flabby, with an upper body that was too long. His receding chin and narrowed eyes gave him a 'slightly Mongolian' look. He led Eismann over to a larger table to study the operations map. Eismann saw that it was at least twenty-four hours out of date.
'What have we got to close this gap and establish a new front?' Eismann asked. He was not new to crises exacerbated, if not created, by Führer headquarters. In December 1942, he had been the officer flown into the Stalingrad encirclement on Field Marshal von Manstein's orders to discuss the situation with General Paulus.
Himmler answered with all the thoughtless cliches of his master: 'immediate counter-attack', 'smash in their flank' and so on. His replies were devoid of any basic military knowledge. Eismann had the impression 'that a blind man was speaking about colour'. He then asked what battle-worthy formations they had at their disposal. Himmler had no idea. He seemed unaware of the fact that the Ninth Army virtually existed in name only. Only one thing was clear. The Reichsführer SS did not appreciate direct questions in general staff style.
Army Group Vistula headquarters, it turned out, not only lacked trained staff officers, it also had no supply or transport organization and no signals detachment. The sole means of communication was the chief of staff's telephone. And apart from the road map which Eismann had brought on his journey from Berlin, the headquarters possessed no more than one map. Even those general staff officers who had experienced earlier disasters still found it hard to fathom the degree of incompetence and irresponsibility of Hitler's Kamarilla' .
Himmler, still determined on a counter-attack, wanted to throw together odd regiments and battalions. Eismann suggested a divisional commander, who at least had a staff and communications, to organize it, but Himmler insisted on a corps commander to make it sound impressive. He chose Obergruppenführer Demmlhuber. (Army officers had given Demmlhuber the nickname of 'Tosca' after a well-known scent of that name which he was suspected of using.) A makeshift corps staff was assembled and the following day Demmlhuber took over. Demmlhuber, who had more experience than Himmler, was not overjoyed at the task given him. The operation, if it deserved such a name, proved a complete failure, and he became one of the very few Waffen SS generals to be dismissed. This perhaps provoked jokes among opera-lovers on the army general staff that 'Tosca' may have been pushed out, but at least he had not had to jump.
Another Waffen S S officer arrived to take over as chief of staff of the army group. This was Brigadeführer Lammerding, a former commander of the SS Das Reich Panzer Division. Although a respected commander, he had little staff experience and no taste for compromise. Meanwhile, the Soviet advance on Schneidemühl forced Army Group Vistula headquarters to withdraw northwards to Falkenburg. Schneidemiihl, designated a fortress by Hitler along with Poznan, was left to its fate, with eight battalions of Volkssturm, a few engineers and some fortress artillery. Hitler's dogma, 'Where the German soldier has once stood, he will never retreat', remained the watchword.
A Pomeranian Volkssturm battalion on its way to Schneidemühl by train from Stolp passed Himmler's Steiermark train. This so-called 'battalion' was commanded by Baron Jesko von Puttkamer, the land- owner who had threatened the pot-bellied Nazi official. He and his officers, dressed in their uniforms from the First World War, had brought their old service pistols. Their men, mostly farmers and shopkeepers, had no weapons at all, only Volkssturm armbands. They were supposed to receive weapons in Schneidemühl. Suddenly, the train came under fire from Soviet tanks. The driver managed to stop and then reverse with remarkable promptness.
Once they were well away from danger, Puttkamer ordered his men out of the train. He then marched them back to Stolp
'What have we got to close this gap and establish a new front?' Eismann asked. He was not new to crises exacerbated, if not created, by Führer headquarters. In December 1942, he had been the officer flown into the Stalingrad encirclement on Field Marshal von Manstein's orders to discuss the situation with General Paulus.
Himmler answered with all the thoughtless cliches of his master: 'immediate counter-attack', 'smash in their flank' and so on. His replies were devoid of any basic military knowledge. Eismann had the impression 'that a blind man was speaking about colour'. He then asked what battle-worthy formations they had at their disposal. Himmler had no idea. He seemed unaware of the fact that the Ninth Army virtually existed in name only. Only one thing was clear. The Reichsführer SS did not appreciate direct questions in general staff style.
Army Group Vistula headquarters, it turned out, not only lacked trained staff officers, it also had no supply or transport organization and no signals detachment. The sole means of communication was the chief of staff's telephone. And apart from the road map which Eismann had brought on his journey from Berlin, the headquarters possessed no more than one map. Even those general staff officers who had experienced earlier disasters still found it hard to fathom the degree of incompetence and irresponsibility of Hitler's Kamarilla' .
Himmler, still determined on a counter-attack, wanted to throw together odd regiments and battalions. Eismann suggested a divisional commander, who at least had a staff and communications, to organize it, but Himmler insisted on a corps commander to make it sound impressive. He chose Obergruppenführer Demmlhuber. (Army officers had given Demmlhuber the nickname of 'Tosca' after a well-known scent of that name which he was suspected of using.) A makeshift corps staff was assembled and the following day Demmlhuber took over. Demmlhuber, who had more experience than Himmler, was not overjoyed at the task given him. The operation, if it deserved such a name, proved a complete failure, and he became one of the very few Waffen SS generals to be dismissed. This perhaps provoked jokes among opera-lovers on the army general staff that 'Tosca' may have been pushed out, but at least he had not had to jump.
Another Waffen S S officer arrived to take over as chief of staff of the army group. This was Brigadeführer Lammerding, a former commander of the SS Das Reich Panzer Division. Although a respected commander, he had little staff experience and no taste for compromise. Meanwhile, the Soviet advance on Schneidemühl forced Army Group Vistula headquarters to withdraw northwards to Falkenburg. Schneidemiihl, designated a fortress by Hitler along with Poznan, was left to its fate, with eight battalions of Volkssturm, a few engineers and some fortress artillery. Hitler's dogma, 'Where the German soldier has once stood, he will never retreat', remained the watchword.
A Pomeranian Volkssturm battalion on its way to Schneidemühl by train from Stolp passed Himmler's Steiermark train. This so-called 'battalion' was commanded by Baron Jesko von Puttkamer, the land- owner who had threatened the pot-bellied Nazi official. He and his officers, dressed in their uniforms from the First World War, had brought their old service pistols. Their men, mostly farmers and shopkeepers, had no weapons at all, only Volkssturm armbands. They were supposed to receive weapons in Schneidemühl. Suddenly, the train came under fire from Soviet tanks. The driver managed to stop and then reverse with remarkable promptness.
Once they were well away from danger, Puttkamer ordered his men out of the train. He then marched them back to Stolp
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