Thereafter American history recalled the sinking of the battleship Maine , Teddy Roo-se velt’s Rough Riders, and the “Splendid Little War” against Spain. Yet the Spanish-American War had lasted only
months, while the Philippine Insurrection officially persisted for more than three years and involved four times as many American
soldiers. Regardless, few Americans paid attention to what had transpired in the Philippines until forty years later when
a new event, Arthur MacArthur’s son Douglas’s doomed defense of the islands against Japa nese invasion, superseded all else.
Subsequently, even military historians largely disregarded the Philippine Insurrection until American involvement in Vietnam
compelled renewed interest in how to fight Asian guerrillas.
By 1902, officers who served in the Philippines came to a near unanimous conclusion that commitment to a policy of attraction
had prolonged the conflict. Colo nel Arthur Murray expressed a combat soldier’s view. When he first assumed regimental command,
Murray opposed punitive measures because they caused innocent people to suffer and turned potentially friendly people into
insurgents. His experience on the ground changed his mind: “ 11 If I had my work out there to do over again, I would do possibly a little more killing and considerably more burning than
I did.” Most officers concluded that the key to a successful counterinsurgency was decisive military action employing severe
policies of chastisement. To their minds, the Filipino insurgents had given up the fight for the same reasons Robert E. Lee
surrendered: both were unwilling to endure the pain that continued resis tance would bring. As an inhabitant of Batangas explained
in an interview decades after the conflict had ended, “When the people realized that they were overpowered they were forced
to accept the Americans.” 12
When the Americans invaded in 1899, victory depended upon the suppression of violent opposition to the United States by replacing
the control exercised by the Philippine revolutionary government with American control. The American solution had three components.
First was to persuade the Filipinos that they were better off under the American vision of their future. This effort came
quite naturally because Americans sincerely believed it. In American minds, the Spanish had exploited the islands. The revolutionary
government continued both the exploitation and the entrenched, Spanish-style inefficiency and corruption. The Americans had
no particu-lar insight into Filipino “hearts and minds.” Without any extensive thought, they assumed that Filipinos—indeed,
all reasonable people—wanted what Americans wanted. So both military officers and civilian administrators worked hard to make
real physical improvements to show the Filipinos that their future was brighter under American rule. This notion guided the
policy of attraction.
The second component of American pacification emerged when American leaders realized that attraction alone was insufficient.
The military had to devise a way to end the insurgent hold on the people. In some areas the Americans were able to exploit
ethnic, religious, or class differences to enlist native support. With the help of collaborators, the Americans identified
and eliminated insurgent operatives. But in areas where resis tance was the fiercest and the fear of insurgent retaliation
too high, collaborators did not appear. So the American pacification effort forcibly separated the insurgents from the people
by concentrating them in the so-called protected zones.
The third component of American pacification was military field operations. The field operations were essential to prevent
guerrillas from massing against isolated American outposts and to deny them opportunities to rest and recover. Naturally most
officers preferred such operations because they better represented the war for which they
months, while the Philippine Insurrection officially persisted for more than three years and involved four times as many American
soldiers. Regardless, few Americans paid attention to what had transpired in the Philippines until forty years later when
a new event, Arthur MacArthur’s son Douglas’s doomed defense of the islands against Japa nese invasion, superseded all else.
Subsequently, even military historians largely disregarded the Philippine Insurrection until American involvement in Vietnam
compelled renewed interest in how to fight Asian guerrillas.
By 1902, officers who served in the Philippines came to a near unanimous conclusion that commitment to a policy of attraction
had prolonged the conflict. Colo nel Arthur Murray expressed a combat soldier’s view. When he first assumed regimental command,
Murray opposed punitive measures because they caused innocent people to suffer and turned potentially friendly people into
insurgents. His experience on the ground changed his mind: “ 11 If I had my work out there to do over again, I would do possibly a little more killing and considerably more burning than
I did.” Most officers concluded that the key to a successful counterinsurgency was decisive military action employing severe
policies of chastisement. To their minds, the Filipino insurgents had given up the fight for the same reasons Robert E. Lee
surrendered: both were unwilling to endure the pain that continued resis tance would bring. As an inhabitant of Batangas explained
in an interview decades after the conflict had ended, “When the people realized that they were overpowered they were forced
to accept the Americans.” 12
When the Americans invaded in 1899, victory depended upon the suppression of violent opposition to the United States by replacing
the control exercised by the Philippine revolutionary government with American control. The American solution had three components.
First was to persuade the Filipinos that they were better off under the American vision of their future. This effort came
quite naturally because Americans sincerely believed it. In American minds, the Spanish had exploited the islands. The revolutionary
government continued both the exploitation and the entrenched, Spanish-style inefficiency and corruption. The Americans had
no particu-lar insight into Filipino “hearts and minds.” Without any extensive thought, they assumed that Filipinos—indeed,
all reasonable people—wanted what Americans wanted. So both military officers and civilian administrators worked hard to make
real physical improvements to show the Filipinos that their future was brighter under American rule. This notion guided the
policy of attraction.
The second component of American pacification emerged when American leaders realized that attraction alone was insufficient.
The military had to devise a way to end the insurgent hold on the people. In some areas the Americans were able to exploit
ethnic, religious, or class differences to enlist native support. With the help of collaborators, the Americans identified
and eliminated insurgent operatives. But in areas where resis tance was the fiercest and the fear of insurgent retaliation
too high, collaborators did not appear. So the American pacification effort forcibly separated the insurgents from the people
by concentrating them in the so-called protected zones.
The third component of American pacification was military field operations. The field operations were essential to prevent
guerrillas from massing against isolated American outposts and to deny them opportunities to rest and recover. Naturally most
officers preferred such operations because they better represented the war for which they
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