HRC: State Secrets and the Rebirth of Hillary Clinton by Jonathan Allen, Amie Parnes Page A
Authors: Jonathan Allen, Amie Parnes
Tags: General, Biography & Autobiography
Ads: Link
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist assault on the United States into resentment.Bush’s numbers were pathetic in parts of the Arab and Muslim worlds: in Pakistan, a crucial partner in pursuing Al Qaeda, confidence in Bush’s foreign policy leadership stood at 7 percent during his last year in office and was just as bad throughout the Middle East, at 11 percent in Egypt, 7 percent in Jordan, and 2 percent in Turkey. The story wasn’t much better among America’s long-standing European allies: Bush stood at 16 percent in Great Britain and 13 percent in France.
Second, she had to rebuild the State Department’s influence within the American government, a project that required buy-in not only from the president but from the military and the CIA, which had taken big bites out of State’s portfolio during the Bush years, from diplomacy to development (which means distributingAmerican aid). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell had barely been on speaking terms, and Rumsfeld’s relationship with Condoleezza Rice wasn’t much better. With the leaders of the two agencies at odds, there had been no incentive for the rank-and-file workers at the State Department and the Pentagon to fight the natural tension between diplomats and soldiers.
Third, she had to win the confidence and rebuild the morale of the roughly seventy thousand people at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, many of whom felt beleaguered after years of playing second fiddle in the national security realm. Past secretaries had found it much easier to implement their agendas when the bureaucracy embraced them and much harder when the permanent class of foreign service and civil service officers rejected them. Hillary needed allegiance from the career folks to execute her plans.
Fourth, and most important should she choose to run for president in 2016, she had to fortify her own brand within the United States, a task that depended on her ability to execute the first three. Some of her aides vehemently dispute the idea that Hillary’s brand needed any burnishing at the time—her numbers had been on the rise since the end of the Democratic primary—but public opinion polls are fickle, and the ground she gained by endorsing Obama and joining his team could easily be lost if Americans decided she wasn’t up to the task of serving as America’s top diplomat.
One of her first moves in the transition was to court General David Petraeus, the architect of the successful counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq who was moving into a new role as the head of Central Command, the Pentagon’s unit overseeing both Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In that post, Petraeus would have significant say over American policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Hillary’s trusted lieutenant Richard Holbrooke would represent the State Department’s interests. Though they had enjoyed a good relationship during most of her time in the Senate—and Petraeus was a protégé of Hillary’s best uniformed pal, General Jack Keane—Hillary had rattled their friendship during an ArmedServices Committee hearing on Iraq in late 2007, just as the presidential campaign was heating up. She believed that Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker had delivered to the committee an overly rosy assessment of the success of the surge in Iraq. “I think the reports that you provide to us really requirethe willing suspension of disbelief,” she said. Hillary and Petraeus had sporadic contact over the next year, but the relationship had grown cold.
Hillary made rekindling that connection a high priority. Petraeus was stationed in Florida, but while he was in Washington at the end of 2008, in late November or early December, she invited him to the house on Whitehaven Street. Petraeus understood what was going on, that Hillary wanted to make a gesture of reconciliation because she would need his help. But regardless of the calculation
Second, she had to rebuild the State Department’s influence within the American government, a project that required buy-in not only from the president but from the military and the CIA, which had taken big bites out of State’s portfolio during the Bush years, from diplomacy to development (which means distributingAmerican aid). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell had barely been on speaking terms, and Rumsfeld’s relationship with Condoleezza Rice wasn’t much better. With the leaders of the two agencies at odds, there had been no incentive for the rank-and-file workers at the State Department and the Pentagon to fight the natural tension between diplomats and soldiers.
Third, she had to win the confidence and rebuild the morale of the roughly seventy thousand people at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, many of whom felt beleaguered after years of playing second fiddle in the national security realm. Past secretaries had found it much easier to implement their agendas when the bureaucracy embraced them and much harder when the permanent class of foreign service and civil service officers rejected them. Hillary needed allegiance from the career folks to execute her plans.
Fourth, and most important should she choose to run for president in 2016, she had to fortify her own brand within the United States, a task that depended on her ability to execute the first three. Some of her aides vehemently dispute the idea that Hillary’s brand needed any burnishing at the time—her numbers had been on the rise since the end of the Democratic primary—but public opinion polls are fickle, and the ground she gained by endorsing Obama and joining his team could easily be lost if Americans decided she wasn’t up to the task of serving as America’s top diplomat.
One of her first moves in the transition was to court General David Petraeus, the architect of the successful counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq who was moving into a new role as the head of Central Command, the Pentagon’s unit overseeing both Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In that post, Petraeus would have significant say over American policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Hillary’s trusted lieutenant Richard Holbrooke would represent the State Department’s interests. Though they had enjoyed a good relationship during most of her time in the Senate—and Petraeus was a protégé of Hillary’s best uniformed pal, General Jack Keane—Hillary had rattled their friendship during an ArmedServices Committee hearing on Iraq in late 2007, just as the presidential campaign was heating up. She believed that Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker had delivered to the committee an overly rosy assessment of the success of the surge in Iraq. “I think the reports that you provide to us really requirethe willing suspension of disbelief,” she said. Hillary and Petraeus had sporadic contact over the next year, but the relationship had grown cold.
Hillary made rekindling that connection a high priority. Petraeus was stationed in Florida, but while he was in Washington at the end of 2008, in late November or early December, she invited him to the house on Whitehaven Street. Petraeus understood what was going on, that Hillary wanted to make a gesture of reconciliation because she would need his help. But regardless of the calculation
Similar Books
