Sabbah was a thinker and writer as well as a man of action. Sunni authors have preserved two citations from his works - a fragment of an autobiography, and an abridgement of a theological treatise. 4' Among later Ismailis, he was revered as the prime mover in the da`wa jadida - new preaching - the reformed Ismaili doctrine which was promulgated after the break with Cairo, and which was preserved and elaborated among the Nizari Ismailis. Later Nizari works contain a number of passages which may be quotations or summaries. of his own teachings. Hasan never claimed to be an Imam - only a representative of the Imam. After the disappearance of the Imam he was the Hujja, the proof - the source of knowledge of the hidden Imam of his time, the living link between the lines of manifest Imams of the past and the future, and the leader of the da'wa. Ismaili doctrine is basically authoritarian. The believer has no right of choice, but must follow the ta`lim, the authorized teaching. The ultimate source of guidance was the Imam; the immediate source was his accredited representative. Men could not choose their Imam, as the Sunnis said, nor exercise judgement in determining the truth in matters of theology and law. God appointed the Imam, and the Imam was the repository of the truth. Only the Imam could validate both revelation and reason; only the Ismaili Imam, by the nature of his office and teaching, could in fact do this, and he alone therefore was the true Imam. His rivals were usurpers, their followers sinners, their teachings falsehood.
This doctrine, with its stress on loyalty and obedience, and its rejection of the world as it was, became a powerful weapon in the hands of a secret, revolutionary opposition. The painful realities of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt had become an embarrassment to Ismaili claims. The break with Cairo, and the transfer of allegiance to a mysterious hidden Imam, released the pent-up forces of Ismaili passion and devotion; it was the achievement of Hasan-i Sabbah to arouse and direct them.
The Mission in Persia
The death of a Seljuq Sultan meant an immediate halt to all positive action, and an interval of conflict and uncertainty, during which the internal and external enemies of the state could find and seize their opportunities. There must have been many who expected that the Ismaili principality founded by Hasan-i Sabbah would, on his death, conform to this lamentably normal pattern of Muslim government in this period.
In 1126, two years after the succession of Buzurgumid, Sultan Sanjar launched an attack which put the question to the test. Since his expedition against Tabas in 1103, Sanjar had taken no action against the Ismailis, and may even have entered into some sort of agreement with them. No immediate casus Belli for the antiIsmaili offensive of 1126 is known. The growing confidence of the Sultan, and the presumed weakness of the Ismailis under their new ruler, may be a sufficient explanation of his decision no longer to tolerate this dangerous and independent power on the borders and even within the borders of his Empire. An important role was played by the Sultan's vizier Mu`in al-Din Kashi, an advocate of strong action.
The first attack seems to have come in the East. `In this year the vizier ... gave orders to make war against the Ismailis, to kill them wherever they were and wherever they were conquered, to pillage their property and enslave their women. He sent an army against Turaythith [in Quhistan] which was in their hands, and against Bayhaq, in the province of Nishapur ... he despatched troops against every part of their possessions, with orders to kill whatever Ismailis they encountered.', The implication would seem to he that the Ismailis were to be denied the rights allowed to prisoners and civilians by Muslim law in inter-Muslim warfare, and to be treated as infidels, subject to death or enslavement. The Arabic chronicler reports two successes - the conquest of the Ismaili
This doctrine, with its stress on loyalty and obedience, and its rejection of the world as it was, became a powerful weapon in the hands of a secret, revolutionary opposition. The painful realities of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt had become an embarrassment to Ismaili claims. The break with Cairo, and the transfer of allegiance to a mysterious hidden Imam, released the pent-up forces of Ismaili passion and devotion; it was the achievement of Hasan-i Sabbah to arouse and direct them.
The Mission in Persia
The death of a Seljuq Sultan meant an immediate halt to all positive action, and an interval of conflict and uncertainty, during which the internal and external enemies of the state could find and seize their opportunities. There must have been many who expected that the Ismaili principality founded by Hasan-i Sabbah would, on his death, conform to this lamentably normal pattern of Muslim government in this period.
In 1126, two years after the succession of Buzurgumid, Sultan Sanjar launched an attack which put the question to the test. Since his expedition against Tabas in 1103, Sanjar had taken no action against the Ismailis, and may even have entered into some sort of agreement with them. No immediate casus Belli for the antiIsmaili offensive of 1126 is known. The growing confidence of the Sultan, and the presumed weakness of the Ismailis under their new ruler, may be a sufficient explanation of his decision no longer to tolerate this dangerous and independent power on the borders and even within the borders of his Empire. An important role was played by the Sultan's vizier Mu`in al-Din Kashi, an advocate of strong action.
The first attack seems to have come in the East. `In this year the vizier ... gave orders to make war against the Ismailis, to kill them wherever they were and wherever they were conquered, to pillage their property and enslave their women. He sent an army against Turaythith [in Quhistan] which was in their hands, and against Bayhaq, in the province of Nishapur ... he despatched troops against every part of their possessions, with orders to kill whatever Ismailis they encountered.', The implication would seem to he that the Ismailis were to be denied the rights allowed to prisoners and civilians by Muslim law in inter-Muslim warfare, and to be treated as infidels, subject to death or enslavement. The Arabic chronicler reports two successes - the conquest of the Ismaili
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