he was glad to have them, but added, “I’ve been wondering how things were progressing” in other assignments Johnson had been given before he left Washington.
One thing at which Johnson
was
working was politics. Every day, not one but several letters from his congressional office would arrive at the Empire Hotel in San Francisco with reports on various district problems—ranging from appointments to the service academies and rural postmasterships to procuring for Austin businessmen priorities that would enable them to obtain scarce raw materials; moreover, in Texarkana, where Brown &
Root was building a military depot, heavy pressure from theOffice of Price Administration was needed to reduce high rentals, “which,” Weber reported, “is forcing Brown & Root to lose many men each week.” Johnson would write instructions on the handling of each problem in the margins of the reports, or would reply by letter if his instructions were detailed. And he and Connally were also wrestling with the
larger political problem. In the first excitement of the outbreak of war, and Johnson’s going on active service, it had been assumed by everyone—including Johnson—that he would certainly not be running for the Senate nomination in the summer of 1942, and he had promised to support former GovernorJames V. Allred, a longtime ally, against Pappy O’Daniel. When Roosevelt had given Allred his blessing, Allred had formally entered therace. But now, as the May 31 filing deadline drew closer, although everyone else concerned still felt that Johnson could not possibly run, Johnson was no longer so certain. The upcoming election would fill one Texas senatorial seat for six years; the other was held byTom Connally, re-elected just two years before and as immensely popular as ever. Johnson felt, John Connally recalls, that “hemight not ever have
another chance as good as this.” Connally and Wirtz told him—Connally with the diffidence of a subordinate, Wirtz with the quiet certitude that made him the “only man Johnson listened to”—that running was not feasible; that, as Connally recalls, “war fever was extremely high at this time, patriotism was high, and it would have indicated he was more interested in his political future than the war.” But Johnson appears
to have been unwilling to let even a war defer his ambition; he kept trying to find an excuse to escape from his promise to Allred and to run. Although President Roosevelt made it clear that he wanted the Allred candidacy to go forward as agreed, so that there would be no split in the liberal vote, Johnson refused to drop the subject, and he and Connally analyzed the situation from every angle, day after day—“this went on for weeks,” Connally
recalls—and Johnson began quietly maneuvering to be “drafted” for the nomination.
He was also working diligently at obtaining promotion within the Navy. While he was not reporting often to his superior, Professor Barker, he was lobbying with Barker’s boss, Undersecretary Forrestal, for a job in which the roles of superior and subordinate would be reversed. And he wrote to Forrestal’s personal aide, Commander John Gingrich:
All over the place there is in evidence great need of positiveness, leadership, and direction. There is much that I should be doingthat I am not. One does not function well without authority and responsibility.
When and if you or the Boss run into a problem that requires energy, determination, and a modicum of experience give me the word. I need more work.
Lady Bird says that the period from January to April of 1942 was “a very frustrating time of high hopes which didn’t come to fruition.… That [was] a nonproductive few months, and he didn’t like it a bit.”A “constant stream of letters” was coming back to her, she says, “and after a while I could tell in his letters that there was an increasing frustration and feeling that he wasn’t
being useful, he wasn’t
One thing at which Johnson
was
working was politics. Every day, not one but several letters from his congressional office would arrive at the Empire Hotel in San Francisco with reports on various district problems—ranging from appointments to the service academies and rural postmasterships to procuring for Austin businessmen priorities that would enable them to obtain scarce raw materials; moreover, in Texarkana, where Brown &
Root was building a military depot, heavy pressure from theOffice of Price Administration was needed to reduce high rentals, “which,” Weber reported, “is forcing Brown & Root to lose many men each week.” Johnson would write instructions on the handling of each problem in the margins of the reports, or would reply by letter if his instructions were detailed. And he and Connally were also wrestling with the
larger political problem. In the first excitement of the outbreak of war, and Johnson’s going on active service, it had been assumed by everyone—including Johnson—that he would certainly not be running for the Senate nomination in the summer of 1942, and he had promised to support former GovernorJames V. Allred, a longtime ally, against Pappy O’Daniel. When Roosevelt had given Allred his blessing, Allred had formally entered therace. But now, as the May 31 filing deadline drew closer, although everyone else concerned still felt that Johnson could not possibly run, Johnson was no longer so certain. The upcoming election would fill one Texas senatorial seat for six years; the other was held byTom Connally, re-elected just two years before and as immensely popular as ever. Johnson felt, John Connally recalls, that “hemight not ever have
another chance as good as this.” Connally and Wirtz told him—Connally with the diffidence of a subordinate, Wirtz with the quiet certitude that made him the “only man Johnson listened to”—that running was not feasible; that, as Connally recalls, “war fever was extremely high at this time, patriotism was high, and it would have indicated he was more interested in his political future than the war.” But Johnson appears
to have been unwilling to let even a war defer his ambition; he kept trying to find an excuse to escape from his promise to Allred and to run. Although President Roosevelt made it clear that he wanted the Allred candidacy to go forward as agreed, so that there would be no split in the liberal vote, Johnson refused to drop the subject, and he and Connally analyzed the situation from every angle, day after day—“this went on for weeks,” Connally
recalls—and Johnson began quietly maneuvering to be “drafted” for the nomination.
He was also working diligently at obtaining promotion within the Navy. While he was not reporting often to his superior, Professor Barker, he was lobbying with Barker’s boss, Undersecretary Forrestal, for a job in which the roles of superior and subordinate would be reversed. And he wrote to Forrestal’s personal aide, Commander John Gingrich:
All over the place there is in evidence great need of positiveness, leadership, and direction. There is much that I should be doingthat I am not. One does not function well without authority and responsibility.
When and if you or the Boss run into a problem that requires energy, determination, and a modicum of experience give me the word. I need more work.
Lady Bird says that the period from January to April of 1942 was “a very frustrating time of high hopes which didn’t come to fruition.… That [was] a nonproductive few months, and he didn’t like it a bit.”A “constant stream of letters” was coming back to her, she says, “and after a while I could tell in his letters that there was an increasing frustration and feeling that he wasn’t
being useful, he wasn’t
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