Target Tokyo: Jimmy Doolittle and the Raid That Avenged Pearl Harbor by James M. Scott Page B
Authors: James M. Scott
Tags: United States, Asia, History, World War II, Military, 20th Century, Japan, Aviation, Americas, Pulitzer Prize Finalist 2016 HISTORY
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Arnold helped shoulder some of the burden, reaching out to Brigadier General Carl Spaatz, the chief of the air staff. “It is desired that you select for me the objectives in Japan you consider most desirable to be attacked in case we find it possible to send bombardment airplanes over Japan sometime in the near future,” Arnold wrote in a January 22 memo. “The bombing mission should be able to cover any part of Japan from Tokyo south.” Spaatz’s office sent a detailed three-page analysis back just nine days later, citing Nakajima’s and Tokyo Gas’ aircraft and engine plants in the nation’s capital, along with Kawasaki’s factories in Kobe and Mitsubishi’s and Aichi’s plants in Nagoya. “The above aircraft factories represent approximately 75% of the aircraft productive capacity of Japan,” the memo stated. “These are considered vital targets because Japan is dependent alone upon what they can manufacture.”
The report further identified important targets in the iron, steel, aluminum, and magnesium industries as well as in critical petroleum refineries. The study concluded with a calculation of the total volumeof potential targets for each major city. Tokyo and its suburbs of Kawasaki and Tsurumi contained thirteen power plants, six oil refineries, four aircraft factories, two steel plants, and an arsenal. One of the principal cities of Japan’s aircraft industry, Nagoya was home to four such factories, including one of the largest airframe plants in the world, a more than four-million-square-foot facility owned by Mitsubishi. Kobe offered up another four aircraft factories, plus two steel plants, two dockyards, and two power plants. “Many of these objectives,” the January 31 report noted, “are concentrated in fairly small areas so that by careful selection several individual objectives might well be grouped into excellent area targets.”
Doolittle envisioned that his bombers would take off at night and arrive over Japan at dawn. An attack at first light would guarantee greater accuracy as well as allow crews time to fly to China, refuel at airfields near the coast, and push another eight hundred miles inland to Chungking and beyond the reach of Japanese forces fighting on the mainland, all before nightfall. If enemy forces discovered the task force or if intelligence for any reason demanded that his bombers attack at night, Doolittle believed it would need to be a moonlit night in case Japanese cities observed blackout restrictions. Otherwise a moonless evening would be best. Doolittle studied up on the weather, hoping to avoid morning fog over Tokyo, low overcast skies over China, strong westerly winds, and icing. He suggested daily weather updates from China be sent in special code. “An initial study of meteorological conditions indicates that the sooner the raid is made the better,” he wrote. “The weather will become increasingly unfavorable after the end of April.”
China remained one of Doolittle’s biggest logistical challenges, because Japanese forces occupied strategic positions along the coast. He selected several airfields around Chuchow—seventy miles inland and some two hundred miles south of Shanghai—and estimated that crews would need at least 20,000 gallons of 100-octane aviation fuel and another 600 gallons of lubricating oil. Doolittle recommended that First Lieutenant Harry Howze with the Air Service Command, formerly with Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, help make arrangements in China. Colonel Claire Chennault, aviation adviser to the Chinese, should then assign a responsible American or English-speaking native to physically check that supplies were in place. Doolittle suggested that work start at once and cautioned that secrecywas vital. Even the Chinese should not be informed until the planes were airborne, for fear that news of the operation would
Arnold helped shoulder some of the burden, reaching out to Brigadier General Carl Spaatz, the chief of the air staff. “It is desired that you select for me the objectives in Japan you consider most desirable to be attacked in case we find it possible to send bombardment airplanes over Japan sometime in the near future,” Arnold wrote in a January 22 memo. “The bombing mission should be able to cover any part of Japan from Tokyo south.” Spaatz’s office sent a detailed three-page analysis back just nine days later, citing Nakajima’s and Tokyo Gas’ aircraft and engine plants in the nation’s capital, along with Kawasaki’s factories in Kobe and Mitsubishi’s and Aichi’s plants in Nagoya. “The above aircraft factories represent approximately 75% of the aircraft productive capacity of Japan,” the memo stated. “These are considered vital targets because Japan is dependent alone upon what they can manufacture.”
The report further identified important targets in the iron, steel, aluminum, and magnesium industries as well as in critical petroleum refineries. The study concluded with a calculation of the total volumeof potential targets for each major city. Tokyo and its suburbs of Kawasaki and Tsurumi contained thirteen power plants, six oil refineries, four aircraft factories, two steel plants, and an arsenal. One of the principal cities of Japan’s aircraft industry, Nagoya was home to four such factories, including one of the largest airframe plants in the world, a more than four-million-square-foot facility owned by Mitsubishi. Kobe offered up another four aircraft factories, plus two steel plants, two dockyards, and two power plants. “Many of these objectives,” the January 31 report noted, “are concentrated in fairly small areas so that by careful selection several individual objectives might well be grouped into excellent area targets.”
Doolittle envisioned that his bombers would take off at night and arrive over Japan at dawn. An attack at first light would guarantee greater accuracy as well as allow crews time to fly to China, refuel at airfields near the coast, and push another eight hundred miles inland to Chungking and beyond the reach of Japanese forces fighting on the mainland, all before nightfall. If enemy forces discovered the task force or if intelligence for any reason demanded that his bombers attack at night, Doolittle believed it would need to be a moonlit night in case Japanese cities observed blackout restrictions. Otherwise a moonless evening would be best. Doolittle studied up on the weather, hoping to avoid morning fog over Tokyo, low overcast skies over China, strong westerly winds, and icing. He suggested daily weather updates from China be sent in special code. “An initial study of meteorological conditions indicates that the sooner the raid is made the better,” he wrote. “The weather will become increasingly unfavorable after the end of April.”
China remained one of Doolittle’s biggest logistical challenges, because Japanese forces occupied strategic positions along the coast. He selected several airfields around Chuchow—seventy miles inland and some two hundred miles south of Shanghai—and estimated that crews would need at least 20,000 gallons of 100-octane aviation fuel and another 600 gallons of lubricating oil. Doolittle recommended that First Lieutenant Harry Howze with the Air Service Command, formerly with Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, help make arrangements in China. Colonel Claire Chennault, aviation adviser to the Chinese, should then assign a responsible American or English-speaking native to physically check that supplies were in place. Doolittle suggested that work start at once and cautioned that secrecywas vital. Even the Chinese should not be informed until the planes were airborne, for fear that news of the operation would
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