The Bitter Road to Freedom: The Human Cost of Allied Victory in World War II Europe by William I. Hitchcock Page B
Authors: William I. Hitchcock
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coal; the bread lines grew. By the end of October, the temperature in the main cities among a harassed public rose to dangerous levels, and dem- onstrations began to form in front of the government offices.
To complaints about shortages, the public added criti- cism of Prime Minister Pierlot for his dilatory policy toward collaborators. The Allies estimated that some 400,000 Belgians had in some way worked for the Ger- man occupation, and the new government initially arrested as many as 60,000 people. But by the end of 1944, thousands had been released while only 495 peo- ple had been given capital sentences (mostly in absen- tia); only one senior administrator had been convicted of crimes against the state. Most received far more le- nient punishments. An astute British observer likened “the fierce and bitter hatred of collaborators” to “a reli- gious fervor,” and the press excoriated the government ministers, who had spent the war safely in London, for their failure to avenge the injustices suffered at the hands of collaborators during the war. A Belgian who had worked for the BBC in London during the war re- turned in November to find that Belgians cared more about the purges than any other issue, including food. “ Worse than anything,” he wrote of the wartime ex-
periences of his countrymen, “was the treason of the Belgians themselves,” yet these traitors now went un- punished. “Although the people will exercise great pa- tience,” he concluded, “they will never permit that the guilty should slip through the fingers of the law…. The country is beginning to ferment.” 7
The food shortage and the failure of the purges pro- vided the backdrop to a major political crisis in the country in November that required the full interven- tion of the Allied military authorities. Throughout the war, Belgium had not had a large underground resis- tance, but as German labor roundups increased in in- tensity, the resistance grew. By the end of the war, there were 90,000 members of the resistance, most of them armed. The most significant groups were the Armée Se- crète, led by former officers of the Belgian army, which tended to have royalist sympathies; and the Front de l’Indépendence (FI), organized and controlled by the Belgian Communist Party. These units harassed the re- treating Germans, played a small part in the liberation of the country, and now refused to be marginalized by Pierlot’s government, which they viewed as a sad con- tinuation of the prewar gerontocracy. One British se- nior official described the resistance fighters as “a very motley array…. Members of these guerrilla forces are now to be seen in all parts of the country, bearing dis-
tinguishing armlets and carrying Sten guns, revolvers, and sometimes only knives.” They engaged in “arbitrary acts of requisition” from the civilians, and indeed were more numerous and “better armed than the Belgian police.” 8 In order to protect the Belgian government and to secure public order, General Eisenhower on Oc- tober 2 ordered that the Belgian resistance groups sur- render their weapons, while he complimented them for their “devoted heroism.” 9
Yet they did not readily obey. Instead, upset over the failure of the purges and spurred on by hungry, embit- tered civilians, elements of the FI arranged a serious challenge to the government. On October 21, the prime minister alerted SHAEF that he had information about a Communist uprising in the country, centered around striking miners and other disaffected laborers; SHAEF responded by swiftly arming the Belgian police with 7,500 weapons and stepping up demands for the disar- mament of the resistance. (Some of the weapons had to be parachuted into Belgium by British secret services.) General Erskine published an open letter stressing his support for Pierlot and his determination to use force to put down any political uprising. On November 25, the FI and Communist union members
To complaints about shortages, the public added criti- cism of Prime Minister Pierlot for his dilatory policy toward collaborators. The Allies estimated that some 400,000 Belgians had in some way worked for the Ger- man occupation, and the new government initially arrested as many as 60,000 people. But by the end of 1944, thousands had been released while only 495 peo- ple had been given capital sentences (mostly in absen- tia); only one senior administrator had been convicted of crimes against the state. Most received far more le- nient punishments. An astute British observer likened “the fierce and bitter hatred of collaborators” to “a reli- gious fervor,” and the press excoriated the government ministers, who had spent the war safely in London, for their failure to avenge the injustices suffered at the hands of collaborators during the war. A Belgian who had worked for the BBC in London during the war re- turned in November to find that Belgians cared more about the purges than any other issue, including food. “ Worse than anything,” he wrote of the wartime ex-
periences of his countrymen, “was the treason of the Belgians themselves,” yet these traitors now went un- punished. “Although the people will exercise great pa- tience,” he concluded, “they will never permit that the guilty should slip through the fingers of the law…. The country is beginning to ferment.” 7
The food shortage and the failure of the purges pro- vided the backdrop to a major political crisis in the country in November that required the full interven- tion of the Allied military authorities. Throughout the war, Belgium had not had a large underground resis- tance, but as German labor roundups increased in in- tensity, the resistance grew. By the end of the war, there were 90,000 members of the resistance, most of them armed. The most significant groups were the Armée Se- crète, led by former officers of the Belgian army, which tended to have royalist sympathies; and the Front de l’Indépendence (FI), organized and controlled by the Belgian Communist Party. These units harassed the re- treating Germans, played a small part in the liberation of the country, and now refused to be marginalized by Pierlot’s government, which they viewed as a sad con- tinuation of the prewar gerontocracy. One British se- nior official described the resistance fighters as “a very motley array…. Members of these guerrilla forces are now to be seen in all parts of the country, bearing dis-
tinguishing armlets and carrying Sten guns, revolvers, and sometimes only knives.” They engaged in “arbitrary acts of requisition” from the civilians, and indeed were more numerous and “better armed than the Belgian police.” 8 In order to protect the Belgian government and to secure public order, General Eisenhower on Oc- tober 2 ordered that the Belgian resistance groups sur- render their weapons, while he complimented them for their “devoted heroism.” 9
Yet they did not readily obey. Instead, upset over the failure of the purges and spurred on by hungry, embit- tered civilians, elements of the FI arranged a serious challenge to the government. On October 21, the prime minister alerted SHAEF that he had information about a Communist uprising in the country, centered around striking miners and other disaffected laborers; SHAEF responded by swiftly arming the Belgian police with 7,500 weapons and stepping up demands for the disar- mament of the resistance. (Some of the weapons had to be parachuted into Belgium by British secret services.) General Erskine published an open letter stressing his support for Pierlot and his determination to use force to put down any political uprising. On November 25, the FI and Communist union members
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