system to lob cassettes containing film back from space, Lockheed was also pressing ahead with another system; it would send strategic intelligence photos back to earth electronically via high-resolution television transmissions.
A year after the Discoverer 13 success, the White House, on advice from the CIA, clamped a secrecy lid on all satellite espionage operations. It became forbidden even to acknowledge the existence of such systems.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had begun to develop its own reconnaissance satellites, and a curious kind of international gentlemenâs agreement evolved: Each side knew the other had such satellites, but tacitly both agreed to say nothing publicly about the otherâs espionage efforts in space. Each side knew what the other was doing, but they found no value in airing it publicly, because it would just trigger a response in kind. However, for all the superficial good manners regarding each otherâs space spies, learning about each otherâs capabilitiesâand vulnerabilitiesâin satellite espionage became a principal preoccupation of the intelligence services of the two countries, the CIA and the KGB.
By the early 1970s, no KGB agent had ever penetrated the U.S. satellite operations.
Meanwhile, satellites became as indispensable to modern generals as spears were to ancient warriors. Their surveillance capabilities became a cornerstone of American defense in the nuclear era, as well as a promising tool in the search for a stable peace. The satellites were eyes in space that could photograph and inventory the number, locations and types of missiles deployed by the Soviets, and thus allow U.S. negotiators to enter Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with prior knowledge of the extent of the Soviet arsenal and determine if the Russians were living up to any SALT agreement. Likewise, the Russians could monitor U.S. land-based missiles the same way.
Satellites could eavesdrop on telecommunications around the world and maintain a vigil in space to warn of a possible attack; and if deterrence failed, satellites would be ready in space to report on the accuracy of missiles by locating and counting the mushroom clouds that would billow into the sky during a nuclear war.
The United States built a global network of tracking stations to control the satellites and receive information from them. Headquartered in a huge windowless structure beside a Lockheed plant in Northern California, the network spanned the globe with stations in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Iceland, Australia, the Seychelles Islands off Africa and other secret locations. From this command post, Air Force operators could guide the satellites by remote control, much as if they were in the cockpit of a plane.
Along with Lockheed, TRW became the CIAâs principal supplier of Black Satellites.
Besides learning more about satellite espionage, Chris in his initial months on the job began to know some of his associates better. Gene Norman, he learned, had worked at TRW for seven years, including five in Special Projects. He both liked and felt repelled by him. Gene seemed to enjoy assuming the role of an older brother teaching Chris the ways of the world. There was nothing racial about the tension that Chris began to feel toward his black co-worker. Chris felt no racial bias toward anyone. But Normanâs values were not always consistent with those of the new code-room clerk, who still carried with him substantial vestiges of the moral code heâd assimilated at St. John Fisher.
Norman made much of his two years as a Marine in Vietnam. To Chris he often acted as if he were still a Marine. He never stopped talking about the camaraderie of Marines under fire, and he was forever polishing his dark cordovan-colored shoes.
Norman loved to drink beer, smoke pot and ogle womenâs breasts; Chris discovered this one night after work when Norman took him to a place near the plant called The Buckit. At noon and in the
A year after the Discoverer 13 success, the White House, on advice from the CIA, clamped a secrecy lid on all satellite espionage operations. It became forbidden even to acknowledge the existence of such systems.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had begun to develop its own reconnaissance satellites, and a curious kind of international gentlemenâs agreement evolved: Each side knew the other had such satellites, but tacitly both agreed to say nothing publicly about the otherâs espionage efforts in space. Each side knew what the other was doing, but they found no value in airing it publicly, because it would just trigger a response in kind. However, for all the superficial good manners regarding each otherâs space spies, learning about each otherâs capabilitiesâand vulnerabilitiesâin satellite espionage became a principal preoccupation of the intelligence services of the two countries, the CIA and the KGB.
By the early 1970s, no KGB agent had ever penetrated the U.S. satellite operations.
Meanwhile, satellites became as indispensable to modern generals as spears were to ancient warriors. Their surveillance capabilities became a cornerstone of American defense in the nuclear era, as well as a promising tool in the search for a stable peace. The satellites were eyes in space that could photograph and inventory the number, locations and types of missiles deployed by the Soviets, and thus allow U.S. negotiators to enter Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with prior knowledge of the extent of the Soviet arsenal and determine if the Russians were living up to any SALT agreement. Likewise, the Russians could monitor U.S. land-based missiles the same way.
Satellites could eavesdrop on telecommunications around the world and maintain a vigil in space to warn of a possible attack; and if deterrence failed, satellites would be ready in space to report on the accuracy of missiles by locating and counting the mushroom clouds that would billow into the sky during a nuclear war.
The United States built a global network of tracking stations to control the satellites and receive information from them. Headquartered in a huge windowless structure beside a Lockheed plant in Northern California, the network spanned the globe with stations in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Iceland, Australia, the Seychelles Islands off Africa and other secret locations. From this command post, Air Force operators could guide the satellites by remote control, much as if they were in the cockpit of a plane.
Along with Lockheed, TRW became the CIAâs principal supplier of Black Satellites.
Besides learning more about satellite espionage, Chris in his initial months on the job began to know some of his associates better. Gene Norman, he learned, had worked at TRW for seven years, including five in Special Projects. He both liked and felt repelled by him. Gene seemed to enjoy assuming the role of an older brother teaching Chris the ways of the world. There was nothing racial about the tension that Chris began to feel toward his black co-worker. Chris felt no racial bias toward anyone. But Normanâs values were not always consistent with those of the new code-room clerk, who still carried with him substantial vestiges of the moral code heâd assimilated at St. John Fisher.
Norman made much of his two years as a Marine in Vietnam. To Chris he often acted as if he were still a Marine. He never stopped talking about the camaraderie of Marines under fire, and he was forever polishing his dark cordovan-colored shoes.
Norman loved to drink beer, smoke pot and ogle womenâs breasts; Chris discovered this one night after work when Norman took him to a place near the plant called The Buckit. At noon and in the
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