The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror by Bernard Lewis Page B
Authors: Bernard Lewis
Tags: nonfiction
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backlash of anger and hatred from the Arab community.
Russia’s interest in the Middle East was not new. The czars had been expanding southward and eastward for centuries, and had incorporated vast Muslim territories in their empire, at the expense of Turkey and Persia and the formerly independent Muslim states of Central Asia. The defeat of the Axis in 1945 brought a new Soviet threat. The Soviets were now strongly entrenched in the Balkans and could threaten Turkey on both its eastern and its western frontiers. They were already inside Iran, in occupation of the Persian province of Azerbaijan. Their threat to Iran was of long standing. In the Russo-Iranian wars of 1804–1813 and 1826–1828, the Russians had acquired the northern part of Azerbaijan, which became a province of the czarist empire and later a republic of the Soviet Union. In World War II, together with the British, the Soviets occupied Iran, to secure its lines of communication for their mutual use. When the war ended the British withdrew; the Soviets stayed, apparently with the intention of adding what remained of Azerbaijan to the Soviet Union.
That time they were held back. Thanks largely to American support, the Turks were able to refuse the Soviet demand for bases in the Straits, while the Iranians dismantled the Communist puppet state which the Soviet occupiers had set up in Persian Azerbaijan and reasserted the sovereignty of the government of Iran over all its territories.
For a while, the Soviet attempt to realize the age-old dream of the czars was resisted, and both Turkey and Iran entered into Western alliances. But the Russian-Egyptian arms agreement of 1955 brought Russia back into the Middle Eastern game, this time with a leading role. The Turks and Iranians had long experience of Russian imperialism and were correspondingly wary. The Arab states’ experience of imperialism was exclusively Western, and they were disposed to look more favorably on the Soviets. By leapfrogging the northern barrier and dealing directly with the newly independent Arab states, the Russians were able, within a short time, to establish a very strong position.
At first they proceeded in much the same way as their Western European predecessors—military bases, supply of weapons, military “guidance,” economic and cultural penetration. But for Soviet-style relationships this was only a beginning, and the intention clearly was to carry it much further. There can be little doubt that, had it not been for American opposition, the Cold War, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab world would at best have shared the fate of Poland and Hungary, more probably that of Uzbekistan. And that is not all. While seeking to establish a protectorate over their Middle Eastern allies, the Soviets showed themselves to be very ineffectual protectors. In the Arab-Israel War of 1967 and again in 1973, they were unwilling or unable to save their protégés from defeat and humiliation. The best they could do was to join with the United States in calling a halt to the Israeli advance.
By the early 1970s the Soviet presence was becoming not only ineffectual but also irksome. Like their Western imperial predecessors, the Soviets had established military bases on Egyptian soil which no Egyptian could enter and proceeded to the classic next stage of unequal treaties.
There were some Middle Eastern leaders who learned the lesson and turned, with greater or lesser reluctance, toward the West. Notable among them was President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who had inherited the Soviet relationship from his predecessor, President Nasser. In May 1971 he was induced to sign a very unequal “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” with the USSR; 2 in July 1972 he ordered his Soviet military advisers to leave the country and took the first steps toward a rapprochement with the United States and a peace with Israel. President Sadat however seems to have been almost alone in his assessment
Russia’s interest in the Middle East was not new. The czars had been expanding southward and eastward for centuries, and had incorporated vast Muslim territories in their empire, at the expense of Turkey and Persia and the formerly independent Muslim states of Central Asia. The defeat of the Axis in 1945 brought a new Soviet threat. The Soviets were now strongly entrenched in the Balkans and could threaten Turkey on both its eastern and its western frontiers. They were already inside Iran, in occupation of the Persian province of Azerbaijan. Their threat to Iran was of long standing. In the Russo-Iranian wars of 1804–1813 and 1826–1828, the Russians had acquired the northern part of Azerbaijan, which became a province of the czarist empire and later a republic of the Soviet Union. In World War II, together with the British, the Soviets occupied Iran, to secure its lines of communication for their mutual use. When the war ended the British withdrew; the Soviets stayed, apparently with the intention of adding what remained of Azerbaijan to the Soviet Union.
That time they were held back. Thanks largely to American support, the Turks were able to refuse the Soviet demand for bases in the Straits, while the Iranians dismantled the Communist puppet state which the Soviet occupiers had set up in Persian Azerbaijan and reasserted the sovereignty of the government of Iran over all its territories.
For a while, the Soviet attempt to realize the age-old dream of the czars was resisted, and both Turkey and Iran entered into Western alliances. But the Russian-Egyptian arms agreement of 1955 brought Russia back into the Middle Eastern game, this time with a leading role. The Turks and Iranians had long experience of Russian imperialism and were correspondingly wary. The Arab states’ experience of imperialism was exclusively Western, and they were disposed to look more favorably on the Soviets. By leapfrogging the northern barrier and dealing directly with the newly independent Arab states, the Russians were able, within a short time, to establish a very strong position.
At first they proceeded in much the same way as their Western European predecessors—military bases, supply of weapons, military “guidance,” economic and cultural penetration. But for Soviet-style relationships this was only a beginning, and the intention clearly was to carry it much further. There can be little doubt that, had it not been for American opposition, the Cold War, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab world would at best have shared the fate of Poland and Hungary, more probably that of Uzbekistan. And that is not all. While seeking to establish a protectorate over their Middle Eastern allies, the Soviets showed themselves to be very ineffectual protectors. In the Arab-Israel War of 1967 and again in 1973, they were unwilling or unable to save their protégés from defeat and humiliation. The best they could do was to join with the United States in calling a halt to the Israeli advance.
By the early 1970s the Soviet presence was becoming not only ineffectual but also irksome. Like their Western imperial predecessors, the Soviets had established military bases on Egyptian soil which no Egyptian could enter and proceeded to the classic next stage of unequal treaties.
There were some Middle Eastern leaders who learned the lesson and turned, with greater or lesser reluctance, toward the West. Notable among them was President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who had inherited the Soviet relationship from his predecessor, President Nasser. In May 1971 he was induced to sign a very unequal “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” with the USSR; 2 in July 1972 he ordered his Soviet military advisers to leave the country and took the first steps toward a rapprochement with the United States and a peace with Israel. President Sadat however seems to have been almost alone in his assessment
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