonic technique: he would circle around and get behind the Russians at Smolensk, cut off their line of retreat, and then crush them.
The hoped-for alliance between Bagration and Barclay had never materialized on the ground. Bagration, a Russian hawk to his highly excitable nerve endings, lobbied for a battle, while the careful Barclay was still terrified of being crushed by one of Napoleon’s surprise flank or rearguard attacks. Finally, Barclay agreed that a confrontation with Napoleon was necessary, and he marched northwest from Smolensk to find the French. But a confusing and contradictory series of orders was sent to Bagration, miles to the south, the last of which ordered him to a rendezvous. The Second Army’s leader had grown exasperated by the blizzard of directives and now refused the command to turn around for another pointless march. Instead of joining forces with Barclay, his troops continued toward Smolensk. Barclay was forced to abandon his offensive and turned back toward the city. The rift in the Russian high command was now deep and wide.
Confusion—and Napoleon’s own reputation—worked against Barclay, denying him the decisive battle he needed. Barclay didn’t believe that his opponent’s tactical skills had deteriorated. The Russians repeatedly suspected a Napoleonic strike would come wheeling in from some unexpected direction, and so they chose again and again to retreat away from the invisible presence they sensed over the next hill.
On August 14, Napoleon sent Davout rushing to Smolensk from the southwest, followed by Ney and Murat. “At last! I have them!” he cried when Marshal Ney reported back that he had the entire Russian army in sight. The emperor decided on a classic frontal assault against a fortified position, just the kind of warfare he had seemed to make obsolete in victories such as Austerlitz. The time for finesse was gone.
But now that Napoleon needed the kind of massive army he had assembled in Germany, his numbers were falling fast. He was down to 175,000 effective fighting troops, with 100,000 others on the sick or missing lists. Ney’s corps had been reduced from 39,342 men at the start of the campaign to 16,053 troops fit enough for battle. The medical situation was grim.
The German foot soldier Jakob Walter saw his company dwindle to 25 men as they marched toward Smolensk. “One man after another stretched himself half-dead upon the ground,” he wrote in his diary. “Most of them died a few hours later; several, however, suddenly fell to the ground dead.” He attributes many of the casualties to thirst but reports no symptoms. It’s likely that typhus and dysentery were killing as many as, if not more than, dehydration was.
As he approached Smolensk, Napoleon decided against sending an encircling force to block any Russian retreat, allowing the road to Moscow at the Russian forces’ rear to remain clear. Some historians have theorized that he expected a decisive battle in which no retreat would be possible, but it’s also likely that the emperor felt he needed every available man for the assault and
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