welcomed the stand by the Iranians.
Instead of reacting to Iranians in small, isolated ambushes, the 28th Combined Arms
Army would be able to fight the kind of war it was trained and equipped for. The commander of the 28th CAA prepared to fight a battle of annihilation. His goal was to pin, trap and destroy every organized Iranian unit deployed against him. The plan was simple and well proven. It was, in fact, nothing more than an updated version of the German blitzkrieg.
Units of the 28th CAA would close up on the Iranians, feeling out their positions for weak points with air, ground and electronic reconnaissance.
Once the Iranian units had been located, weaknesses identified and command posts targeted, the point of attack would be determined and a breakthrough assault would be launched.
Soviet doctrine calls for the concentration of numerical superiority at the point of attack in attacker-defender ratios of at least five to one in infantry, four to one in tanks and seven to one in artillery.
Superiority is achieved by the use of artillery and rockets; air attacks including attack helicopters, electronic warfare including radio direction-finding and jamming on command and control nets; and masses of men and tanks on the ground. The well-orchestrated assault designed to break through the defender commences with a violent twenty-minute artillery attack at the selected point. Not only does the artillery kill some defenders and destroy equipment, it also covers the advance of the attacking force by pinning the defenders and obscuring their observation.
The main instrument for a Soviet breakthrough assault is the motorized rifle regiment. Its battalions, normally deployed two abreast in a first-attack echelon and one back as a second echelon, start in columns five to ten kilometers from the front. As a motorized rifle battalion approaches, it breaks up into company columns, with four tanks normally leading a company of ten to twelve armored personnel carriers. When the battalion reaches the five-kilometer point, it breaks down into platoon columns, with a tank leading each rifle platoon of three or four personnel carriers. Finally, at the two- to three kilometer point, the personnel carriers swing into line as the tanks cut on their on-board smoke generators, shrouding the advancing storm in smoke. All this occurs at a steady, un altering pace of twelve to twenty miles an hour. At this point, the artillery, which has been firing at a rapid rate on the enemy positions, shifts to the next series of targets. Each battalion now has twelve tanks in line, followed by thirty or more personnel carriers fifty to one hundred meters behind the tanks. If antitank fire is heavy, the infantry will dismount a few hundred meters from the enemy and assault on foot, and the tanks and the personnel carriers will follow with support fire. If the defender’s fire is of little consequence, the infantry will remain mounted and the battalion will roll through the defensive positions. Once through, the attacking unit will either continue to drive deep into the enemy’s rear or turn and envelop him from the rear.
In addition to the tanks and the personnel carriers, the lead motorized rifle battalion will have two to four self propelled antiaircraft guns, a battery of six self-propelled artillery guns, and antitank-guided-missile carriers immediately behind the first line of personnel carriers. This force attacks with a frontage of fifteen hundred meters, just under a mile.
Two battalions abreast would give the regiment a frontage of three thousand meters. The third battalion, or second-echelon battalion, follows at a distance of five hundred to one thousand meters behind the two lead battalions and is ready to move forward to take advantage of a success of either of them. Soviet practice is to reinforce success. A battalion that fails to break through will be left to its own devices while all support goes to one that is having success or has
Instead of reacting to Iranians in small, isolated ambushes, the 28th Combined Arms
Army would be able to fight the kind of war it was trained and equipped for. The commander of the 28th CAA prepared to fight a battle of annihilation. His goal was to pin, trap and destroy every organized Iranian unit deployed against him. The plan was simple and well proven. It was, in fact, nothing more than an updated version of the German blitzkrieg.
Units of the 28th CAA would close up on the Iranians, feeling out their positions for weak points with air, ground and electronic reconnaissance.
Once the Iranian units had been located, weaknesses identified and command posts targeted, the point of attack would be determined and a breakthrough assault would be launched.
Soviet doctrine calls for the concentration of numerical superiority at the point of attack in attacker-defender ratios of at least five to one in infantry, four to one in tanks and seven to one in artillery.
Superiority is achieved by the use of artillery and rockets; air attacks including attack helicopters, electronic warfare including radio direction-finding and jamming on command and control nets; and masses of men and tanks on the ground. The well-orchestrated assault designed to break through the defender commences with a violent twenty-minute artillery attack at the selected point. Not only does the artillery kill some defenders and destroy equipment, it also covers the advance of the attacking force by pinning the defenders and obscuring their observation.
The main instrument for a Soviet breakthrough assault is the motorized rifle regiment. Its battalions, normally deployed two abreast in a first-attack echelon and one back as a second echelon, start in columns five to ten kilometers from the front. As a motorized rifle battalion approaches, it breaks up into company columns, with four tanks normally leading a company of ten to twelve armored personnel carriers. When the battalion reaches the five-kilometer point, it breaks down into platoon columns, with a tank leading each rifle platoon of three or four personnel carriers. Finally, at the two- to three kilometer point, the personnel carriers swing into line as the tanks cut on their on-board smoke generators, shrouding the advancing storm in smoke. All this occurs at a steady, un altering pace of twelve to twenty miles an hour. At this point, the artillery, which has been firing at a rapid rate on the enemy positions, shifts to the next series of targets. Each battalion now has twelve tanks in line, followed by thirty or more personnel carriers fifty to one hundred meters behind the tanks. If antitank fire is heavy, the infantry will dismount a few hundred meters from the enemy and assault on foot, and the tanks and the personnel carriers will follow with support fire. If the defender’s fire is of little consequence, the infantry will remain mounted and the battalion will roll through the defensive positions. Once through, the attacking unit will either continue to drive deep into the enemy’s rear or turn and envelop him from the rear.
In addition to the tanks and the personnel carriers, the lead motorized rifle battalion will have two to four self propelled antiaircraft guns, a battery of six self-propelled artillery guns, and antitank-guided-missile carriers immediately behind the first line of personnel carriers. This force attacks with a frontage of fifteen hundred meters, just under a mile.
Two battalions abreast would give the regiment a frontage of three thousand meters. The third battalion, or second-echelon battalion, follows at a distance of five hundred to one thousand meters behind the two lead battalions and is ready to move forward to take advantage of a success of either of them. Soviet practice is to reinforce success. A battalion that fails to break through will be left to its own devices while all support goes to one that is having success or has
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