to Pakistan. Finally, you never ask us what we need and what you should give aid to. So your aid does nothing for your image and does not serve your goals with Pakistan. If you want to have an impact, you have to fix that.
And that became Holbrooke’s objective. American aid could make a difference if it was visible and effective. Only then would Pakistanis think that there was value to a relationship with America.
If we wanted to change Pakistan, Holbrooke thought, we had to think in terms of a Marshall Plan. After a journalist asked him whether the $5 billion in aid was not too much for Pakistan, Holbrooke answered, “Pakistan needs $50 billion, not $5 billion.” The White House did not want to hear that—it meant a fight with Congress and spending political capital to convince the American people. Above all else, it required an audacious foreign policy gambit for which the Obama administration was simply not ready.
Yet in reality we were spending much more than that on Afghanistan. For every dollar we gave Pakistan in aid, we spent twenty on Afghanistan. That money did not go very far; it was like pouring water into sand. We would have been doing ourselves a big favor if we had reversed that ratio. It seems we had no problem spending money, just not on things that would actually bring about change and serve our interests. Even General Petraeus understood this. I recall him saying at a Pakistan meeting: “You get what you pay for. We have not paid much for much of anything in Pakistan.”
In the end, we settled for far more modest assistance to Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation of 2009 earmarked $7.5 billion inaid to Pakistan over a five-year period—the first long-term all-civilian aid package. It was no Marshall Plan, and Congress could still refuse to fund the authorization, but it made a dent in suspicious Pakistani attitudes.
Holbrooke also believed we needed more aggressive diplomacy: America had to talk to Pakistan, frequently and not just about security issues that concern us, but also about a host of economic and social issues that they cared about. The more often American leaders met their Pakistani counterparts and the more diverse the set of issues they addressed, the more broad-based the relationship would become. And if Pakistanis saw something tangible coming out of these meetings they would warm up to closer ties with the United States. Holbrooke knew from the many hours he had spent with Pakistani leaders, academics, and journalists that they wanted to see a long-term relationship with the United States—a commitment to friendship that was not limited to the duration of our engagement in Afghanistan. It was critical for us not to peddle a so-called transactional relationship but to show interest in something more strategic.
Holbrooke convinced Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that America had to offer a strategic partnership to Pakistan, built around a Strategic Dialogue—a type of bilateral forum that America holds with a number of countries, including China and India. America would talk to Pakistan about security issues but also discuss water, energy, and social and economic issues. Holbrooke thought that Clinton was the perfect American leader to lead this effort—she had a history with Pakistan (she had traveled there as both First Lady and senator) and was well liked by Pakistanis. Clinton was also America’s chief diplomat, and who better to engage in diplomacy with Pakistan than the chief?
Clinton was not ready to cut Pakistan any slack on their support for the Taliban or terrorism, but she was serious about engaging Pakistan’s leaders and showing them a path out of their foreign policy quandary. She believed pressure should be combined with engagement and assistance.
In one of her first meetings with Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs she asked them point blank to tell her what their vision was for Pakistan: “Would Pakistan become like North Korea? I am
And that became Holbrooke’s objective. American aid could make a difference if it was visible and effective. Only then would Pakistanis think that there was value to a relationship with America.
If we wanted to change Pakistan, Holbrooke thought, we had to think in terms of a Marshall Plan. After a journalist asked him whether the $5 billion in aid was not too much for Pakistan, Holbrooke answered, “Pakistan needs $50 billion, not $5 billion.” The White House did not want to hear that—it meant a fight with Congress and spending political capital to convince the American people. Above all else, it required an audacious foreign policy gambit for which the Obama administration was simply not ready.
Yet in reality we were spending much more than that on Afghanistan. For every dollar we gave Pakistan in aid, we spent twenty on Afghanistan. That money did not go very far; it was like pouring water into sand. We would have been doing ourselves a big favor if we had reversed that ratio. It seems we had no problem spending money, just not on things that would actually bring about change and serve our interests. Even General Petraeus understood this. I recall him saying at a Pakistan meeting: “You get what you pay for. We have not paid much for much of anything in Pakistan.”
In the end, we settled for far more modest assistance to Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation of 2009 earmarked $7.5 billion inaid to Pakistan over a five-year period—the first long-term all-civilian aid package. It was no Marshall Plan, and Congress could still refuse to fund the authorization, but it made a dent in suspicious Pakistani attitudes.
Holbrooke also believed we needed more aggressive diplomacy: America had to talk to Pakistan, frequently and not just about security issues that concern us, but also about a host of economic and social issues that they cared about. The more often American leaders met their Pakistani counterparts and the more diverse the set of issues they addressed, the more broad-based the relationship would become. And if Pakistanis saw something tangible coming out of these meetings they would warm up to closer ties with the United States. Holbrooke knew from the many hours he had spent with Pakistani leaders, academics, and journalists that they wanted to see a long-term relationship with the United States—a commitment to friendship that was not limited to the duration of our engagement in Afghanistan. It was critical for us not to peddle a so-called transactional relationship but to show interest in something more strategic.
Holbrooke convinced Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that America had to offer a strategic partnership to Pakistan, built around a Strategic Dialogue—a type of bilateral forum that America holds with a number of countries, including China and India. America would talk to Pakistan about security issues but also discuss water, energy, and social and economic issues. Holbrooke thought that Clinton was the perfect American leader to lead this effort—she had a history with Pakistan (she had traveled there as both First Lady and senator) and was well liked by Pakistanis. Clinton was also America’s chief diplomat, and who better to engage in diplomacy with Pakistan than the chief?
Clinton was not ready to cut Pakistan any slack on their support for the Taliban or terrorism, but she was serious about engaging Pakistan’s leaders and showing them a path out of their foreign policy quandary. She believed pressure should be combined with engagement and assistance.
In one of her first meetings with Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs she asked them point blank to tell her what their vision was for Pakistan: “Would Pakistan become like North Korea? I am
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