on, but theypretty much gave the FBI free rein to assist and help the families as long as they reported back to the embassy.â
If the kidnappers had already made a monetary demand, the negotiations would be fairly straightforward. The communicator would ask for proof of life, such as a video or photo of the victim. If the kidnappers refused, the negotiators would try to establish whether the victim was alive by asking questions that only the victim could answer. Once proof of life was established, the negotiations for money would begin. At the time of the kidnapping of Howes, Stansell, and Gonsalves, a common rule of thumb for Colombian kidnappings was that payment would likely be about 10 percent of the initial demand. Just under four years earlier, in a 1999 case, a $3.5 million ransom was paid for seven Canadians and one American oil worker seized in the Ecuadorian village of Tarapoaâthe original demand had been $35 million. The settlement was a tremendous boon for the kidnappers. In the aftermath, the kidnapping of foreigners turned into large-scale and well-planned operations for various guerrillas and paramilitary groups, and negotiations became increasingly difficult to manage because of the enormous stakes.
One of the most ill-fated cases that Noesner oversaw from his Quantico, Virginia, headquarters began on October 12, 2000, when nine foreign workers were captured in Ecuador near an oil-drilling area close to the Colombian border. Forty men, dressed in fatigues and armed with assault rifles, surrounded the site. The victimsâfour Americans, a New Zealander, an Argentinean, a Chilean, and two French citizensâwere forced into a helicopter, which the kidnappers then stole from the site and flew off to a jungle prison camp. Four days later, the two French helicopter pilots escaped. The seven remaining hostages had been working for three different corporations, each of which was represented by its own security company. The security companiesâ representatives had varying degrees of experience in hostage negotiations and held vastly differing views on how to proceed.
From the beginning, the negotiations were tense. The first contact from the kidnappers came over VHF radio to the large group of negotiators who were based in Quito, Ecuador. The group included an FBI agent, members of the Ecuadorian Police Anti-Kidnapping and ExtortionUnit, three security officials from Chile and Argentina, and three private security consultants representing Erickson Air-Crane, a heavy-lift helicopter company; Helmerich & Payne, Inc., an oil-drilling firm; and Schlumberger, a New York oil-services firm. The kidnappers identified themselves as the âFree America Commandoâ and launched into a tirade against the role of the United States in Colombiaâs narcotics industry. The kidnappers, who were believed to be associated with FARC guerrillas, demanded eighty million dollars for the release of the seven men. It was a ridiculous and unprecedented demand. The negotiators went quiet and then broke out in nervous laughter. As the bargaining began, tensions grew. âThere were arguments about who should lead the negotiations, what to offer, how quickly to offer it â¦Â all kinds of complications,â an employee of one of the security firms told a local reporter after the crisis was over.
By early November, with the kidnappers sticking to their eighty-million-dollar demand, the negotiating team began considering the risky option of a rescue attempt. A thirty-five-member team from the U.S. military (SOUTHCOM) concluded that a rescue attempt would be too risky because the hostages were being held in the deepest part of the Amazon jungle. For more than two months, the heated negotiations went back and forth. The team of quarreling negotiators hadnât received any proof of life, and the kidnappers werenât budging on their first demand. Negotiators from one of the security companies argued that
If the kidnappers had already made a monetary demand, the negotiations would be fairly straightforward. The communicator would ask for proof of life, such as a video or photo of the victim. If the kidnappers refused, the negotiators would try to establish whether the victim was alive by asking questions that only the victim could answer. Once proof of life was established, the negotiations for money would begin. At the time of the kidnapping of Howes, Stansell, and Gonsalves, a common rule of thumb for Colombian kidnappings was that payment would likely be about 10 percent of the initial demand. Just under four years earlier, in a 1999 case, a $3.5 million ransom was paid for seven Canadians and one American oil worker seized in the Ecuadorian village of Tarapoaâthe original demand had been $35 million. The settlement was a tremendous boon for the kidnappers. In the aftermath, the kidnapping of foreigners turned into large-scale and well-planned operations for various guerrillas and paramilitary groups, and negotiations became increasingly difficult to manage because of the enormous stakes.
One of the most ill-fated cases that Noesner oversaw from his Quantico, Virginia, headquarters began on October 12, 2000, when nine foreign workers were captured in Ecuador near an oil-drilling area close to the Colombian border. Forty men, dressed in fatigues and armed with assault rifles, surrounded the site. The victimsâfour Americans, a New Zealander, an Argentinean, a Chilean, and two French citizensâwere forced into a helicopter, which the kidnappers then stole from the site and flew off to a jungle prison camp. Four days later, the two French helicopter pilots escaped. The seven remaining hostages had been working for three different corporations, each of which was represented by its own security company. The security companiesâ representatives had varying degrees of experience in hostage negotiations and held vastly differing views on how to proceed.
From the beginning, the negotiations were tense. The first contact from the kidnappers came over VHF radio to the large group of negotiators who were based in Quito, Ecuador. The group included an FBI agent, members of the Ecuadorian Police Anti-Kidnapping and ExtortionUnit, three security officials from Chile and Argentina, and three private security consultants representing Erickson Air-Crane, a heavy-lift helicopter company; Helmerich & Payne, Inc., an oil-drilling firm; and Schlumberger, a New York oil-services firm. The kidnappers identified themselves as the âFree America Commandoâ and launched into a tirade against the role of the United States in Colombiaâs narcotics industry. The kidnappers, who were believed to be associated with FARC guerrillas, demanded eighty million dollars for the release of the seven men. It was a ridiculous and unprecedented demand. The negotiators went quiet and then broke out in nervous laughter. As the bargaining began, tensions grew. âThere were arguments about who should lead the negotiations, what to offer, how quickly to offer it â¦Â all kinds of complications,â an employee of one of the security firms told a local reporter after the crisis was over.
By early November, with the kidnappers sticking to their eighty-million-dollar demand, the negotiating team began considering the risky option of a rescue attempt. A thirty-five-member team from the U.S. military (SOUTHCOM) concluded that a rescue attempt would be too risky because the hostages were being held in the deepest part of the Amazon jungle. For more than two months, the heated negotiations went back and forth. The team of quarreling negotiators hadnât received any proof of life, and the kidnappers werenât budging on their first demand. Negotiators from one of the security companies argued that
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