NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century by Sunil Khilnani Page B

significantly diminish the scope of achievable political objectives. The major factor that influences the constriction of political objectivesis the danger of escalation of war into the nuclear realm. Escalation is structurally intrinsic to war and is unpredictable as it involves an action and reaction chain between two independent wills. The decision to embark on war therefore will be weighed by the degree of risk that the political decision-maker is willing to take, and will depend on the issues at stake.
    Beyond local border skirmishes, armed conflict will necessarily involve air power. Air power application in any war will first seek to neutralize the air assets of the adversary. It is aimed to achieve as much freedom for one’s own aircraft to operate without interference, as also to minimize the adversary’s ability to apply air power against one’s own assets. This process cannot be confined to a limited geographical area and could encompass airfields, aircraft and air defence systems, among other targets. The geographical spread of the conflict is therefore difficult to contain. Escalation can also be inadvertent due to political signals and military actions being misinterpreted in the fog of war. Dual-use assets complicate the danger of escalation as it is not possible to distinguish a conventional armed aircraft or missile from a nuclear one. Consequently, nuclear weapons constrict the traditional utility of military force and call for a redefinition of our notions of ‘victory’. Thechallenge for the military establishment is to shape our hard power capabilities in tandem with India’s political objectives, while remaining within the ambit of the political and strategic logic imposed by nuclear weapons.
    The shift to developing India’s maritime power is possible if we align the shaping of our hard power with the political objectives feasible under a nuclear overhang. The window of opportunity is available, as Pakistan is likely to be enmeshed in internal strife and the Afghanistan imbroglio for the next decade or so. China is likely to remain focused on creating an environment that will facilitate the maintenance of its economic growth and internal stability. While Pakistan is preoccupied, India can make the shift by transforming its hard power capability in coherence with its political objectives. This should facilitate some shift of resources from the Pakistan border and building its defensive capability along the Sino-Indian border. Concurrently, resources can be allocated to develop its maritime capability and undertake a maritime shift in military power. This would also call for concomitant investment and development to enlarge our space assets, given that militaries are increasingly dependent on space assets for effective combat capability.
Pakistan
    Capture of significant amounts of Pakistan’s territory continues to be the primary military objective underpinning the doctrine and organization of the Indian armed forces. However, the capture of significant amounts of territory is no longer a valid proposition, owing to the nuclear equation. Also, except for the desert areas bordering Rajasthan and Gujarat, the density of population poses a danger of triggering humanitarian crises that may dwarf the advantages of military thrusts. In Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistani Punjab, where extremism is rife, we could find ourselves ensnared in a costly counter-insurgency campaign. The potency of insurgencies has also increased due to the technological empowerment of small groups, which can inflict significant physical and psychological damage through acts of terrorism.
    The hard power strategy adopted by us will have to cover the spectrum that includes sending a political signal through military means at the lower end (through cyber or precision air attack) to capture of territory considered feasible under nuclear conditions at the higher end. The important issue is to shape our capabilities so that we