No More Vietnams by Richard Nixon Page B

coup against the commander in chief, another faction suppressed the attempt, and then the suppressors of the coup ousted the commander in chief. Every time I visited South Vietnam in that period, I found a new President or Prime Minister in power. I have never met more pitiful incompetents.
    South Vietnam’s military had thrown out not only Diem butalso the country’s constitution. The Military Revolutionary Council was now responsible for appointing the government. Politics among its members were a free-for-all. Loyalties ran not to the country but to personal careers. Unity of purpose or policy did not exist. Opportunism was the only common ideal. Never were the generals sufficiently united to appoint effective government leaders and back them up with complete support.
    Journalists, who thought only they knew what was best, had always characterized American policy with the ditty “Sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem.” South Vietnam foundered at times under Diem. Now it was going down for the third time, sinking toward political collapse. It would take two years for power to come into the hands of another strong leader, General Nguyen Van Thieu.
    As government-by-intrigue became business as usual, the business of fighting the war ground to a halt. Hanoi was elated. Diem, who had personified stubborn resistance to communism, had been eliminated without their having to lift a finger. Nguyen Huu Tho, the head of the National Liberation Front, said, “The Americans have managed to do what we couldn’t do for nine years.” He added in disbelief that the coup was “a gift from heaven.”
    Ho seized the opportunity the United States and the generals had given him. Captured documents and the testimony of defectors indicated that Ho now believed North Vietnam could win quickly. Within months, he injected regular units of the North Vietnamese Army into the South. At the beginning of each year, Radio Hanoi customarily proclaimed that it would be a “year of victories.” But in 1965, after political chaos overtook South Vietnam, Hanoi declared that this would be the year of victory.
    South Vietnam’s survival all along had depended on whether it developed stable institutions and the ability to defend itself before North Vietnam acquired the power to deal it a death blow. Diem at least had his country moving in the right direction. Now, while Saigon’s government and armywere sliding downward by every index, Communist strength on the battlefield skyrocketed. Guerrillas inundated the countryside. Communist forces began to form larger units and engage in set-piece battles. Outside Saigon, Danang, and other major cities, Communist forces crushed South Vietnam’s mobile reserve battalions one by one, and soon there would be no reserves at all left.
    Time was running short. The United States would have to act soon. President Kennedy’s assassination had followed Diem’s by three weeks. As Vice President, Lyndon Johnson had strongly opposed the steps we took against Diem. He later told aides that our complicity in the coup was the greatest mistake we made in Vietnam. Now, as President, he had to try to pick up the pieces.
    When we arrogated to ourselves the right to choose South Vietnam’s government, we also assumed responsibility for its fate. Johnson wanted neither an American war nor a Communist victory. With the unraveling of South Vietnam, those choices were rapidly becoming our only choices. We could let the Communists conquer South Vietnam or send in our own troops to prevent it. The Kennedy administration sowed the seeds of intrigue that led to the overthrow and murder of Diem. Now we would reap a bitter harvest.
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    Most Americans believe that the Tonkin Gulf incident triggered our entry into the Vietnam War. Although it was an important turning point, it was not our opening volley.
    President Kennedy had increased the number of United States