Lieutenant Fletcher, Same, interpreter Hoan, and I went to the Seawolf helo pad with one case—72 rounds—of 40mm HE, fifty 40mm para flares, fifteen M-18A1 claymore mines, hand grenades, pop flares, smoke grenades, and two M-72 LAAWs. A Navy Sea Lord picked us up at Dong Tam and dropped the four of us off near Ba To’s hamlet at 1300.
After the usual courtesies and respectful bowing, Ba To and his hamlet defense personnel were absolutely ecstatic about the ordnance that we had brought him and his men. Their hamlet was overdue for an attack from the VC; Ba To knew it, and so did we.
Later, Ba To told us that the local VC District Civilian Proselytizing section had been telling the nearby Vietnamese people how to corrupt the upcoming government elections in October. They must have been trained by the Democrats back home, I thought. I later wrote a SEAL intelligence report on Ba To’s information.
When the Sea Lord returned to pick us up at 1345, I slipped Ba To his last month’s pay as an agent handler—8,000 piasters—in a sealed envelope and handed him a bottle of French cognac. That day was a good one for Ba To and his clan. They had enough ammunition to fight off a VC attack for at least one night and a bottle of encouragement for the twilight hours.
The Navy slick dropped Same and me off at Dong Tam while Dai Uy and Hoan went on a VR of the upper Cai Be district. I spent the rest of that afternoon and eveningworking on intel reports, OB card files, and so on, before I called it quits.
During the morning of August seventh, I worked on intel files, took pictures of our Kit Carson scouts for their dossiers, and later drove to My Tho to visit with Al and Jake at the Embassy House. There, I inquired about Tuoi’s imprisonment and status with MSS. Afterward, I stopped by PSB to see Chief Hue. I passed him some information that we had received from one of our agents about the exact location of a VC My Tho sapper. I also requested one PSB operative to accompany Mr. Kleehammer on his river op that night. Chief Hue was very happy to support us and handed me the name-trace results of our two hootch maids. As it turned out, one of the hootch maids had been arrested in May of ’68 and imprisoned for six months for working with and for the VC. I later approached her and asked her why she hadn’t mentioned this in her past-history statement. She gave me a confusing story about how the VC had killed her husband and then coerced her into serving the Marxist cause. In that light, I didn’t bother to question her any further. I later briefed the platoon to be very careful in all that we said in the presence of the hootch maids or the Kit Carson scouts and never to allow any Vietnamese in our intelligence room.
After lunch, Commander Del Guidice, Lieutenant Morrow, and Lieutenant (jg) Antrim of the SpecWar staff spent the afternoon inspecting and quizzing November Platoon. I briefed Commander Del Guidice and Lieutenant Morrow on
all
of our intelligence activities. They seemed properly impressed. Lieutenant Morrow was especially thoughtful and encouraging.
The next morning, August eighth, Dai Uy received word that our CBU-55B FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) bomb op for that afternoon and the following day had been cancelledbecause we had no fuses. However, Fletcher wasn’t easily discouraged.
Later, Eberle, Tam, the PSB operative, and I drove to My Tho to take care of myriad administrative details. After we had dropped off the PSB fellow, Eberle, Tam, and I drove down to the My Tho riverfront and bought fresh papaya and coconut drinks mixed with raw sugar. I also ate a large papaya. All three items cost me 250 P, or less than a dollar. We returned to Dong Tam by the river road, which was a little more dangerous but much shorter than the roundabout route.
The rest of the afternoon I piddled with my field gear, worked out with weights, and played horseshoes with the guys until we were rained out. After supper, at 1945, Dai Uy gave
After the usual courtesies and respectful bowing, Ba To and his hamlet defense personnel were absolutely ecstatic about the ordnance that we had brought him and his men. Their hamlet was overdue for an attack from the VC; Ba To knew it, and so did we.
Later, Ba To told us that the local VC District Civilian Proselytizing section had been telling the nearby Vietnamese people how to corrupt the upcoming government elections in October. They must have been trained by the Democrats back home, I thought. I later wrote a SEAL intelligence report on Ba To’s information.
When the Sea Lord returned to pick us up at 1345, I slipped Ba To his last month’s pay as an agent handler—8,000 piasters—in a sealed envelope and handed him a bottle of French cognac. That day was a good one for Ba To and his clan. They had enough ammunition to fight off a VC attack for at least one night and a bottle of encouragement for the twilight hours.
The Navy slick dropped Same and me off at Dong Tam while Dai Uy and Hoan went on a VR of the upper Cai Be district. I spent the rest of that afternoon and eveningworking on intel reports, OB card files, and so on, before I called it quits.
During the morning of August seventh, I worked on intel files, took pictures of our Kit Carson scouts for their dossiers, and later drove to My Tho to visit with Al and Jake at the Embassy House. There, I inquired about Tuoi’s imprisonment and status with MSS. Afterward, I stopped by PSB to see Chief Hue. I passed him some information that we had received from one of our agents about the exact location of a VC My Tho sapper. I also requested one PSB operative to accompany Mr. Kleehammer on his river op that night. Chief Hue was very happy to support us and handed me the name-trace results of our two hootch maids. As it turned out, one of the hootch maids had been arrested in May of ’68 and imprisoned for six months for working with and for the VC. I later approached her and asked her why she hadn’t mentioned this in her past-history statement. She gave me a confusing story about how the VC had killed her husband and then coerced her into serving the Marxist cause. In that light, I didn’t bother to question her any further. I later briefed the platoon to be very careful in all that we said in the presence of the hootch maids or the Kit Carson scouts and never to allow any Vietnamese in our intelligence room.
After lunch, Commander Del Guidice, Lieutenant Morrow, and Lieutenant (jg) Antrim of the SpecWar staff spent the afternoon inspecting and quizzing November Platoon. I briefed Commander Del Guidice and Lieutenant Morrow on
all
of our intelligence activities. They seemed properly impressed. Lieutenant Morrow was especially thoughtful and encouraging.
The next morning, August eighth, Dai Uy received word that our CBU-55B FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) bomb op for that afternoon and the following day had been cancelledbecause we had no fuses. However, Fletcher wasn’t easily discouraged.
Later, Eberle, Tam, the PSB operative, and I drove to My Tho to take care of myriad administrative details. After we had dropped off the PSB fellow, Eberle, Tam, and I drove down to the My Tho riverfront and bought fresh papaya and coconut drinks mixed with raw sugar. I also ate a large papaya. All three items cost me 250 P, or less than a dollar. We returned to Dong Tam by the river road, which was a little more dangerous but much shorter than the roundabout route.
The rest of the afternoon I piddled with my field gear, worked out with weights, and played horseshoes with the guys until we were rained out. After supper, at 1945, Dai Uy gave
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