Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect by Noam Chomsky, Reese Erlich Page A

world can expect / Reese Erlich ; foreword by Noam Chomsky.
    Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â pages cm
    Includes bibliographical references and index.
    ISBN 978-1-61614-948-2 (hardback) — ISBN 978-1-61614-949-9 (ebook)
    1. Syria—History—Civil War, 2011– 2. Syria—Politics and government—2000– 3. Protest movements—Syria—History—21st century. 4. Political violence—Syria—History—21st century. I. Title.
    DS98.6.E75 2014
956.9104'2—dc23
    2014015840
    Printed in the United States of America



The Arab Spring uprisings of early 2011 were highly exciting events of historic importance. Despite setbacks, significant gains have been achieved, and I suspect they will be lasting—very likely a prelude of more to come.
    In Tunisia, France was the dominant imperial power and supported the dictator strongly in ways that were a considerable embarrassment. A French cabinet minister was even vacationing in Tunisia while the popular uprising was expelling Ben-Ali. In Egypt, the dominant influences were the United States and the United Kingdom. Both supported the dictator, General Hosni Mubarak, until the very end.
    They then followed the standard script when a favored dictator faces internal problems: support him as long as possible, and when it no longer is—particularly if the business classes and the army turn against him—ship him off somewhere. Then be sure to issue ringing declarations about your love of democracy, and try to restore the old system as fully as possible.
    The United States supported the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi, which, crucially, left the military pretty much in charge. When the military overthrew the government and took full control in July 2013, the United States supported it with the usual formulaic comments about democracy.
    I was also excited about the uprising in Syria, although the vicious reaction of the Assad regime turned the early nonviolent demands for reform into a murderous civil war that is destroying the society. In chapter 5 , Reese Erlich shows that the conflict remains one between the Assad regime and major sectors of the Syrian people. But the war has become much more complicated because of intensified fighting between Sunni, Alawites, Shia, and other religious and ethnic groups, and the intervention into the conflict of jihadi groups with their own varying agendas.
    The Sunni-Shia split, of course, goes back to the founding days of Islam. The Alawites were an early offshoot of Shia Islam. Ottoman Turks and French colonialists sought to exploit religious differences to maintain their rule. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the occupation exacerbated low-level religious tensions, which have since been tearing Iraq apart and spread to the entire region—Syria in particular.
    There is perhaps some hope for a negotiated, political settlement of the Geneva type. Russia and the United States could bring pressure to bear to end the civil war. It is a very slim possibility, but it is actually the only one that I can see that has any hope of saving Syria.
    From the beginning, as Erlich shows in chapters 10 – 11 , the United States and Israel have been wary of the Syrian uprising. Assad had, in fact, been relatively cooperative with the United States in recent years, sharing intelligence, absorbing huge numbers of people fleeing from the wreckage of the US invasion of Iraq, and generally conforming to US demands.
    Interestingly, the United States and Israel did not undertake one fairly straightforward action that could have significantly helped the rebels. Israel could have mobilized its forces on the occupied Golan,which would have compelled Assad to move forces to the south, relieving pressure on the rebels. Israel is quite happy to see Arabs murdering each other, as Erlich documents in chapter 10 by interviewing Israeli analysts.
    The United States has been helping expedite some arms