Return of a King: The Battle For Afghanistan by William Dalrymple Page B

city and more or less keeping the Persians at bay single-handedly. This is not, however, a version of events which is supported by any of the many Persian or Afghan chronicles. Here the siege is seen as a titanic struggle between the two peoples, one Sunni, one Shia; and the fortitude of the Herati defenders, subject to the most horrific privations, was depicted as an epic of Afghan bravery and resistance. Indeed two of the most important Afghan historians living at the time devote almost as many pages to the siege of Herat as they do to the British invasion which followed it. Both were seen as equally formidable threats to the independence of Khurasan.
    According to these Afghan sources, as soon as news arrived that the Persian army was heading towards Herat, Shah Kamran ordered grain and forage to be brought in, and the fruit trees in the gardens outside the walls to be cut down. Levies were summoned from the Sadozais’ Uzbek and Hazara tribal allies, and the city’s massive earthen walls were repaired and reinforced. So were those of the Ikhtiyar al-Din, the vast citadel of Herat that occupied an area that was equivalent to two-thirds of the city itself. 85 By 13 November, the advance guard of the Persian army had arrived outside the border fortress of Ghorian. The Herati chronicler Riyazi in the ‘ Ayn al-Waqayi recorded how the Persians captured the mighty castle in less than twelve hours with the aid of their British-trained artillery: ‘so many cannon were fired at the Qala’-i Ghorian that three of its sides completely collapsed’. In this way, wrote Fayz Mohammad, ‘the touch-paper of war was lit and preparations were made in the army of Iran for a major assault on Herat’.
    A few days later, the first divisions of the enormous 30,000-strong Persian army marched along the valley of the Hari Rud towards the walls of Herat, easily driving off the squadrons of cavalry sent out against them. ‘A skirmish was fought and many men died,’ wrote Fayz Mohammad, ‘but when the vast numbers of the main Iranian army hove into view, the Heratis were unable to continue the fight and retired into the city . . . Seeing no hope of resisting the Iranians in the open field, Kamran devoted all his efforts to defence works. The Shah’s forces, like the waves of the sea, lapped against and enveloped the four sides of the city.’ 86
    On the morning of Tuesday 19 December, two days after this unwelcome news had reached Kabul, Burnes and his assistants were looking out of their Bala Hisar residence, waiting for a messenger to bring in the latest despatches from India. Burnes had been hoping that Auckland would change his position on Afghanistan after he had read his long report, and he desperately wanted to be able to give Dost Mohammad some good news. The influence of his enemy, the newly arrived Persian envoy, was growing daily stronger since the news of the encirclement of Herat, and he knew he badly needed to boost British popularity and prestige. Only an undertaking by the British to mediate the return of Peshawar was likely to do that.
    Instead, a message came from Dost Mohammad asking to see him. In formal durbar, the Amir gave him the worst news imaginable: a Russian agent, sent by the Tsar to open diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, had just arrived in Ghazni and was expected in Kabul within the week. The agent’s name, Burnes learned, was Lieutenant Ivan Vitkevitch. 87
     
     
    ‘We are in a mess here,’ wrote Burnes to his brother-in-law, Major Holland, shortly afterwards. ‘Herat is besieged and may fall, and the Emperor of Russia has sent an Envoy to Kabul to offer Dost Mohammad Khan money to fight Ranjit Singh!! I could not believe my eyes or ears, but Captain Vitkevitch, for that is the agent’s name, arrived here with a blazing letter, three feet long, and sent immediately to pay his respects to myself. I of course received him and asked him to dinner.’ 88
    The dinner between the two great rivals – the