Archives in August 2007, I located Record Groups 319, 389, 407, and 496. In doing so, I was pleased to find that there were over twenty boxes of information on Volckmann—including his leadership of USAFIP-NL, his work in creating the Special Forces, and his time as the Director of Special Operations in the U.S. European Command. Record Group 496 included several maps of North Luzon. However, these were drawn from the U.S. Sixth Army Records and, aside from listing Volckmann’s guerrilla positions, did not offer anything in the way of battle plans or situation maps.
Continuing my research, I decided to reference the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. There, I found a wealth of information that, surprisingly, was not present at the National Archives. Under the heading of “The Russell W. Volckmann Papers,” MHI had seven boxes of material relating strictly to his operations in the Philippines. These were in Volckmann’s possession until his death in 1982. Shortly thereafter, the collection was donated by his widow, Helen. Included in this collection are official reports and situation maps of Volckmann’s guerrilla units.
Possibly the most salient items in this collection were the USAFIPNL G-3 Operations Reports , USAFIP-NL G-2 Intelligence Reports , USAFIP-NL G-3 After-Battle Report , and the USAFIP-NL radio logs. USAFIP-NL G-3 Operations Reports are a collection of all combat reports and records pertaining to actions against the enemy. The AfterBattle Report —prepared by General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL— reconstructs the different phases of Volckmann’s guerrilla war by synthesizing the combat and intelligence reports. The radio logs contain some 385 radiograms sent to and from MacArthur in Australia. Collectively, these documents provide a valuable look into the thought process Volckmann undertook while contemplating the course of his guerrilla campaign.
Attempting to balance the perspectives of my primary source material, I referenced a handful of Japanese resources. At MHI, I recovered transcripts of interviews and sworn statements from the Japanese generals and colonels whom Volckmann confronted in the Philippines. Aside from General Yamashita, these officers included the likes of Colonel Sotomu Terau, Chief of Staff–19th Tora Division, Lieutenant General Fukutaro Nishiyama, Commander–23rd Division, and Lieutenant General Yutaka Marauka, Commander–103rd Division. Describing Volckmann as a constant thorn in their sides, these flag officers admittedly stumbled over their own frustrations in a vain attempt to shut down USAFIP-NL. Not only did these men confirm the validity of the USAFIP-NL combat reports, they acknowledged that Yamashita had placed a sizeable bounty on Volckmann’s head.
Another valuable source came from the files of the Rand Corporation. In 1963, six years after his retirement from the U.S. Army, Volckmann participated in the Rand study panel to discuss the viability of close air support for contingency operations. From the Rand Corporation, I secured a transcript of the panel’s proceedings. Volckmann used this opportunity to explain how ground-air operations were indispensable to unconventional warfare. The concepts he articulated on this panel soon found their way into the U.S. Army’s air cavalry doctrine during Vietnam.
Finally, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, I conducted research at the Special Operations Archives at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. While their archives are comparatively smaller than the ones I had visited previously, there was no lack of relevant material. The Special Operations Archives have one file on Volckmann that contains letters he wrote to the Archives—then known as the “History Office”— over a period of time spanning from 1969–1975 explaining his roles in the Philippines and creating the Special Forces. This file also includes some information about Volckmann’s role in developing special
Continuing my research, I decided to reference the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. There, I found a wealth of information that, surprisingly, was not present at the National Archives. Under the heading of “The Russell W. Volckmann Papers,” MHI had seven boxes of material relating strictly to his operations in the Philippines. These were in Volckmann’s possession until his death in 1982. Shortly thereafter, the collection was donated by his widow, Helen. Included in this collection are official reports and situation maps of Volckmann’s guerrilla units.
Possibly the most salient items in this collection were the USAFIPNL G-3 Operations Reports , USAFIP-NL G-2 Intelligence Reports , USAFIP-NL G-3 After-Battle Report , and the USAFIP-NL radio logs. USAFIP-NL G-3 Operations Reports are a collection of all combat reports and records pertaining to actions against the enemy. The AfterBattle Report —prepared by General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL— reconstructs the different phases of Volckmann’s guerrilla war by synthesizing the combat and intelligence reports. The radio logs contain some 385 radiograms sent to and from MacArthur in Australia. Collectively, these documents provide a valuable look into the thought process Volckmann undertook while contemplating the course of his guerrilla campaign.
Attempting to balance the perspectives of my primary source material, I referenced a handful of Japanese resources. At MHI, I recovered transcripts of interviews and sworn statements from the Japanese generals and colonels whom Volckmann confronted in the Philippines. Aside from General Yamashita, these officers included the likes of Colonel Sotomu Terau, Chief of Staff–19th Tora Division, Lieutenant General Fukutaro Nishiyama, Commander–23rd Division, and Lieutenant General Yutaka Marauka, Commander–103rd Division. Describing Volckmann as a constant thorn in their sides, these flag officers admittedly stumbled over their own frustrations in a vain attempt to shut down USAFIP-NL. Not only did these men confirm the validity of the USAFIP-NL combat reports, they acknowledged that Yamashita had placed a sizeable bounty on Volckmann’s head.
Another valuable source came from the files of the Rand Corporation. In 1963, six years after his retirement from the U.S. Army, Volckmann participated in the Rand study panel to discuss the viability of close air support for contingency operations. From the Rand Corporation, I secured a transcript of the panel’s proceedings. Volckmann used this opportunity to explain how ground-air operations were indispensable to unconventional warfare. The concepts he articulated on this panel soon found their way into the U.S. Army’s air cavalry doctrine during Vietnam.
Finally, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, I conducted research at the Special Operations Archives at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. While their archives are comparatively smaller than the ones I had visited previously, there was no lack of relevant material. The Special Operations Archives have one file on Volckmann that contains letters he wrote to the Archives—then known as the “History Office”— over a period of time spanning from 1969–1975 explaining his roles in the Philippines and creating the Special Forces. This file also includes some information about Volckmann’s role in developing special
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